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ABSTRACT
This study examines corporate governance modes in different
international business systems: the Anglo-Saxon, the Communitarian, and the
Asian/emerging business systems. The review of the literature covers the link
between corporate governance and the agency problem on the basis that the
latter is concerned with the conflicting interests between corporate managers
and its financiers. In this respect, the literature has come up with mechanisms
that can mitigate the negative effects of the agency problem such as incentive
contracts.
The study also addresses the conventional practices of corporate
governance as equivalent to practices of corporate finance. In this respect, debt
financing and equity financing are discussed as the two main financial tools
that shape the financial phase of corporate governance.
The management discretion, upon which financing mechanism(s) is
(are) to be relatively relied upon, is inherent the certain institutional
infrastructure that permits certain financing mechanism to relatively dominate
the other(s). In this concern, the study discusses the political-legal perspectives
of corporate governance.
Considering that different international business systems result in
different institutional structures and orientations, the financing mechanisms
available in each system create certain economic institutions such as the stock
markets, banks, ...etc. In this regard, the study discuses, from international
business perspectives, the basic corporate governance mechanisms: the stock
11
market governance, the banks governance and the role of the board of directors
in corporate governance.
The study extends the current domain of corporate governance to
address non-financial issues drawn from the literature of social-business
studies in international business context. These issues are corporate orientation
towards its stakeholders interests and corporate identity as determinants to the
corporate relative competitive position in the marketplace. In addition, from a
transitional markets point of view, the study examines what information can
be disclosed to company's stakeholders for monitoring its performance, thus
providing an evidence that helps corporate stakeholders to certify the
company's business affairs.
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INTRODUCTION
The emerging markets, in general, and the transitional emerging
markets, in particular, are to examine the most convenient and adaptable path
of development. The conventional modes of corporate governance structures
and mechanisms - as merely mechanisms of corporate finance - may not be
viable to emerging markets as long as their institutional infrastructure is not
well adaptable to accept this mode of governance. This necessitates to extend
the scope of the current practices of corporate governance to explore additional
viable alternatives that can be adaptable to the unique institutional
infrastructure of the emerging and the transitional markets. These alternatives
are to be examined in the developed countries first before recommending any
of them as a viable one(s) to the case of emerging markets.
Accordingly, this study extends the current domain of corporate
governance as equivalent to corporate finance and financial economics to
address related issues drawn from the literature of the social foundation of
business studies. These issues are corporate orientations toward its
stakeholders interests and the influential role of corporate identity as
determinants to corporate relative competitive position in the marketplace.
Finally, this necessitates to explore the approach that can be used to release
relevant information to corporate stakeholders. The approach used in this
study is the Z-Score model as one of the most common approaches used for
monitoring corporate performance.
Corporate orientation towards its stakeholders' interests, including its
shareholders' interests, is important to the emerging markets as long as their
13
unique institutional infrastructure is not well adaptable to accept the
shareholders-driven corporate governance mode.
Concerning the issue of 'Corporate Identity,' the inherent intangibility
of product and service quality, especially in the services and knowledge-based
industries, leads to problems in measurement costs. This necessitates a firm to
depend on its stakeholders as a convenient indices that determine corporate
identity in the marketplace.
Concerning the Z-score model as a monitoring tool, a firm in a
transitional emerging market should determine what information is to be
disclosed to its stakeholders so as to enhance its identity, then its relative
competitive advantage in the marketplace.
OBJECTIVES OF THE STUDY
As this study explores corporate governance issues in emerging
markets, it is to emphasis on some of the distinct aspects that can widen the
current domain of corporate governance practices to include issues that can be
relevant to emerging markets. Therefore, the general outline of the objectives
of this study is to provide some insights drawn from developed and matured
markets to both corporate managers and policy makers in emerging markets.
Specifically, the objectives of this study can be stated as follows.
1. Examine the current scope and practices of corporate governance on the
basis of the underlying institutional path-dependence embedded in running
business enterprises in different business systems.
2. Examine the non-financial aspects of corporate governance. This objective
is necessary for emerging markets, in general, and for transitional
14
emerging markets, in particular, on the basis that the financial aspects of
corporate governance have already been examined extensively in the
developed countries that are characterised by their mature markets. The
study, therefore, provides an extended governance structures that can be
adaptable to the emerging and transitional markets which are characterised
by their immature markets and institutions.
3. This study presents the extended and adaptable corporate governance
structures in an applied form which means that they are to be tested
empirically so that they can be of practical use.
METHODOLOGY OF THE STUDY
The methodology of this study consists of two main sections. The first
section discusses the types of research design used in the study. The second
section discusses the research methods used in the study. From a
methodological point of view, the classification of study types was developed
with reference to research design issues while research methods are concerned
primarily with the researcher's tasks, the work that will have to be done, the
techniques that are to be used and problems that may be encountered
(McBurney, 1998; Hakim, 1997). That is, the research methods focus on the
implementation stage, the procedures and tasks for translating the initial idea
into a plan of action, while the research design focuses on the design stage, so
study types are distinguished with reference to their purpose and intellectual
strategy rather than the methods or techniques used.
15
Strategy of the Research Types: An Overview
1. Theoretical Research and Policy Research
This study outline can be considered a theoretical research as much as
it is a policy research. The former provides knowledge for understanding and
the latter provides knowledge for action (Majchrzak, 1984; Hakim, 1997).
Accordingly, for better understanding of the different corporate governance
structures in the context of international business systems, a theoretical
research approach is adopted in the first part of the thesis. As the theoretical
research is concerned primarily with causal processes and explanation, the
various aspects of international corporate governance modes are discussed on
theoretical basis. These aspects are based primarily on the relevant previous
research findings that highlight the general scope and magnitude of corporate
governance practices in the international context.
Part two follows the approach of policy research as it provides
knowledge for action. As the theoretical research is selective in its nature
(Smelser, 1980), this requires the policy research to encompass a more diverse
variety of research including theoretical research. In this sense, part two
provides an empirical study that contributes to the theoretical and empirical
foundations of international corporate governance modes. Therefore, the
policy approach results in an actionable variables that extend the current
practices of corporate governance to include new perspectives: those that are
referred to as the 'competitiveness phase of corporate governance.' The
resulted actionable variables meet the diversity in interests of the corporate
governance constituencies, hence provide new perspectives that are to be
16
considered catalysts for change in practice. In this sense, chapters 3 and 4
address respondents as role-holders who are responsible for making corporate
decisions.
As the policy research is considered a multi-method or multi-level
study (Majchrzak, 1984), part two of this study is a multi-dimensional where it
investigates empirically three issues (chapters 3, 4, and 5) that broaden the
scope of the current practices of corporate governance. Specifically, chapters 3
and 4 test two issues on the corporate level, while chapter 5 tests an issue on
an international level. In this sense, the multi-dimension approach enhances
the probability of generalisation. As long as the policy research tends to focus
on testing whether a particular antecedent is necessary or sufficient cause of a
known behaviour or result(s), it requires that the dependent variable is
identified and the antecedents, or causes, are assessed (Miller, 1977).
Therefore, the way the research methods are conducted in those three chapters
is based mainly on the premises that the dependent factor - e.g., corporate
competitiveness - is, and should be, the ultimate aim of corporate decisions,
thus the results are to provide robust associations that address the underlying
factors that contribute to corporate competitiveness. In this sense, the policy
research approach tends to be more useful to policy interests as well as being
of greater disciplinary interest: the benefits are not mutually exclusive.
2. Qualitative and Quantitative Research
A qualitative research approach is adopted in this study. In theory,
qualitative research is concerned with individuals' own accounts of their
attitudes, motivations and behaviour. The qualitative research is used for
17
exploratory studies leading to more structured or quantitative studies
(Light and Pillemer, 1984). Moreover, the qualitative research can be
extremely valuable for identifying patterns of associations between the
underlying factors, subjects and issues of the study (Blaxter, 1979; Van
Maanen, 1979; Walker, 1985).
A qualitative research is basically developed in chapter 3 to address the
issue of the corporate stakeholders and its link to corporate performance and
corporate competitiveness. Specifically, qualitative research in conjunction
with quantitative research are carried out to link banks' orientation - as active
corporate monitors - towards the stakeholders theory to banks' performance.
The essence of this link is that the more the corporate monitor is active and
effectual, the higher its influence on corporate orientation, then on corporate
decisions.
A qualitative research approach is undertaken in chapter 4 as well. This
chapter discusses the role of intentional information released by a firm in
determining its identity, therefore, its competitive position in the market.
The quantitative research is carried out in chapter 5 through
undertaking Multivariate Data Analysis to build a Z-score model: a statistical
model that is used to monitor corporate performance (Altman, 1971; Deakin,
1972; Taffler, 1984). Nevertheless, Chapter 5 combines both of the
quantitative and qualitative research approaches since number of the
underlying qualitative issues and/or variables have not been tested
quantitatively before.
18
Types of Research Design used in the Study
The study of corporate governance in international context requires
careful examination of the most convenient research types that are to be
undertaken. In general, the international dimension of the study needs the
researcher to consider the differences between and among the various
international systems under consideration. Therefore, no one type of research
study is inherently inferior or superior to others as each does a particular job
(Hakim, 1997). In this sense, the study types undertaken in this study are as
follows.
1. Literature Reviews
Part one of this study outlines a review of the literature on corporate
governance. It is carried out as a part of ground-clearing and preparatory work
for the empirical part of the study. As long as the literature of corporate
governance itself is a multi-dimensional - as it is related to various
constituencies, hence addresses various issues - the research review is based
on an assessment of the relevant empirical research that highlights the aspects
of corporate governance modes in an international context.
The multi-dimensionality requires the research review to be multi-
disciplinary. That is, a review of the relevant research done in the literature of
finance, management, law, and economics is considered. In so doing, all of the
relevant journals, text books and reading books are considered. In general,
when reviewing a literature, it is recommended to cover both of the
contemporary and historical situation at the same time (Cooper, 1984).
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Accordingly, the focus is on the historical and current practices of corporate
governance in an international perspectives.
Specifically, the current practices of corporate governance are
discussed in chapters 1 and 2. Chapter 1 focuses on the current state of
corporate governance including agency problem, the financial structures of
corporate governance, i.e., the interaction between corporate managers and
financiers. In addition, chapter 1 highlights a brief outline of the political-legal
framework of the current state of corporate governance. Chapter 2 focuses on
the mechanisms through which corporate governance practices are undertaken.
The latter includes the role of the main financial institutions (the stock markets
and banks) in addition to the managerial role in corporate governance, that is,
the managers' influences on corporate financial and investment decisions.
The literature review is undertaken as a policy-oriented research review
which summarises the current and historical knowledge on the various phases
of corporate governance to show, then draw out, the relevant policy
implications that are in the interests of, and practical to, various interest groups
on the micro-level, i.e., the corporate managers, and the macro-level, i.e., the
policy makers. An important aspect of the literature review is addressing
issues which have re-emerged in the policy agenda and in the literature as
well.
2. Secondary Analysis
The researcher has carried out a secondary analysis to build a Z-score
model for the Egyptian Textile Sector. The model is used in practise to
monitor corporate performance (Altman, 1971; Deakin, 1972; Taffler, 1984).
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The detailed statistical methodology used for building the model is described
in chapter 5. As the secondary analysis involves the use of multiple datasets to
provide an overall assessment of findings on a topic (Stewart, 1984; Hakim,
1982, 1997), the Z-score model is built through combining various measures
of corporate performance. These measures, therefore, are considered a multi-
source dataset that includes those that are commonly used for measuring
corporate financial performance, those used for measuring corporate strategic
performance, basic measures of corporate governance, and those used for
measuring corporate international transitional performance.
Considering Egypt as an emerging country in transition, the Z-score
model developed in this study is to be used to monitor company's transitional
performance. In this sense, the ultimate aim is to make sure whether a
company's transitional performance is, or is not, showing to its stakeholders
those aspects of competitiveness. This is one of the core dimensions of part
two which is the empirical part of the study.
3. Analysis of Administrative Records
Administrative records are collections of documents containing mainly
factual information compiled in a variety of ways and used by organisations to
record the development and implementation of decisions and activities that are
central to their functions (Hakim, 1983, 1997; McBurney, 1998). This type of
research is employed in chapter 5 to build the Z-score model of the Egyptian
Textile Sector. The data was collected from many sources. Firstly, from
companies' annual reports. Secondly, from companies' performance reports
held by many authorities in Egypt. These authorities are the Ministry of
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Industry, the Public Sector Authority, Information and Decision Support
Center (IDSC), and the annual reports of the Textile Industry held by the three
Holding Companies to which the thirty one textile companies (the population
of this study) report to. In this case, the administrative records are used in their
own right for research on the policy process itself and in evaluation research.
In this sense, the Z-score model is to provide a basis for evaluating the
corporate performance in a transitional country like Egypt.
Theoretically, the analysis of administrative records may be similar to
secondary analysis. That is, any research uses information from administrative
records constitutes secondary analysis given that the primary use of the
records was for administrative purposes. Nevertheless, this similarity does not
exist in chapter 5 of this study considering that the data used to build the Z-
score model is not recorded specifically for research purposes rather it is
recorded as a by-product of the organisation's day to day activities. This issue
is to be emphasised because economic studies routinely use data collected by
others, thus raise questions concerning the quality and limitations of the data,
and frequently fail to distinguish between data from records and research data,
treating both as if they were interchangeably valid and appropriate for any
research analysis (Sayer, 1984; Griliches, 1985).
4. Ad Hoc Sample Survey
The development of sampling theory and techniques in the early part of
the twentieth century led to the sample survey becoming one of the most
widely used methods of data collection in social research (Hakim, 1997). In
general, The ad hoc survey is used increasingly for highly focused studies of
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particular social groups of narrowly defined issues. Procedures for identifying
and sampling minority groups become an integral part of survey design. The
term 'minority group' is used to refer to any target population for a survey
that is relatively rare because it has very specific characteristics or experiences
(Hakim, 1997). Sample surveys allow associations between factors to be
mapped and measured. The type of the ad hoc sample survey used in the study
is the 'Sample Survey on Role and Relationships.' It is discussed as follows.
Sample Survey on Role and Relationships
This type of survey seeks information about the individual
relationships and interactions or activities with other people. Here, the
informant is considered as a role-holder who can supply information about
social units, events and processes. This type of research is employed
particularly in chapter 3 where two roles were examined in the banking
industry. The first role is the one of Corporate Loans Managers as
representatives of, and responsible for, banks' loans and borrowing policy and
their relationships with the borrowers (firms). The second role is the one of the
Finance Directors as representatives of, and responsible for, the bank's
investment policy including investing part of the bank's capital in the stock
market which is considered a significant part of a bank's business.
The essence of these roles and relationships is that the Corporate Loans
Managers have a close relationship with the banks' borrowers (firms).
Furthermore, the former's roles and responsibilities in the banking business
encourage them to be active monitors of their clients performance. The same is
23
true for the Finance Directors where their responsibilities encourage them to
act in the best interests of the shareholders.
As a strategy of the research types, an important advantage of the ad
hoc sample survey is that it offers a multi-purpose research design with many
advantages for both policy research and theoretical research. That is, sample
survey provides transparency or accountability, the fact that the methods and
procedures are visible and accessible to other parties be they professional
colleagues, clients, or the public audience for the study. Regarding the
orientation towards the interests of corporate stakeholders, the transparency of
sample survey is very important aspect when surveying the respondents'
orientations. Therefore, the results of the survey can provide a basis for further
theoretical development and practical considerations for policy research.
It is worth to mention that although the ad hoc surveys are designed
and carried out on a 'one off basis, they can, nevertheless, be repeated at
irregular intervals of time, thus offering some of the advantages of regular
surveys for measuring changes over time. Accordingly, as the issue of
stakeholders theory is still debatable on different international business
systems, the ad hoc surveys can be replicated in other business systems or
other countries, thus provide a very good basis for international comparative
analysis.
The ad hoc survey data of banks' orientation towards the importance of
corporate stakeholders was supplemented by the addition of information from
administrative records that include measures of banks' performance. The aim
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is to measure the association between the banks' orientation and their
performance.
Multi-Disciplinary Research Design
The multi-disciplinary research is becoming an increasingly arid
acknowledgeable strand of research in the applied science, in general, and in
the social science as well. The multi-disciplinary-oriented research in social
sciences has contributed significantly to much understanding of the
individuals' behaviour and organisations - as social societies - on the ground
that the individuals and organisations are run, and constrained, by a nexus of
economic, political, legal, and social rules and/or norms. This is the underlying
practical contribution of the multi-disciplinary research on social sciences that
benefit the society.
The researcher extends the conventional domain of corporate
governance, as merely an equivalent to corporate finance, to explore additional
issues that stem from socio-economics and from the link between economics,
organisation and management. Specifically, part one reviews the literature on
corporate governance form financial, legal, managerial, and economic
perspectives. Chapter 3 discusses the issue of corporate stakeholders which is
linked to the literature of management and interrelationship between and
among economics, organisations and management. Chapter 4 discusses the
issue of corporate identity which is rooted in the literature of socio-economics.
Finally, chapter 5 discusses monitoring corporate transitional performance and
the underlying governance structures in transitional emerging markets which is
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closely linked to the international institutional differences that determine
international corporate governance modes.
As the core of this study is multi-disciplinary, it necessitates multi-
disciplinary research design. Accordingly, as it is mentioned above, the
researcher has followed more than one type of research study: the research
reviews, secondary analysis, qualitative in conjunction with quantitative
analysis, analysis of administrative records, and ad hoc sample survey.
Research Methods used in the Study
1. Research Methods used in Chapter 3
Sampling
The issue of corporate stakeholders versus shareholders orientation is
debatable in the literature of corporate finance, corporate governance, business
organisation, and corporate law. Furthermore, the debate is continued at the
level of the different business systems. This may add complexity regarding
what are the most practical individuals and/or institutions that are to be
targeted to assess the relative magnitude of corporate stakeholders.
Fortunately, this complexity can be mitigated by considering the fact
that banks are considered a very viable financial institutions. That is, banks are
a common factor, e.g., a viable source of finance, in different international
business systems. Banks provide loans to corporations which necessitates the
bank loans managers to play an active role in monitoring their clients
performance. In addition, quite apart from the differences between
international business systems, banks are entitled to invest part of their capital
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in the stock market and, at the same time, are entitled to provide an advice to
their clients who are willing to invest in the stock market.
Consequently, banks have good expertise in both monitoring corporate
performance and investing in the stock market. This close relationship
between banks and their corporate clients permits the researcher to explore
whether banks are able to support corporate stakeholders orientations. The
population of the study is the British banks and foreign banks located in the
UK. Within banks, as the major population of the study, two groups were
chosen: Corporate Loans Managers in the commercial banks and Finance
Directors in the investment banks. The first group is assumed to represent the
banks' role as corporate creditors. In this sense, the Corporate Loans Managers
are assumed to be a reliable source of information about the borrowing
companies. The second group is assumed to represent the banks' role as an
advisers and dealers in corporate stocks trading. In this sense, the Finance
Directors are assumed to be a reliable source of information about the
shareholders, therefore the stock market, trends of corporate securities trading.
In this regard, both of those two groups should be most knowledgeable about
the full range of measures adopted in the literature of this study (Boyd et al.,
1993). Therefore, the type of sampling used in this study is the 'purposive
sample.' The purposive sample is selected nonrandomly but for the particular
reasons mentioned earlier. In addition, the purposive sample has an advantage
over the other types of sampling that it can be considered to constitute a
population (McBurney, 1998), which is true in this study. The population of
this study, therefore, consists of 86 major commercial and investment banks:
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the major British and foreign banks operating in the UK. A list of the banks'
names and addresses is provided in the POLK World Banking Profiles (1996).
Questionnaire
The issue of the relative importance of corporate stakeholders and their
effects on corporate performance is examined by a questionnaire which is one
of the most widely methods used to survey people's opinions and attitudes
toward various issues and events (McBurney, 1998).
The objectives of the questionnaire used in the study: It is noted earlier that
the conventional corporate governance structures and practices in the Anglo-
Saxon business systems - as merely practices of corporate finance - stem from
the principal role the stock markets play to provide companies the needed
capital. It follows that the principal investors are shareholders. This is why the
problems of 'economic short-termism' centres around the shareholders' short-
term expectations and, consequently, the management's short-term objectives.
The main objective of the questionnaire, Therefore, is to avoid the
problems of short-termism and to extend the corporate governance time
horizon to address long-term objectives. In so doing, the researcher examines
the effects of corporate stakeholders' orientations, including corporate
shareholders' orientations, on corporate performance. The literature review of
stakeholder issues on corporate governance (Freeman and Reed, 1983;
Freeman and Evan, 1990; Ziegel, 1993; Karmel, 1993), corporate stakeholders
(Freeman, 1984; Cornell and Shapiro, 1987; Barton et al., 1989; Preston and
Sapienza, 1990; Savage eta!., 1991; Hill and Jones, 1992; Clarkson and Deck,
1993; Jones, 1995; Donaldson and Preston, 1995; Greenley and Foxall, 1997;
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Rowley, 1997; Mitchell et al., 1997), and corporate social responsibility
(Preston et al., 1978; Dierkes, 1980; Rey, 1980; Cochran and Wood, 1984;
Aupperle et al., 1985; McGuire et al., 1988; Clarkson, 1991, 1995) provided
the basis for developing the questionnaire used in this study. The questionnaire
contained 20 variables related to various aspects of those three fields of
research.
The questionnaire design: The questionnaire design encompasses only
closed-ended questions. There are two main reason behind this orientation.
Firstly, as it is cited in research methods textbooks (Fowler, 1988; Hellevik,
1984; Neuman, 1991; McBurney, 1998), the open ended questions are harder
to code. Secondly, as mentioned above, the data was collected from two
different persons in two different, and very important, positions in the banking
industry. In this case, if the open-ended question were included, the
questionnaire would have been long enough for each of them to spare time
answering the open-ended questions. This would have reduced the response
rate. Nevertheless, the closed-ended questions include sufficient options that
cover the wide range of the aspects included in the literature of corporate
governance in conjunction with corporate stakeholders and corporate social
responsibility. The format of the closed-ended questions are mutually
exclusive questions and Likert scale. Finally, the questions were developed in
a format that permits easy coding and using of statistical packages (Gaito,
1980), specially SPSS and STATGRAPHICS Plus 3.1.
The method of administering the questionnaire: The questionnaire was
mailed to the respondents: the Corporate Loans Managers in the commercial
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banks and the Finance Directors in the investment banks working for the major
British and foreign banks located in the UK (POLK, 1996). The questionnaire
was accompanied with a personal letter explains the nature of the research and
highlights the importance of banks as a viable source of financing, then
contributing significantly to economic development. The questionnaire was
sent to each bank's Corporate Loans Manager and Finance Director by mail.
Of the 86 major commercial and investment banks a total of 48 banks
responded representing a response rate of 55.8 per cent [Appendix (3-2)]. To
test for non-respondent bias, the results from the later respondents were
compared to those of the early respondents. (Filion, 1976; Armstrong and
Overton, 1977). The differences between respondents and non-respondents
were not statistically significant.
Statistical Analysis
The statistical tools used in chapter 3 are as follows (Daniel and
Terrell, 1995; Newbold, 1995; Berenson and Levine, 1996).
A) Simple Factorial ANOVA Analysis is carried out to test the sample
consistency. That is, to test whether there is a significant difference
between the two respondents (the Corporate Loans Mangers and the
Finance Directors), it requires to test whether their answers are relatively
drawn from the same work background.
B) `Chi-square test of goodness of fit' (x 2 ) is carried out to test data
normality. This test determines whether the sample data are compatible
with the hypothesis that they are drawn from a population that follows
some specified functional form, the uniform distribution or the normal
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distribution. The purpose of this test is to determine whether parametric or
non-parametric statistical methods are to be used.
C) Analysis of variance 'ANOVA' is carried out to test hypotheses about the
equality of two or more than population means. The type of the ANOVA
that is used is the one-way analysis of variance. The term one-way refers
to the fact that the classification of each survey unit ( and consequently the
measurement obtained) is done according to one criterion, i.e., the group to
which they belong to. In the case of this research population study, the
Corporate Loans Manager belongs to only one group in each bank, so does
the Finance Director. From the point of view of the assumptions
underlying ANOVA models, the researcher is using the random-effect
model on the basis that the respondents who returned the questionnaire
back represent a sample of the population. Here, the random-effect model
is to use the sample results to make an inference about the entire
population.
D) Principal Component Factor Analysis (varimax rotation) is carried out to
test the discriminant validity of the variables included in the study
(Podsakoff, and Organ, 1986). The object of the PCA analysis is to take a
number of variables and find combinations of these to produce indices, i.e.,
factors that are uncorrelated . The lack of correlation is a useful property
because it means that the factors are measuring different dimensions in the
data (Manly, 1998; Hair et al., 1995). Therefore, PCA is used to reduce the
dimensionality of the data set by appropriate transformation of the original
data. The original data variables are projected into new axes such that the
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new variables, orthogonal to each other and thus uncorrelated, are linear
combinations of the old (Taffler, 1981). The decision to include a variable
in a factor was based on factor loadings greater than 0.50 and all factors
whose eigenvalue was greater than one were retained in the factor solution
(Tabachnick and Fidel!, 1989; Hair et al., 1995).
E) Data reliability is tested by carrying out a Reliability Analysis (Alpha) to
determine the extent of the consistency and reliability of the data.
F) Stepwise Regression Analysis between banks performance measures and
their stakeholding orientation.
2. Research Methods used in Chapter 4
Sampling
The researcher is examining the issue of corporate identity in the
banking industry. As corporate identity is intangible on the basis that it is
related to the quality and content of a company's products and services, this
necessitates to look at an industry where knowledge is the primary assets. This
is true in the banking industry where banks' identity is determined by the
external intermediaries' assessment of the quality and content of the banks'
products and services which, in turn, depend upon the bankers' experience and
banking knowledge. Therefore, the central issue in examining banks identity is
related to what information a bank releases which can help external
intermediaries to do good assessment to the quality of the banks services, thus
can help in determining the bank's competitive advantage in the market place.
On that basis, the researcher has targeted the advertisements made by
banks in the Economist magazine during the year 1995. As the Economist
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magazine is issued on a weekly basis, banks advertisements are considered a
good source of the content and extent of information released about banks.
The type of sampling is random selection as long as most of the international
banks advertise regularly on this magazine, thus each bank advertisement has
the same probability to show up on each weekly issue.
Content Analysis
A content analysis is carried out to measure banks' drivers of identity
and their association with banks' performance. The sample survey is basically
carried out through analysing the content of the information mentioned in
banks' advertisements in the Economist magazine during the year 1995.
Considering intangibility is the central characteristics of banks, and most other
financial services industries, banks' advertisements provide a reliable source
of information about banks' indices of identity. In this case, the content of
banks' advertisements includes an indices (Jervis, 1985; Choi and Lee, 1996)
that can be used as drivers of banks' identity.
The researcher used the two types of content analysis, manifest content
and latent content (McBurney, 1998). The former is based on counting the
frequency of the indices of identity, and the latter is based on the assessment,
rather than only counting, of the magnitude of the indices of identity
mentioned in each advertisement. The manifest content provides the advantage
of easy coding the content, thus turns out to be more reliable. But the
frequency itself may not indicate the extent of emphasis if it is not mentioned
in the proper context. Therefore, one has to examine the magnitude of the
frequency by further undertaking latent content analysis in order to increase
33
the reliability of the content analysis. A Reliability Analysis for the collected
data is undertaken. More details about this test are mentioned below.
Statistical Analysis
The statistical tools used in chapter 4 are as follows (Daniel and
Terrell, 1995; Newbold, 1995; Berenson and Levine, 1996).
A) `Chi-square test of goodness of fit' (x 2
 ) is carried out to test data
normality.
B) Data reliability is tested by carrying out a Reliability Analysis (Alpha) to
determine the consistency of the data.
C) Stepwise Regression Analysis is carried out to determine which of the
independent variables (banks indices of identity) account(s) more for
variations in the dependent variable (performance measures). As this type
of the linear regression analysis is very useful for undertaking pure
description and extrapolations for examining new issues and relationships
(Hocking, 1976), it is, therefore, convenient to use for exploring the
importance of corporate identity as a determinant of the corporate relative
position both in the its local market and in international context.
D) TUKEY 'S HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test is used to carry out
pairwise comparisons between the three basic business systems: the
Anglo-Saxon, the Communitarian, and the Asian/emerging business
systems. The purpose of this test is to explore the extent to which banks in
two business systems converge in terms of their orientation towards the
emphasis on indices of identity. In this sense, the pairwise comparisons are
more helpful than the comparisons among the three systems at a time
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because the latter do not show specifically which business system is more
oriented towards each of the indices of identity.
3. Research Methods used in Chapter 5
Sampling
The issue of monitoring the transitional corporate performance in
Egypt as an emerging country is examined by building a Z-score model for
monitoring the transitional performance in the Textile Sector in Egypt. The
Textile Sector comprises thirty one companies of which seven companies were
privatised since the privatisation of the Egyptian public sector has formally
been undertaken by late 1991.
Archival Data
The data used in this study cover the period from 1992 to 1997. The
data was collected from many sources. Firstly, from companies' annual reports
and financial accounts. Secondly, from companies' performance reports held
by many authorities in Egypt. These authorities are the Ministry of Industry,
The Public Sector Authority, Information and Decision Support Center
(IDSC), and the annual reports of the Textile Industry held by the three
Holding Companies to which the thirty one textile companies (the population
of this study) report to.
The data needed to build the Z-score model is basically to be in the
form of ratios with different time and scale dimensions. The data available
from the records of the Egyptian Textile Sector were neither in the required
form nor classified to be compatible with those ratios required to build the Z-
score model. Therefore, the researcher has undertaken numerous of
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calculations to put the available data in the required forms. Nevertheless, all of
the data is formal data which means that it complies with the Egyptian
regulations and legislation. In addition, in terms of consistency and
completeness, the data is very relevant to the nature and the use of the model
in practise, e.g., monitoring corporate performance in a transitional country.
Statistical Analysis
The three main statistical tools used in chapter 5 are as follows.
1. 'Chi-square test of goodness of fit' (x 2
 ) is carried out to test data
normality.
2. Principal Component Analysis (PCA-varimax rotated) is carried out to test
the discriminant validity of the variables included in the study (Podsakoff,
and Organ, 1986).
3. Discriminant analysis, which is the most common technique used to
develop Z-score models, is carried out. The problem that is addressed with
discriminant analysis is how well it is possible to separate two or more
groups of observations (i.e., individuals, companies, ...etc.), given
measurements for these observations on several variables (Manly, 1998;
Hair et al., 1995). Therefore, the discriminant analysis is a statistical
technique used to classify an observation into one of several a periori
groupings dependent upon the observation's individual characteristics. It is
used primarily to classify and/or make predictions in problems where the
dependent variable appears in qualitative form, e.g., male or female,
bankrupt or non-bankrupt, privatised, non-privatised,...etc.
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The discrimainant analysis has been initially utilised by Altman (1968,
1971, 1977; 1981) by building a Z-Score model to discriminate between
bankrupt and non-bankrupt firms. In the literature of finance, interests in this
model, and the methodology itself, have continued in the work of Wilcox
(1971), Edmister (1972), Deakin (1972), Blum (1974), Sinkey (1975), Taffler
(1978, 1982, 1983), and Sudarsanam (1981).
Discriminant Function Analysis
It is sometimes useful to be able to determine functions of the variables
X 1 , X 2 , ...,X p that in some sense separate the m groups as well as is
possible. The simplest approach involves taking a linear combination of the X
variables
Z=a, X I +a2X2+...+apXp
for this purpose, in such a way that Z reflects group differences as much as
possible. Groups can be well separated using Z if the mean value changes
considerably from group to group, with the values within a group being fairly
constant. One way to choose the discriminant coefficients a 1 , a 2 ,..., a p in
the index is therefore so as to maximise the F ratio for a one-way analysis of
variance. Hence a suitable function for separating the groups can be defined as
the linear combination for which the F ratio is as large as possible. When this
approach is used, it turns out that it may be possible to determine several linear
combinations for separating groups. In general, the number available is the
smaller of and m-1. This is one of the advantages of the linear discriminant
P
analysis: that is the reduction of the analyst's space dimensionality, i.e., from
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the number of different independent variables X to m-1 dimension (s). As this
study is concerned with only two groups, consisting of privatised companies
on one hand, and non-privatised companies on the other hand, the resulted Z
function is only one function (i.e., one-dimension analysis).
When the discriminant coefficients are applied to the actual ratio, a
basis for classification into one of the mutually exclusive groupings exists. In
this regard, the discriminant analysis technique has the advantage of
considering an entire profile of characteristics common to the relevant
observations (i.e., companies), as well as the interaction of these
characteristics. The linear discriminant analysis has also the advantage of
yielding a model with a relatively small number of selected measurements
which have the potential of conveying a great deal of information (Altman,
1968, 1971, 1977).
The Z-score Model
The linear discriminant function with its Z index (Z model) is derived
by using a Stepwise Linear Discriminant Analysis provided on the
STATGRAPHICS Plus 3.1 package and SPSS package. This procedure, using
a stepwise selection algorithm, is designed to develop a set of discriminating
functions which can help predict grouping based on the values of other
quantitative variables. As the total number of companies under consideration
is thirty one companies, thirty one cases are used to develop a model to
discriminate among the two levels of grouping, the privatised companies and
non-privatised companies.
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CONTRIBUTION OF THE STUDY
This study contributes to the literature of corporate governance through
extending the current practices of corporate governance to address some of the
non-financial aspects. Specifically, the contribution of this study can be stated
as follows.
1. This study extends the domain of corporate governance by addressing
some of the non-financial aspects of corporate governance such as
corporate stakeholders orientation and corporate identity which are
empirically examined. Therefore, they provide alternatives governance
structures that are drawn from the literature of international business,
sociology and economics. These issues are important to emerging markets,
particularly at the level of public policy, considering that the institutional
infrastructure in these markets is not relatively as strong as those of the
developed countries.
2. This study contributes to doing business in emerging markets, particularly
transitional emerging markets by building a statistical tool (Z-score model)
for monitoring corporate transitional performance. Once again, this
approach is very important to emerging market in transition considering
that any institutional change requires monitoring the path of change in the
first place.
LIMITATIONS OF THE STUDY
In general, this study is primarily concerned of examining non-
financial aspects of corporate governance. As it is mentioned above this study
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has considered three basic issues that present alternatives governance
structures, e.g., corporate stakeholders orientation, corporate identity, and
monitoring corporate performance in transitional emerging market.
Accordingly, the limitations of this study can be stated as follows.
1. This study does not examine the financial aspects of corporate governance.
But the literature review is to draw some lessons from the financial aspects
of corporate governance in international context.
2. Concerning the international perspectives of corporate governance
structures, this study focuses on the U.S. and the UK as an examples of the
Anglo-Saxon business system, Germany as an example of the
Communitarian business system, and Japan as an example of the Asian
business system. This classification is mot mutually exclusive considering
that other countries have business aspects similar to those considered in
this study. Nevertheless, the countries considered in this study show three
distinct corporate governance aspects that exist in many other countries or
may alternatively be adopted by other countries.
3. The three issues examined in this study are three alternative governance
orientations out of other non-financial governance structures such as the
internal aspects of corporate governance.
4. The Z-score model, as an approach used for monitoring corporate
transitional performance in transitional emerging market, is applied to the
Textile Sector in Egypt, which is basically a manufacturing sector.
Nevertheless, this approach can be adopted in other business sectors such
as the service industries.
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PART ONE
THE CORNERSTONES OF CORPORATE GOVERNANCE:
PERSPECTIVES FROM INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS
SYSTEMS
41
INTRODUCTION
This part explores the current practices of corporate governance with
special focus on the differences between business systems. It discusses the
interrelationships between the agency problem and the corporate governance.
In addition, it discusses the corporate governance mechanism as equivalent to
practices of corporate finance. As the underlying current practices of corporate
governance are inherent in the political-legal institutional orientations, the
brief discussion of the political and legal perspectives of corporate governance
is also discussed.
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Chapter 1
Corporate Governance: An Overview
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1.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces the underlying cornerstones of the current
corporate governance practices. It first highlights some of the most common
definitions of corporate governance. Then, it explains, in brief, the link
between the 'agency problem' as it is simply a matter of conflicts of interests
and the essence of 'governance.'
The chapter, then explores the financial consequences of the agency
problem on the basis that the conflicts of interests between corporate managers
and the owners of capital lead the former to favour the sources of financing
that minimise the level of conflicts. In this concern, the use of financial tools,
most commonly used in the literature of corporate finance, to exercise
governance of a firm is affects by the political institutions orientations toward
running the economy. This is why the current practices of corporate
governance is considered as equivalent of practices of corporate fiancee.
Finally, the chapter discusses the consequences of the agency problem
from a legal point of view. This discussion is to explore whether corporate law
recognises the conflicts of interests, or the agency problem, in the best interest
of the firm.
1.2 Definitions of Corporate Governance
The traditional literature of corporate governance provided number of
definitions. Shleifer and Vishny (1997) state that corporate governance deals
with the ways in which suppliers of finance to corporations assure themselves
of getting a return on their investments. How do the suppliers of finance get
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managers to return some of the profits to them? How do they make sure that
managers do not steal the capital they supply or invest it in bad projects?.
Sheikh and Chatterjee (1995) define corporate governance as it is
concerned with establishing a system whereby directors are entrusted with
responsibilities and duties in relation to the direction of a company's affairs. It
is founded on a system of accountability primarily directed toward the
shareholders in addition to maximising shareholders' welfare.
Tricker (1984) argues that some of the management literature has
confused the distinction between 'management of a company' and the
'governance of a company.' The management role is primarily perceived to be
running the business operations efficiently and effectively which includes the
product, design, procurement, personnel, management, production, marketing
and finance functions within the boundaries of the company under which it
trades.
However, Tricker states that the governance role is not concerned with
running the business of the company, per se, but with directors giving overall
direction to the enterprise, with overseeing and controlling the executive
actions of management and with satisfying legitimate expectations for
accountability and regulation by interests beyond the corporate boundaries: 'if
management is about running business; governance is about seeing that it is
run properly. All companies need governing as well as managing.' Therefore,
the process of corporate governance comprises four main principal activities,
namely:
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1. Direction, which is concerned with formulating the strategic direction for
the future of the enterprise in the long-term.
2. Executive action applies to involvement in crucial executive decisions.
3. Supervision involves the monitoring and oversight of management
performance.
4. Accountability, which is concerned with recognising responsibilities to
those making a legitimate demand for accountability.
Maw (1994) suggests that some commentators take a very narrow view
of the concept of corporate governance by referring to it as a 'fancy term' for
the way in which directors and auditors handle their responsibilities toward
shareholders. Others, however, use the expression as if it is synonymous with
shareholder democracy. According to Maw: "Corporate governance is a topic
recently conceived, as yet ill-defined, and consequently blurred at the edges."
Sheridan and Kendall (1992) have advocated another definition of the
term 'corporate governance'. They believe that good corporate governance
consists of a system of structuring, operating and controlling a company in
order to achieving the following objectives:
1. To fulfil the long-term strategic goals of the owners which, after survival,
may consist of building shareholder value or establishing a dominant
market share or maintaining a technical lead in a chosen sphere, or
something else, but will certainly not be the same for all organisations.
2. To consider and care for the interests of employees, past, present and
future, which comprises the whole life-cycle including planning future
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needs, recruitment, training, working environment, severance and
retirement procedures, through to looking after pensioners.
3. To take account of the needs of the environment and the local community,
both in terms of the physical effects of the company's operations on the
surrounding area and the economic and cultural interactions with the local
population.
4. To work to maintain excellent relations with both customers and suppliers,
in terms of such matters as quality of service provided, considerate
ordering and account settlement procedures.
5. To maintain proper compliance with all the applicable legal and regulatory
requirements under which the company is carrying out its activities.
Sheridan and Kendall (1992) believe that a well-run organisation must
be structured in such a way that all the above requirements are catered for and
can be seen as operating effectively by all the interest groups concerned. The
concept of corporate governance advocated by Sheridan and Kendall embraces
a wide spectrum of responsibilities which directors have toward their
shareholders and other 'stakeholders' in the company including employees,
customers, creditors, and suppliers. It appears from the latter definition that
corporate governance is a wider concept. It includes the financial aspects of
corporate governance, namely directors responsibility for the company's
financial situation which in turn requires directors to have regard to the
interests of the company's creditors and shareholders. Directors also have a
broader responsibility concerning payment of excessive remuneration. It is
maintained that the concepts of corporate governance also include the social
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responsibilities of companies toward other stakeholders who are otherwise
known as the potential claimants on the corporation.
Monks and Minow (1995) define corporate governance as "The
relationship among various participants in determining the direction and
performance of corporations." They define the primary participants as the
shareholders, the management (led by the chief executive officer) and the
board of directors.
It is obvious that the definitions mentioned above incorporate both the
financial and non-financial aspects of corporate governance. The definition
presented by Sheridan and Kendall (1992) is more wider in its scope than the
other definitions because it incorporates stakeholders' interests with the
companies long-term performance. Therefore, this definition is the one
adopted in this study.
1.3 Corporate Governance and the 'Agency Theory'
Corporate governance is viewed in the literature as a straightforward
agency perspectives, sometimes referred to as separation of ownership and
control, i.e., separation of finance and management (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). Therefore, the fundamental question of corporate governance is how to
assure financiers that they get a return on their financial investment. The
literature of corporate governance shows that the agency problem is serious.
That is, possibilities of managers' discretion among various types of investors
are high. Managers' discretion may take many forms such as gaining private
benefits from accepting projects with negative, or at least non-competitive,
NPV and the discretion towards allocating the firm's returns among the
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various types of financiers. In some cases, the managers' discretion may reach
to the extent of consuming the firm's resources for achieving private benefits
such as putting high stress on perquisites and/or, in some extremes, stealing
from the firm.
1.3.1 The nature of the agency problem
The agency problem has provided the literature of corporate
governance with a clear evidence that when it is less likely to put co-operation
and co-ordination mechanisms in place, conflicts between managers' and
capital suppliers' interests arise. The literature provides number of studies that
present evidence that when managers have a stake or benefits in the firm, both
of the firm managers' and shareholders' interests align. For example, Walkling
and Long (1984) find that managerial resistance to value-increasing take-overs
is less likely when top managers have a direct financial interest in the take-
over deal via share ownership or golden parachutes, or when top managers are
more likely to keep their jobs.
In contrast, when managers' interests are disregarded, they protect
themselves at the expense of shareholders interests. For example, Ryngaert
(1988) and Malatesta and Walkling (1988) find that, for firms who have
experienced challenges to management control, the adoption of poison pills -
which are devices to make take-overs extremely costly without target
management's consent - also reduce shareholder wealth. These examples
support the idea that having a stake in a firm motivate owners of the stakes to
align their interests for the benefits of the whole firm.
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The above reveals the conclusion that when managers have a stake in
the firm, the agency theory turns out to be of little help in explaining the
relationship between managers and shareholders. That is, a co-operative or a
mutual benefits mechanism replaces the agency theory in explaining that
relationship.
1.3.1.1 The standard models of agency
The most common standard models of agency embodied in the
literature are: Contracts, Managerial discretion, and Incentive contracts. The
following sections summarise each of them.
1.3.1.1.1 Contracts
The agency problem is an essential element of the so-called contractual
view of the firm, developed by Coase (1937), Jensen and Meckling (1976),
and Fama and Jensen (1983a,b). The essence of the agency problem is the
separation of management and finance or as it is referred to in the literature
'separation of ownership and control'. An entrepreneur, or a manager, raises
funds from investors either to put them in productive use or to cash out his
holdings in the firm. The financiers need the manager's specialised human
capital to generate returns on their funds. The managers need the financiers'
funds, since he either does not have enough capital of his own to invest or else
wants to cash out his holdings. But how can financiers be sure that, once they
sink their funds, they get anything but a worthless piece of paper back from
the manager? The agency problem in this context refers to the difficulties
financiers have in assuring that their funds are not expropriated or wasted on
unattractive projects.
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In most general terms, the financiers and the manager sign a contract
that specifies what the manager does with the funds, and how the returns are
divided between him and the financiers. Ideally, they would sign a complete
contract that specifies exactly what the manager does in all states of the world
and how the profits are allocated. The trouble is, most future contingencies are
hard to describe and foresee and as a result complete contracts are not
technologically feasible. But, practically, the uncertainty surrounding business
decisions makes the future not easy to foresee by both of the managers and the
financiers, hence, the contracts between them are to be incomplete.( Allen and
Lueck, 1995; Al-Najjar, 1995; Hart, 1995; Aghion and Bolton; 1992; Bolton
and Scharfstein, 1990). Therefore, because of these problems in designing
their contracts, the manager and the financiers have to allocate residual control
rights, i.e., the rights to make decisions in circumstances not fully foreseen by
the contract (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). The theory of
ownership addresses the question of how these residual control rights are
allocated efficiently.
The literature states that it is not possible for the financiers to have
residual rights. As Shleifer and Vishriy (1997) demonstrate, one could imagine
a contract in which the financiers give funds to the manager on the condition
that they retain all the residual control rights. Any time something unexpected
happens, they get to decide what to do. But it is less likely this may quite work
because the financiers are not qualified or informed enough to decide what to
do- the very reason they hired the manager in the first place. As a
consequence, the manager ends up with substantial residual control rights and
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therefore discretion to allocate funds as he chooses. There may be limits on
this discretion specified in the contract and much of the corporate governance
deals with these limits, but the fact is that managers do have most of the
residual control rights.
In practice, the situation is more complicated. First, the contracts that
the managers and investors sign can not require too much interpretation if they
are to be enforced by outside courts. In the United States, the role of courts is
more extensive than anywhere else in the world, but even there the so-called
'business judgement rule' keeps the courts out of the affairs of companies
(Charkham, 1994). In much of the rest of the world, courts only get involved
in massive violations by managers of investors' rights (e.g., erasing
shareholders' name from the register). Second, in the cases where financing
requires collection of funds from many investors, these investors themselves
are often small and too poorly informed to exercise even the control rights that
they actually have. The 'free rider problem' faced by individual investors
makes it uninteresting for them to learn about the firms they have financed, or
even to participate in the governance process (Charkham, 1994; Shleifer and
Vishny, 1997). As a result, the effective control rights of the managers - and
hence the room they have for discretionary allocation of funds - end up being
much more extensive than they would have been if courts or providers of
finance became actively involved in detailed contract enforcement.
1.3.1.1.2 Managerial discretion
As managers, practically, end up with significant control rights over
how to allocate investors' funds, managers can expropriate investors. In many
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pyramid schemes, for example, the organisers end up absconding with the
money. Managerial expropriation of funds can also take more elaborate forms
than just taking the cash out, such as transfer pricing. For example, managers
can set up independent companies that they own personally, and sell the output
of the main company they run to the independent firms at below market prices.
In the Russian oil industry, such sales of oil to manager-owned trading
companies (which often do not even pay for the oil) are evidently common. An
even more dramatic alternative is to sell the assets of the company to other
manager-owned firms at below market prices. For example, the Economist
(June 1995) reports that Korean chaebol sometimes sell their subsidiaries to
the relatives of the chaebol founder at low prices. Zingales (1994) describes an
episode in which one state-controlled Italian firm sold some assets to another
at an excessively high price. The buying firm, unlike the selling firm, had a
large number of minority shareholders, and these shareholders got
significantly diluted by the transaction. In short, straight-out expropriation is a
frequent manifestation of the agency problem that financiers need to address.
In many countries today, the law protects investors better than it does
in Russia, Korea, or Italy. In the United States, for example, courts try to
control managerial diversion of company assets to themselves, although even
in the United States there are cases of exception that take the form of executive
compensation or transfer pricing. For example, Victor Posner, a Miami
financier, received in 1985 over $8 million in salary from DWG, a public
company he controlled, at the time the company was losing money (Shleifer
and Vishny, 1997).
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Managers' expropriation of shareholders may take a serious form:
managers entrenching themselves and staying on the job even if they are no
longer competent or qualified to run the firm (Shleifer and Vishny, 1989). As
argued in Jensen and Ruback (1983), poor managers who resist being replaced
might be the costliest manifestation of the agency problem. Managerial
opportunism, whether in the form of expropriation of investors or of
misallocation of company funds, reduces the amount of resources that
investors are willing to put up ex ante to finance the firm (Williamson, 1985;
Grossman and Hart, 1986). Much of the subject of corporate governance deals
with constraints that managers put on themselves, or that investors put on
managers, to reduce the ex post misallocation and thus induce investors to
provide more funds ex ante. Even with these constraints, the outcome is in
general less efficient than would occur if the manager financed the firm with
his own funds.
These constraints have a legal perspective: what is so-called
'managers' "duty of loyalty" to shareholders. This duty may prevent managers
from exerting obvious deviation from shareholders' interests. While it is
difficult to describe exactly what this duty obligates the managers to do (Clark,
1985), threats to take value-reducing actions unless one is paid off would
surely violate this duty. But this only raises the question of why this legal duty
exists at all if it prevents efficient ex post bargaining between managers and
shareholders. As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) indicate, the reason for
introducing the duty of loyalty is probably to avoid the situation in which
managers constantly threaten shareholders, in circumstances that have not
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been specified in the contract, to take ever less efficient actions unless they are
bribed not to. If the duty of loyalty to shareholders prevents the managers from
being paid off for not taking self-interested actions, then such actions will be
taken even when they benefit managers less than they cost shareholders.
1.3.1.1.3 Incentive contracts
When contracts are incomplete and managers possess more expertise
than shareholders, managers typically end up with the residual rights of
control, giving them enormous latitude for self-interested behaviour. In some
cases, this results in managers taking highly inefficient actions which cost
investors far more than the personal benefits to the managers. Moreover, the
managers' fiduciary duty to shareholders makes it difficult to contract around
this inefficiency ex post. A better solution is to grant a manager a highly
contingent long term incentive contract ex ante to align his interests with those
of investors. While in some future contingencies the marginal value of the
personal benefits of control may exceed the marginal value of the managers'
contingent compensation, such instances will be relatively rare if the incentive
component of pay is substantial. In this way, incentives contracts can induce
the manager to act in investors' interest without encouraging blackmail.
Although such contracts may be expensive if the personal benefits of control
are high and there is a lower bound on the manager's compensation in the bad
states of the world. Typically, to make such contracts feasible, some measures
of performance that is highly correlated with the quality of the manager's
decision must be verifiable in court.
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Incentive contracts can take a variety of forms, including share
ownership, stock options, or a threat of dismissal if income is low (Jensen and
Meekling, 1976; Fama, 1980; Eisenhardt, 1989). The optimal incentive
contract is determined by the manager's risk aversion, the importance of his
decisions and his ability to pay for the cash flow ownership up front (Ross,
1973; Stiglitz, 1975). Incentive contracts are indeed common in practice. A
vast empirical literature on incentive contracts in general and management
ownership in particular dates back at least to Berle and Means (1932), who
argue that management ownership in large firms is too small to make
managers interested in profit maximisation. Kaplan (1994a,b) in his
comparative studies shows that the sensitivity of pay (and dismissal) to
performance is similar in the United States, Germany and Japan.
Incentives contracts may not be an efficient solution to managers'
expropriation of shareholders. In fact, high powered incentive contracts create
enormous opportunities for self-dealing for the managers, especially if these
contracts are negotiated with poorly motivated boards of directors rather than
with large investors. Managers may negotiate for themselves such contracts
when they know that earnings or stock prices are likely to rise, and this may
raise a possibility for manipulating accounting numbers and investment policy
to increase their pay. For example, Yermack (1997) finds that managers
receive stock option grants shortly before good news announcements and
delay such grants until after bad news announcements. Therefore, these results
suggest that options are often not so much an incentive device that can prevent
managers from self-dealing, thus expropriation of shareholders.
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The above high possibilities of managers' opportunism, especially with
high powered incentive contracts, led the courts and regulators to look at these
contracts with suspicion. Fortunately, in the United States, managers'
opportunism, or self-dealing, and pay are ruled by courts, although the
'business judgement rule' that govern the attitude of American courts toward
agency problems keeps the courts out of corporate decisions.
1.4 The Financial Structure of Corporate Governance
The financial structure of corporate governance describes the financial
tools available to finance the corporate operations and the financial
mechanisms through which the governance process is carried out. The
conventional tools are Debts Financing and Equity Financing. The following
sections describe the nature and the scope of each.
1.4.1 Corporate governance through Debt Financing
This mechanism is a financing decision, made by a firm, to choose
between debts and equities for financing its operations. The choice of one of
them, or even both, subjects the firm to specific control rights practised by the
financiers. Firstly, debt is a contract in which a borrower gets some funds from
the lender, and promises to make a prespecified stream of future payments to
the lender. In addition, the borrower typically promises not to violate a range
of covenants such as maintaining the value of the assets inside the firm (Smith
and Warner, 1979). If the borrower violates any of covenants, and especially if
he defaults on a payment, the lender gets certain rights such as the ability to
repossess some of the firm's assets (collateral) or the opportunity to throw the
firm into bankruptcy. An essential feature of debt, then, is that a failure by the
57
borrower to adhere to the contract triggers the transfer of some control rights
from him to the lender.
Gale and Hellwig (1985) consider models in which the borrower can
abscond with the profits of the firm. However, if the lender is not repaid, he
has the right to investigate the books of the firm, and grab its cash before the
borrower can steal it. Thus failure to repay triggers the transfer of control over
the assets from the borrower to the lender. Gale and Hellwig (1985) show that
the optimal contract that minimises the expected investigation costs is a debt
contract. Grossman and Hart (1982) and Jensen (1986) model the role of debt
in committing the payment of free cash flows to investors. In Grossman and
Hart (1982), in particular, default enables creditors to deprive the manager of
the benefits of control. Myers and Majluf (1984) show that, because
management has superior information, external finance is costly. Moreover,
they argue that this adverse selection problem is minimised by the issuance of
the "safest" security, i.e., the security whose pricing is least sensitive to the
manager's private information. Thus highly rated debt with a fairly certain
payoff stream is issued before equity, since equity is difficult to price without
knowing the precise value of the firm's assets in place and future growth
opportunities. Debt is particularly easy to value where there is abundant
collateral, so that investors need only concern themselves with the value of the
collateral and not with the valuation of the entire firm, as equity investors
would need to.
Aghion and Bolton (1992) use incomplete contract theory to
characterise debt as an instrument whose holders take control of the firm in a
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bad states of the world. They show that if the managerial benefits of control
are higher in good states of the world, then it may be efficient for managers to
have control of assets in good states, and for creditors to have it in bad states.
Bolton and Scharfstein (1990) present a model in which upon default, creditors
have enough power to exclude the firm from the capital market, and hence
stop future financing altogether. Hart and Moore (1994) explicitly model the
idea that debt is a contract that gives the creditor the right to repossess
collateral in cases of default. Fear of such liquidation keeps money flowing
from the debtors to the creditors. Hart and Moore's models of debt show
exactly how the schedule of debt repayments depends on what creditors can
realise once they gain control.
Several other articles model the costs and benefits of the debt contract.
The benefit is usually the reduction in the agency cost such as preventing the
manager from investing in negative NPV projects, or forcing him to sell assets
that are worth more in alternative use. The main costs of debts are that firms
may be prevented from undertaking good projects because debt covenants
keep them from raising additional funds, or else they may be forced by
creditors to liquidate when it is not efficient to do so. Stulz (1990), Harris and
Raviv (1990), Diamond (1991) and Hart and Moore (1995) present some of
the main models incorporating these ideas, whereas Lang et al., (1996) present
evidence indicating that leverage indeed curtails investment by firms with poor
prospects.
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1.4.2 Corporate governance through Equity Financing
The second alternative for a firm to raise external finance is issuing
shares which are the principal component of firm's equity holding. Shares are
bought by both individuals whether they are small shareholders or large
shareholders and institutions, i.e., institutional shareholders. Unlike creditors,
individual shareholders are not promised any payments in return for their
financial investment in the firm, although often they receive dividends at the
discretion of the board of directors. Unlike creditors, individuals shareholders
have no claim to specific assets of the firm, and have no right to pull their
collateral (one commonly studied exception is mutual funds, in which
individual equity holders can force a liquidation of their pro rata share of the
assets and a repayment of its value). Unlike creditors, shareholders do not even
have a final date at which the firm is liquidated and the proceeds are
distributed. In principle, they may never get anything back at all.
In addition to some relatively weak legal protection, the principal right
that equity holders typically get is the right to vote for the board of directors.
Even this right is not universal, since many countries have multiple classes of
common stock, and hence equity holders with inferior voting rights get
proportionately fewer votes than their financial investment in the company.
Because concerted action by a large group of shareholders is required to take
control via the voting mechanism, voting rights are of limited value unless
they are concentrated. Moreover, concerted action is less likely because of the
'free rider problem.' That is, whatever the size of the group who are initiating
a concerted action, still they are relatively small in comparison of the total
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shareholders. This weaken the probability of concerted action since the costs
associated with the action are incurred by the small group while the benefits
are distributed to the large group of shareholders. Most small shareholders do
not even have an incentive to become informed on how to vote. Contacting
and persuading a large group of small shareholders through the proxy
mechanism is difficult and expensive, especially when the management stands
in the way (Dodd and Warner, 1983).
In contrast, when votes are concentrated - either in a large share
holding block or through a take-over - they are extremely valuable, since the
party that controls the concentrated votes can make virtually all corporate
decisions. Concentrated equity in this respect is more powerful than
concentrated debt. The value of individual shares comes from the fact that the
votes attached to them are valuable to those truing to control the firm., and the
protection of minority shareholders assures that those who have control must
share some of the benefits with the minority (Grossman and Hart, 1988).
One of the fundamental questions that the equity contracts raise is how
- given the weakness of control rights without concentration - do firms manage
to issue equity in any substantial amounts at all? Young firms, and firms with
intangible assets, may need to equity financed simply because their assets have
little or no liquidation value. If they are financed by debts, their managers
effectively give full control to the bank from the start. This may be especially
problematic when the firm's value consists primarily of future growth
opportunities, but the bank's debt claim and unwillingness to take equity give
it little interest in the upside and a distorted incentive to liquidate (Diamond,
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1991; Hart and Moore, 1995). Rather than give away control to the bank, such
firms often have highly concentrated equity ownership by the entrepreneur and
a venture capitalist. This may pave the way for some dispersed outside equity
ownership as long as minority rights are well enough protected. In this regard,
it is worth to mention that because of extensive legal protection of small
investors, young American firms are able to raise capital in the stock market
better than firms elsewhere in the world (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In fact,
equity financing is observed primarily for young, growing firms, as well as for
firms in rapidly growing economies, whereas mature economies and mature
firms typically use bank finance when they rely on external funds at all (Singh,
1995). In the same spirit, Rajan and Zingales (1995) show for the United
States and several OECD economies respectively that debt finance is most
common for firms with tangible assets.
This analysis of equity financing still leaves an important question
open: how can firm raise equity finance in countries with virtually no
protection of minority investors, even if these countries are rapidly growing?
Singh (1995) provides some evidence on the importance of equity financing in
LDCs, although some of his data on equity financing might include
privatisations and equity exchanges within industrial groups, both of which
often take the form of sales of large blocks and hence need not reflect any
minority purchases. Gomes (1996) presents one possible explanation which is
during a period of rapid economic growth, reputational effects and the
prospects of coming back soon to the capital market sustain good behaviour
until the requisite institutions and legal protections are put in place. Therefore,
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investors can count on reputation in the short run, and legal protection in the
longer run when the firm's needs for access to capital markets are smaller.
Korea, as one of the rapidly growing countries, presents another evidence
where the rates of return on investment may exceed the rates of appropriation
by insiders. However, another possibility is that speculative bubbles and
investor opportunism are playing an important role in equity financing in
rapidly growing economies.
1.4.3 Debt versus equity choice
Because the rights of creditors are clearer, and violations of those
rights are easier to verify in courts, the existing literature has anointed debt as
providing better protection to outside investors than equity. However the focus
on large investors sheds new light on the relative powers of debt and equity.
Specifically, debt and equity ought be compared in terms of the combination
of legal protections and ease of ownership concentration that each typically
provides.
First, does debt promote concentrated ownership? By far the dominant
form of lending around the world is bank lending. Banks are usually large
investors, who gain numerous control rights in the firm at the time of, or even
before, default. For example, the main bank, as in Germany, can often take
physical control of the firm's bank account - which resides at that very bank -
if it misses a payment, thereby assuring fairly complete control of the firm by
the bank without much involvement of the courts. This control is often
guaranteed by direct equity ownership in the firm, as well as a large degree of
monopoly power over any future credit extended to the firm (OECD, 1995). In
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contrast, American, Canadian and British firms make more extensive use of
syndicated bank lending and even of public debt, in which creditors are fairly
dispersed. Therefore, it is hard to believe that even debt holders in these
countries, then corporate governance in terms of corporate finance, can
reconcile poorly performing firms effectively enough.
But even when debt is not very concentrated, the effective legal
protection afforded creditors is likely to be greater than that available to
dispersed equity holders. The crucial feature of the creditors' legal rights is
that concerted action by multiple creditors is not required to take action against
a delinquent debtor. The legal obligation of the firm is an obligation to each
and every creditors, and of these creditors can typically sue the firm for
payment of what is owed or for sale of assets. Of course, once action is taken
by one creditor, the other creditors and the courts will take action to ensure
that the first creditor does not grab a disproportionate share for himself.
Unlike equity, debt in a peculiar way may be tougher when it is not
concentrated. If a borrower defaults on debt held by a large number of
creditors, renegotiating with these creditors may be extremely difficult, and the
borrower might be forced into bankruptcy (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). In
contrast, it may be easier to renegotiate with a bank. The difficulty of
renegotiation, and the power of dispersed creditors, might explain why public
debt is an extremely uncommon financing instrument, used only in a few
developed countries, and even there much less than bank debt.
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1.5 Corporate Governance: Political or Economic Inevitability?
1.5.1 Economic perspectives of corporate governance
The economic foundations of contemporary Anglo-Saxon corporate
governance systems stem from the work of Berle and Means (1932) who both
introduced an economic explanation of equity financing and portfolio
diversification. For example, the current Anglo-American corporate ownership
structure tells the economic story of how many small shareholders with small
percentage holdings, and until recently, little voice in governance, came to be
the dominant form of large business enterprise in the United States. According
to Berle and Means, economies of scale made possible by new technologies
required U.S companies at the turn of the century to become so large that their
enormous capital needs could be satisfied only by selling stocks to many
investors who, by and large, wanted diversified portfolios. Ownership was
thus dispersed, thus shifting decision-making power over the firm from
shareholders to professional managers. In addition, the dispersion of
ownership that eventually resulted from equity financing determined that
professional, salaried managers (with perhaps modest stock holdings)
practised control of the daily operations of the firm. At that stage, the
separation of corporate owners and professional managers provided a chance
for large mergers as long as motives for expansion, and for more economies of
scale, did suffice. The obvious consequence of the separation between owners
and managers, as Berle and Means speculated, is the weakening managerial
incentives and accountability. This, of course, has resulted in the current
corporate governance mechanisms that both managers (i.e., corporate insiders)
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and owners (i.e., corporate outsiders) invented to balance the power, thus to
reduce the informational gap, between them. But this balance has been always
proportional, therefore, resulting in certain costs that are known in the
literature as 'agency costs': the costs that are typically incurred by the
relatively weak party; corporate insiders or outsiders.
For the large family-owned businesses that made up most of American
industry at this time, founders, (or their heirs) wanting to cash out thus had
only two basic choices: (1) they could sell their stocks into the securities
market; or (2) they could merge with another firm, thus to let the stock market
finance the merger. Indeed, the primary role of the securities market at the turn
of the century was not to raise new capital, but to finance the massive mergers
at the end of the 19th century and allow founders to cash out. Therefore, the
role of the stock markets in the United States was a consequence of the
political restrictions that did not enable banks and other financial institutions
to contribute in financing the firm's capital requirements.
Then, over time, concentrated stock ownership dissipated into
fragmented holdings as the heirs sold off the inheritance and the managers
occasionally raised new capital in the public markets. Therefore, the resulting
combination of a large-scale enterprise, a professional (non-owner)
management, and fragmented, diversified stockholders shifted control of
public corporations from shareholders to managers. In contrast to business
enterprise in Europe and elsewhere, dispersed shareholders and concentrated
management became the distinguishing characteristics of the large American
firm.
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The continued domination of the large public corporation in the U.S.
suggests that the current corporate governance mechanisms, coming on top of
intense competition in American product markets, worked to minimise the
problems of the separation of ownership from control. For if the U.S. system
had failed to adapt in a way that solved this governance problem, the current
U.S. ownership structure would have been supplanted by a more efficient
alternative. Therefore, the economic perspectives of corporate governance
seems to advocate that survival implies efficiency - or at least greater
efficiency than available alternatives.
The economic perspectives of corporate governance indicate some
advantages of the separation of ownership and control. This separation proved
functional and, in many cases, a major source of value in its own right
(Lazonick, 1992). Good manager replaced often less motivated or sometimes
incompetent heirs. Specialisation of risk-bearing and management meant that
good managers did not need to have their own source of capital to get to run
large enterprises. Nevertheless, separation via public stock markets was not the
only plausible path (Roe, 1997). Some founders might have preferred that
banks, insurance, or other financial institutions had instead become part
owners of their businesses. Then the power of professional managers could
have been balanced by financiers with large stakes and a continuing interest in
the firm - much as happens in the small firms financed by U.S. venture
capitalists.
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1.5.2 Political perspectives of corporate governance
As the current literature of corporate governance deals with solely
subjects of corporate finance, corporate governance and corporate finance are
viewed primarily as economic matters. In this regard, the common sense refers
to the financing goal as to secure funding for the corporation at the lowest
possible cost; and to the governance goal as to maximise the value of the firm
to its owners. The political role in shaping corporate governance structure is
seen at the top of a nation's companies, where the board of directors,
shareholders, and senior managers interact. This place is, practically, the
outcome not just of economic evolution toward efficiency, but of political
developments such as laws and regulations that organise corporate activities.
Considering that the current well-known corporate governance systems
are those of the United States, Germany and Japan, the current debate on
differences among these systems refers to the evolution of each system. A
recent study by Roe (1994) concludes that political pressure dominated
economic pressures to the extent that the current practices of corporate
governance were, politically, inevitable outcomes. Roe (1997) argues that,
although the economic view of corporate governance is correct, it is
incomplete. Rather politics have a dominant role over economics in this
perspective. That is, economics alone can not fully account for the evolution of
the main current corporate governance systems (the American, Japanese, and
German systems) into its present form. For the United States, politics, in the
form of laws and regulations affecting commercial banks and other financial
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institutions, played a key role in fragmenting stock ownership beyond what
was required to have big firms and well-diversified investors (Roe, 1997).
Roe (1997) summarises the historical legal restrictions that have
circumscribed corporate finance in the United States. As he puts it:
"From the middle of the 19th century onward, both
state and federal laws restricted the growth and
activities of the largest American financial institutions.
U.S. commercial banks were prevented from branching
rationally, and thus they lacked both the size and the
information networks to fund big pieces of the capital
required by the large American firms emerging at the
end of the 19th century. Banks' products and portfolios
were also restricted - most important, banks were barred
from the securities business and from owning stock.
U.S. insurance companies were barred from buying
stock for most of this century. Mutual funds, thanks to
rules established in the 1930s and 1940s, can not easily
devote their portfolio solely to big blocks; and they face
legal problems if they go into the board room. And,
finally, pension funds can not take very big blocks
without structural and legal problems; the big private
pensions are under managerial control (not the other
way around) and ERISA make it more comfortable for
pension managers to avoid big blocks than to take
them." (Roe, 1997: 8).
Roe (1997) indicates the political-legal restrictions that circumscribed
banks' and insurers' involvement in corporate decision-making. As he
explains, the New Deal legislation of the 1930s has resulted in The Glass-
Steagall Act, which separated commercial banks from investment banks. But
the most serious restrictions on both banks and insurers came well before the
New Deal. For banks, they were in place at the end of the 19 th century; for
insurance companies, they came shortly after the turn of the century. The New
Deal was important in confirming the financial and ownership structures that
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already prevailed. The political-legal restrictions in banking extend to U.S.
banking branching. As Clair and Tucker (1989) put it:
"for much of the its history, the United States has had a
banking system like no other in the industrialised
world. Since the early 1800s, the U.S. banking system
has been highly fragmented, consisting of numerous
small banks without extensive branch systems." (Clair
and Tucker, 1989: 32).
This indicates that the States chartered their own banks, and the
Congress, influenced by local interests, refused to charter national banks that
could operate more extensively than the politically powerful local banks.
The consequences of U.S. banking geographic restrictions have been
historically evidenced. Every few decades, the lack of diversification resulting
from geographic restrictions caused a U.S. banking crisis. As Roe (1997)
explains, this inspired some political leaders to propose nation-wide branching
in order to strengthen the banking system. But, as happened when President
Cleveland endorsed proposals to allow national banks to branch in 1895, the
proposals were repeatedly blocked in Congress by well-organised unit bankers
(bankers that operated from a single physical location). Indeed, the well-
organised unit bankers not only stymied truly national branching for national
banks, but induced congress to reduce the capital requirements for rural
national banks. The result was the establishment of many new banks, thus
adding to the banking crisis and further strengthening the anti-branching
banker constituency. In terms of politics, having more weak, local banks
meant there were more players willing to invest in political action to block
creation of national financial institutions.
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Roe (1997) does document the effects of political-legal restrictions on
the Anglo-American banking activities not only in terms of geographic
restrictions but also in terms of product restrictions. Roe (1997) argues that
geographic restrictions on U.S. banks were crucial, product restrictions also
played an important role-and they too were in place well before the turn of the
century. The National Bank Act of 1863 and 1864 gave national banks only
limited powers. Control of an industrial company was not even contemplated
and, hence, out of the question. And, in 1892, when the controversy over
whether national banks could own stocks got the attention of the Supreme
Court, the ruling came down that the power to own stock was not listed in the
Act, and so it was not granted.
The claim is that protection of the public interests underlies those legal
restrictions. But, while the public interest goals of protecting financial
institutions explain some legal restrictions, they do not explain all of them.
Two major forces lie behind many of the restrictions. Firstly, American
populism which works against large private accumulations of power.
Secondly, interest group politics, such as local banks who gained from the
early fragmentation of U.S. financial institutions. Therefore, politicians have
played active role, considering their power in the Congress, in restraining the
financial institutions' capabilities toward providing finance on the national
basis, and in raising the costs to financial institutions of participating in the
governance of large firms. For the United States, Roe (1994) argues that
political preferences rather than economic efficiency shaped American
corporate law, at least at the Federal level, through systematic discouragement
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of large investors. That is, banks, insurance companies, mutual funds and
pension funds were all prevented from becoming influential in corporate
affairs. In this regard, the political response to the 1980s take-overs can be
viewed as a continuation of the promanagement and antilarge-shareholders
policies (Grundfest, 1990; Jensen; 1993). For example, financiers like J. P.
Morgan were able to play a major role in corporate governance at the turn of
the century even without holding big blocks of stock, particularly when the
client firms needed outside capital. Like modern-day venture capital and
merchant bankers, Morgan and other influential investment bankers sat on
corporate boards and participated in strategic decision-making. But this role
proved to be short-lived, at least partly because political restrictions against
large ownership concentration in the early 20th century, which induced Morgan
and other bankers to keep low corporate governance profile.
Roe (1997) claims that U.S. politics had a negative effects on corporate
efficiency. He argues that if U.S. corporations and their investors successfully
adapted, it seems plausible that American laws reduced corporate efficiency
and increased the cost of capital for some firms in some periods of U.S.
history. Therefore, U.S. politics, laws and regulations influenced the forms of
ownership and top-level governance of the American corporations.
For Germany and Japan, politics have also played an essential role in
shaping the current corporate governance system in each to the extent that the
political process accommodates the powerful interests in the economy rather
than maximising social welfare. In both countries, politics had more impact on
the structure of the corporation and the institutions that own them. Both
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countries have shaped their systems of powerful banks at the end of the 19th
century, during the period of rapid economic growth and with strong support
from the state. In both countries, the United States attempted to destroy the
powerful financial institutions during the occupation after World War II, and
in both countries it failed (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). Moreover, once
German banks became sufficiently powerful, they discouraged the
introduction of disclosure rules, prohibitions on insider trading, and other
protections of minority shareholders, thus making sure that these investors
never become a significant economic or political force to protect their rights.
As a consequence of this evolution, the legal system has been developed to
accommodate the prevailing economic power, resulting in relatively high
powerful banks.
The political-legal effects on the structure and scope of financial
institutions are quite clear outside the United States. In this regard, different
political structures have yielded different outcomes. Historically,
undemocratic Japan did not have the same open political structure that made
American populism such a potent force. Japanese interest group configurations
also differed from those in the U.S., and the national political structure was
less responsive to local banking interests than the American structure.
Therefore, when the Japanese banking system faced a rash of failure in 1927,
the Japanese authorities reacted by merging many banks into larger ones. Such
mergers were one of the major steps in the evolution of the Japanese banks
into the main banks that characterise the Japanese keiretsu. In this regard, the
Japanese banks had the financial strength to be able to take equity positions in
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most large firms after World War II. Large stock purchases of industrial firms
by groups of four or five Japanese banks and insurers then produced the
Japanese keiretsu, the networks of cross-ownership and influence among
both industrial and financial firms that have dominated the Japanese economy
since the 1950s.
At that point, the differences in political insights between Japan and
the United States were shown in the responses of the Japanese versus the
American policy makers. The Japanese policy makers responded to the
Depression-era banking crisis by concentrating finance through large banking
mergers. At the same time, the American policy makers responded to their
banking crisis by enacting deposit insurance (which was intended to protect
small banks from larger competitors) and separating commercial from
investment banking (to prevent concentration of power among the larger
banking operations). In Germany, securities markets were stifled, mandatory
co-determination was added, and a rigid corporate law was kept in place.
This American outcome was a result of influences of the U.S.
politician in the Congress (Roe, 1997). Most members of the U.S. Congress,
given the strength of their ties to their local districts, had an interest in keeping
banks small and local. Small-town American bakers were influential people;
and by exploiting the public sentiment against concentrated financial power,
this interest group were consistently effective in Congress. On the other hand,
the Congress strengthened the power of small banks by deposit insurance and
other regulations that are designed to protect their ability to compete with
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larger banks at roughly the same time that an authoritarian Japan was
concentrating its banking system.
The Anglo-American political-legal restrictions extended the role of
insurance companies in corporate governance. As Roe (1997) indicates, the
three largest American insurers at the time - Equitable, Mutual, and New York
life - were growing so rapidly that they showed promise of developing into
institutions that would rival the powerful German universal banks or the main
banks in Japan. At the very least, they seemed ready to become much like the
large modern British insurers, which hold considerable stock and play a more
important governance role than their passive American counterparts. But in
1905 the insurance industry was rocked by scandal, revealing nepotism,
insider financial chicanery, and bribery of legislatures. The New York
legislature responded with a political inquiry, which came to be called the
"Armstrong investigation" after the state legislator who chaired the committee.
In 1906, new insurance laws barred insurers from owning stock, controlling
banks, or underwriting securities. For the next 50 years, insurers were banned
from owning any stock at all and serious deregulation of this ban on stock
ownership by insurance companies did not begin until the 1980s.
Therefore, it is obvious that American politics limited the insurance
industry to its core business of writing insurance and investing in debt. Today,
although insurance companies have stock holdings that amount to about 5 per
cent of the total market (which puts them a distant third behind mutual funds'
share of about 10 per cent and pension funds' 30 per cent), they play a
negligible role in corporate governance. As for the Anglo-American mutual
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funds and pension funds, the political influences on laws and regulations that
govern these funds are less direct and clear-cut than those that constrained the
historical structure of American banking and insurance. But such laws and
regulations raise the costs of such funds becoming involved in corporate
governance. For example, mutual funds face portfolio limits that restrict them
in deploying much of their assets in big block ownership with boardroom
influence. The few public exception seem to rise when a mutual fund, or a
complex of funds, find itself with a sizeable block. For example, when Kodak
was in crisis and Fidelity found that its group of funds owned about 7 per cent
of the company, Fidelity became involved (Roe, 1997).
As for pension funds, although the laws governing such funds do not
explicitly bar big blocks, then boardroom influence, such activities are
deterred by the reality that deviate from prevailing practice expose themselves
to greater business risks, then the threat of litigation (Roe, 1993a, 1994).
Private pension funds are also typically under the control of the sponsor
company's managements, and most senior managers have usually not
supported strong corporate governance activity. By contrast, the public
pension funds have been more active. For example, CalPERS and others have
prodded boards to set up governance and review procedures (Wagster, and
Prevost, 1996).
In sum, in most nations where the evidence is available, politics have
favoured some form of organisation and ownership over others. In Germany,
bank influence has been favoured, stock markets suppressed. In Japan,
regulation blocked the growth of public capital markets and channelled post-
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war financing through banks. American political influences have favoured
liquid public markets and small-town banks at the expense of concentrated
finance.
1.6 The Corporate Legal Framework
The business legal framework describes the legal boundaries within
which corporate operations are conducted. The traditional subject of corporate
governance describes the business legal framework from the viewpoint of the
laws and courts' practices that bound corporate financing decisions. For
example, external financing is a contract between the firm as a legal entity and
the financiers, which gives the financiers certain rights vis-a-vis the assets of
the firm (Hart, 1995). If firm managers violate the terms of the contract, then
the financiers have the right to appeal to the courts to enforce their rights.
Much of the differences in corporate governance systems around the world
stem from the differences in the nature of legal obligations that managers have
to the financiers, as well as in the differences in how courts interpret and
enforce these obligations.
In theory, the most important legal right shareholders have is the right
to vote on important corporate matters, such as mergers and liquidation, as
well as in elections of boards of directors, which in turn have certain rights vis-
a-vis the management (Easterbrook and Fischel, 1983). In practise, however,
voting rights turn out to be expensive to exercise and to enforce. In many
countries, shareholders can not vote by mail and actually have to show up at
the shareholders meeting to vote - a requirement that virtually guarantees
nonvoting by small investors. In developed countries, courts can be relied on
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to ensure that voting takes place, but even there managers often interfere in the
voting process, and try jawbone shareholders into supporting them, conceal
information from their opponents (Pound, 1988).
In countries with weaker legal systems, shareholders voting rights are
commonly violated. For example, Russian managers sometimes threaten
employee-shareholders with layoffs unless these employees vote with the
management, fail to notify shareholders about annual meetings, try to prevent
hostile shareholders from voting based on technicalities, and so on. Besides, as
Stalin noted, "it is important not how people vote, but who counts the votes,"
and managers count shareholders' votes. In addition, in Russia, courts have
protected a large shareholder when a firm's management erased his name from
the register of shareholders. It is obvious, therefore, that differences in
corporate governance across countries are indicated by the differences in both
of the legal extent and the courts' protection of shareholders voting rights.
Another phase of firm's legal boundaries is what is so-called 'duty of
loyalty'. In many countries, shareholders voting rights are supplemented by an
affirmative duty of loyalty of the managers to shareholders. That is, managers
have a duty to act in shareholders' interests. Perhaps the most common
accepted element of the duty of loyalty are the legal restrictions on managerial
self-dealing, such as outright theft from the firm, excessive compensation.
Some legal restrictions on managers constrain their actions by, for example,
demanding that managers consult the board of directors before making major
decisions, or giving shareholders appraisal remedies to stop asset sales at low
prices. Other restrictions specify that minority shareholders be treated as well
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as the insiders (Holderness and Sheehan, 1988b). On the other hand, courts
should play an active role in enforcing managers' duty of loyalty. Managers
may rely heavily on the 'business judgement rule' to interpret this duty from
their personal point of view, to achieve personal benefits. Although the duty of
loyalty is accepted in principle in most OECD countries, the strictness with
which the courts enforce it varies greatly. In the United States, courts would
interfere in cases of management theft and asset diversion, and they would
surely interfere if managers diluted existing shareholders through an issue of
equity to themselves. Courts are less likely to interfere in cases of excessive
pay (Jensen, and Murphy, 1990), especially if it takes the complex form of
options contracts, and are very unlikely to second guess managers' business
decisions, including the decisions that hurt shareholders. But shareholders in
the United States have the right to sue the corporations, often using class
action suits that get around the free rider problem, if they believe that the
managers have violated the duty of loyalty. Therefore the United States is
generally viewed as relatively tough on managers in interpreting the duty of
loyalty, although Bebchuk (1985) believes it is not tough enough.
In France the doctrine of corporate opportunities, which prohibits
managers from personally profiting from business opportunities that are
offered to the corporation, is not accepted by courts. Outside the United States
and Canada, class action suits are not generally permitted and contingent fees
are prohibited. Outside the OECD, the duty of loyalty is a much weaker
concept, at least in part because courts have no capability or desire to interfere
in business (OECD, 1995).
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Because large shareholders govern by exercising their voting rights,
their power depends on the degree of legal protection of their votes. Majority
ownership only works if the voting mechanism works, and the majority owner
can dictate the decisions of the company. This may require fairly little
enforcement by courts, since 51 per cent ownership is relatively easy to prove,
and a vote count is not required once the majority shareholder expresses his
preferences. With large majority shareholders, matters are more complicated,
since they need to make alliances with other investors to exercise control. The
power of the managers to interfere in these alliances is greatly enhanced, and
the burden on courts to protect large shareholder rights is much greater. For
this reason, large minority share holdings may be effective only in countries
with relatively sophisticated legal systems, whereas countries where courts are
really weak are more likely to have outright majority ownership.
Legal protections extend to the second group of financiers, the
creditors. These legal protections may include the right to grab assets that
serve as collateral for the loans, the right to liquidate the company when it
does not pay its debts, the right to vote in the decision to reorganise the
company and the right to remove managers in reorganisation. Therefore, legal
protection of creditors is often more effective than of the shareholders, since
default is a reasonably straightforward violation of a debt contract that a court
can verify. On the other hand, when the bankruptcy procedure gives
companies the right of automatic stay of the creditors, managers can keep
creditors at bay even after having defaulted. Repossessing assets in bankruptcy
is often very hard even for the secured creditors. With multiple, diverse
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creditors who have conflicting interests, the difficulties of collecting are even
greater, and bankruptcy proceedings often take years to complete (Weiss,
1990). Therefore, this makes debt a less attractive financing instrument to
begin with (Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996). Still, while costly to the creditors,
bankruptcy is very tough on the debtor firms as well, since their managers
typically get fired, assets liquidated, and debt kept largely in place. Creditors'
legal rights are thus enforced in a costly and inefficient way, but they are
enforced. Again, these legal protections vary across countries. For example,
because bankruptcy procedures are so complicated, creditors often renegotiate
outside of formal bankruptcy proceedings both in the United States (Gilson et
al., 1990) and in Europe (OECD, 1995). The situation is worse in developing
countries, where courts are even less reliable and bankruptcy laws are even
less complete. The complications and inefficiency of existing bankruptcy
procedures raised the possibility of using the debt-equity swaps to avoid
complicated negotiations. That is, converting all the claims of a bankrupt
company into equity, and then allowing the equity holders to decide what to
do with the bankrupt firm (Bebchuk, 1988; Aghion et al., 1992). It is possible
that in the long-run, the debt-equity swaps will reduce the cost of enforcing
creditors rights.
In sum, the extent of legal protection of investors varies enormously
around the world. In some countries, such as the United States, Japan and
Germany, the law protects the rights of at least some investors and the courts
are relatively willing to enforce these laws. But even in these countries, the
legal systems leaves managers with considerable discretion. In most of the rest
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of the world, the laws are less protective of investors and courts function less
well and stop the clearest violations of investor rights. As a result, legal
protection alone becomes insufficient to ensure that investors get their money
back (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). The need for at least some legal protection
is shared by all large investors. Large shareholders need courts to enforce their
voting rights, take-over artists need court-protected mechanisms for buying
shares and changing boards of directors, and creditors need courts to enable
them to repossess collateral. The principal advantage of large investors (except
in take-overs) is that they rely on relatively simple legal interventions, which
are suitable for even poorly informed and motivated courts.
In much of the rest of the world, legal protection of investors is less
substantial, either because laws are bad or courts do not enforce these laws. As
a consequence, firms remain family-controlled and, even in some of the richest
countries, have difficulty raising external funds, and finance most of their
investment internally. For example, in Italy, Pagano et al., (1997) report the
extraordinary difficulties that Italian firms face raising outside finance. As an
evidence, over an eleven year period between 1982 and 1992, only 123 firms
went public in Italy, compared to several thousand in the United States. The
same difficulties exist when raising external finance from banks. (Barca, 1996)
reports a significant amount of bank financing in Italy, most of it comes from
state bank financing. Therefore, the conclusion that can be drawn that in Italy
most large firms not supported by the government are family controlled and
internally financed.
82
Although there is little systematic evidence available, most of the
world appears to be more like Italy than like the United States, Germany or
Japan (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). For example, a recent study of India shows
that large firms tend to be family controlled, and to rely almost entirely on
internal financing except when they get money from the government (Khanna
and Palepu, 1997). Latin America firms also face little external corporate
governance, and financing tends to be either internal or from the government-
controlled banks.
1.7 The Legal Embeddedness of Corporate Autonomy
The concept of `stakeholding company' began to emerge in company
law in the 1980s. The idea of corporate autonomy can be traced to two
principal sources: the legal doctrine of separate corporate personality and the
so-called separation of ownership and control. (Davies, 1997). That legal
doctrine asserts that the incorporated company has an entirely separate legal
existence from that of its shareholders. This radical separation is reflected in
the fact that, in law, shareholders have no direct proprietary rights to the
company's property, only rights to their share. In the 1850s, the joint stock
companies began to be conceptually cleansed of shareholders and seen, both in
law and everyday consciousness, as entities in their own right with a
completely autonomous existence (Ireland, 1996a).
Although most companies' practises seem to be directed to satisfy
shareholders interests, any identification of the company with its shareholders
was contingent. That is, various legal rules - such as those concerning
fiduciary duties and those giving shareholders control of the General Meeting
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and the right to appoint and dismiss directors - theoretically ensured that
companies were controlled by and operated in the interests of their
shareholders. However, with the growing separation of ownership and control,
this contingent link is called into question. That contingency was realised
since the writings of Berle and Means (1932). They suggested that the
autonomy of the corporation from its shareholders was being supplemented by
the autonomy of its managers from shareholders control. Therefore, by casting
doubts on the effectiveness of the mechanisms guaranteeing shareholder
supremacy, the debate has left a permanent question mark over the claim that
companies, already entities with an entirely independent existence, are
controlled by, and operated in the interests of, their shareholders.
By the late 1980s, the literature of corporate governance has
incorporated a revival of ideas that corporate and managerial autonomy could
be mobilised to make companies more socially responsible and accountable
(Parkinson, 1993). As the corporate law recognised corporations as
autonomous legal entities, it follows that corporate directors are autonomous
as well. This highlights the crucial role of the board of directors as an
important factor that determines the corporate economic and social role in the
society. Therefore, to the extent that the character of companies seemed to be
largely determined by who controlled them, the composition of company
boards appeared to be the crucial issue. In Britain, the Bullock report on
Industrial Democracy highlighted the importance of the board of directors in a
world of autonomous corporate legal entities (Ireland, 1996a). That is,
corporate autonomy is, by law, accompanied by board autonomy. Therefore,
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the report targeted the board of directors as the agents of these autonomous
and neutral corporate entities, proposing the appointment of equal numbers of
workers and shareholders representatives on the board of large companies.
The central weakness of the proposals for a reconceptualisation of the
company is their failure to analyse their own theoretical foundations. Like the
idea of the socially responsible corporation that animated managerialism, they
are ultimately premised on the radical autonomy of the company from its
shareholders, believing that this autonomy can, with appropriate changes to
company law and business culture, be exploited to ensure that the interests of
all those with a 'stake' in the company are taken into account.
Because of the external constraints imposed by globalisation and by
product, capital and share market, stakeholders are more modest in their
claims than most of the managerialist predecessors. But the nature and limits
of corporate and managerial autonomy and, in particular, its starting point, the
doctrine of separate corporate personality, are still not subjected to close. That
is, the complete expulsion of the capitalist shareholder from production was
latent in the joint stock form (Ireland, 1996a).
Contrary to the orthodox view, the complete separation of company
and shareholders effected by the modern doctrine of corporate personality was
not, and is not, an inevitable and natural consequence of the act of
incorporation. It was not until the latter half of the nineteenth century that
incorporation came to be regarded as having this effect (Ireland, 1996b). Prior
to this, while incorporation was seen as creating a separate legal entity, there
was no suggestion that this entity was completely cleansed of shareholders.
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Rather, as Ireland explains, incorporated companies were conceptualised as
their shareholders merged into a legally distinct entity. This was vividly
illustrated by the Joint Stock Companies Act 1856, section three of which
declared that 'seven or more people' could 'form themselves into an
incorporated company, clearly implying that they were the company, that it
was made of them. It was also illustrated linguistically in the regular
references to 'the company' as a 'they'.
However, from the mid century, joint stock companies, incorporated
and unincorporated, were gradually conceptually cleansed of their
shareholders, coming to be perceived, both in law and everyday
consciousness, as things, entities in their own right with an entirely
independent existence. By the time of the Companies Act 1862, people were
being permitted to form incorporated companies, objects external to them.
Companies were no longer made of people but by them. Linguistically, the
company was now an 'it' emptied of shareholders. Moreover, Ireland shows
the legal foundation of the complete separation of the company and its
shareholders through the separation of the value of shares and that of company
assets. As he explains, until 1830s, joint stock company shares were large in
domination and relatively few in number with the result that there was no
developed market for their purchase and sale. In the period between 1830 and
1870, the share emerged for the first time as an autonomous and independent
form of property. Shares, thus, were redefined in law as an autonomous form
of property independent of the assets of the company. They were no longer
conceptualised as equitable interests in the property of the company but as
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rights to profit with a value of their own, rights which could be freely and
easily bought and sold in the marketplace. Therefore, with the development of
the share market, shareholders are no longer 'tied' to their share, nor to the
companies of which they were members.
It is obvious that the assets were owned by the company alone, either
through a corporation or, in the case of unincorporated companies, through
trustees. The intangible share capital of the company had become the sole
property of the shareholders. Moreover, with the legal constitution of the share
as an entirely autonomous form of property, the externalisation of the
shareholder from the company had been completed in a way not previously
possible. A vital legal space had emerged between the joint stock company
(the owner of the assets) and the shareholder(the owner of the shares). The
company was now the sole legal and equitable owner and personification of
industrial capital; the shareholders the sole owners of money capital.
Moreover, this space emerged, as the courts recognised, in unincorporated as
well as incorporated joint stock companies, for the shares of all joint stock
companies were redefined. Thus, the autonomisation of the company, then of
the shares, was a consequent of the modern company law (Ireland et al., 1987).
In addition, that autonomisation of the company and its shareholders enables
us to understand the distinction, in company law, which lies at the heart of
stakeholding models: the distinction between the 'corporate interest,' an
interest in the productive utilisation of industrial capital and the shareholder
interest - a money capital interest in the revenue generated by those industrial
capital assets. The autonomisation implies that the return on the share and its
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fictitious capital value are both determined by the surplus generated by the
productive utilisation of those assets.
It is in this context that many managerial advocates of stakeholding are
re-emphasising the autonomy of the company as an institution and seeking to
distinguish its interests from those of its shareholders, broadly endorsing the
Kay and Silberston (1995) claim that the corporation has a life of its own and
that directors should be viewed (legally and otherwise) as trustees of the
corporate assets. However, unlike those managerialists who treated the
company as an entirely empty vessel, modem stakeholders from business
generally display an acute awareness of the nature and limits of corporate and
managerial autonomy, implicitly recognising the company as the
personification of industrial capital.
Another approach that shows the legal perspectives in corporate
autonomy conceptualises the company as a 'nexus of contracts' (Parkinson,
1993). This approach has been used to argue that workers might seek to further
their interests vis-a-vis the company through contract (Stone. 1993).
1.8 Conclusion
This chapter concludes that the existence of the 'agency problem' leads
to managers discretion to finance corporate operations in such a way that can
deter outsiders intervention in corporate affairs. It is obvious that the political
institutions orientations plays an influential role in supporting or rejecting
outsiders intervention in the corporate affairs.
It is worth to note that as long as corporate law does recognise a
corporation as a separate legal entity, this supports the idea that corporate
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managers should focus on the sustainability of the company's long-term
performance. This is what is to be explored in the next chapter which discusses
the current corporate governance mechanisms and their link to corporate
performance.
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Chapter 2
Corporate Governance Mechanisms
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2.1 Introduction
Corporate governance mechanisms are economic and legal institutions
that can be altered through the political process. These mechanisms can also
be described as contractual mechanisms used to address the agency problem.
Chapter one has shown that the current practises of corporate governance are
embedded in the literature of corporate finance. In this concern, this chapter
discusses the role of the basic mechanisms described in the literature of
corporate governance: the role of the stock markets, the role of the banks and
the role of the boards of directors.
The discussion focuses primarily on an international comparative
perspectives which show the differences between the basic business systems:
the Anglo-Saxon, the Communitarian and the Asian business systems. The
United States and the United Kingdom are considered as an examples of the
Anglo-Saxon business system, Germany is considered as an example of the
Communitarian business system, and Japan is considered as an example of the
Asian business system. The countries chosen as an examples of each business
system are not mutually exclusive. That is, there are other countries that can be
included in each business system. Here, the researcher has chosen those
countries as they are characterised by distinct institutional infrastructures
which are useful to explore the different institutional alternatives that can be
considered viable to emerging markets.
2.2 The Stock Market Governance Mechanisms
The role of the stock market in corporate governance describes the
practices through which corporate financiers exert their influences on the
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corporate board, thus corporate decisions. This influence is referred to as
investors control rights. These rights vary according to the structure of
corporate ownership, i.e., the type and the size of the investors.
2.2.1 The Structure of shareholding: An international comparative
perspectives
Investors can get more effective control rights by being large. When
control rights are concentrated in the hands of a small number of investors
with a collectively large cash flow stake, concerted action by investors is much
easier than when control rights, such as votes, are split among many of them.
In particular, this concerted action is possible with only minimal help from the
courts. In effect, concentration of ownership leverages up legal protection. In
terms of international business systems, there are several distinct forms that
share holdings can take. The following sections describe the common forms
and the magnitude of corporate ownership structure in the Anglo-Saxon,
Communitarian, and Japanese business systems respectively.
2.2.1.1 The Anglo-Saxon shareholding structures
From a political history point of view, the stock market has been
considered a major supplier of capital in the Anglo-Saxon countries. This
means that a significant part of corporate financing takes the form of shares
traded in the stock market. The magnitude of share holdings determine the
shareholders control rights (or governance), and ultimately the corporate
governance mode. In most of the Anglo-Saxon economies such as the U.S. and
UK, the norm is relatively high dispersed ownership. In the United States, for
example, large share holdings, and especially majority ownership, are
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relatively uncommon - probably because of legal restrictions on high
ownership and exercise of control by banks, mutual funds, insurance
companies and other institutions (Roe, 1994). According to the NYSE
statistics, in1990 the private shareholders hold 29 per cent of the U.S. equities
in all — 19 per cent in hands of the general public and 10 per cent in the hands
of the owner founders (Charkham, 1994).The situation in the UK is nearly the
same. Individual shareholders are numerous — about 9.26 million according to
PRO SHARE. Of all the UK shareholders 62 per cent own shares in privatised
issues only; 7 per cent own only the free shares they were given with the
abbey National flotation; and 10 per cent own shares solely through employee
schemes. PRO SHARE estimate there are only 1.6 million shareholders with a
portfolio of shares (Charkham, 1994).
The shareholders' rights do not differ significantly in the U.S. and the
UK. The bundle of rights with which the shareholder is left include a share of
money distributed as dividends; a share of any surplus if the enterprise in
wound up; a vote in the election of those to whom its stewardship is entrusted
— the directors; a supply of information as laid down by the Companies Act in
the UK and the SEC in the U.S.; the right to subscribe when new capital is
sought. A shareholder's main right is, of course, to dispose freely of stock at
the best price. The most striking features that shareholders, unlike
professional, lack the power or knowledge to monitor corporate and/or
managers performance in details. They are not even enthusiastic to do so. That
is, they have to face the 'free rider' problem: individually they would have to
bear all the costs of actions whose benefits mainly accrued to others. The
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logical answer is for them to get together with other private shareholders and
make common cause. Britain lacks a means of bringing this about. People are
encouraged to own shares but not to combine to protect their interest: this is
quite opposite to the situation in the U.S where the United Shareholders
Association (USA) is set up to combine individual shareholder's dispersed
power. In the U.S., shareholding can be relatively large. This can mean that
one or several investors in the firm have substantial minority ownership
stakes. A substantial minority shareholder has the incentive to collect
information and monitor the management, thereby avoiding the traditional
'free rider problem.' The large shareholder also has enough voting control to
put pressure on the management in some cases, or perhaps even to oust the
management through a proxy fight or a take-over (Shleifer and Vishny, 1986).
In the most extreme cases, large shareholders have outright control of the
firms and their management with 51 or more percent of ownership. Therefore,
large share holdings is the most way to align cash flow and control rights of
outside investors. Large shareholders thus address the agency problem in that
they both have a general interest in profit maximisation, and enough control
over the assets of the firm to get their voice influential on corporate board's
decisions.
The ownership in the U.S. can also be concentrated: holdings by
families and wealthy investors are common than is believed (Demsetz, 1983;
Shleifer and Vishny, 1986). In fact, Holdemess and Sheehan (1988a,b) found
several hundred cases of over 51 per cent shareholders in public firms in the
United States.
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As for the institutional investors, one study of Columbia University's
institutional investor project shows that the institutional investors in the U.S.
invested approximately 18.7 per cent in the U.S. total financial assets and 45
per cent in the total equities (Brancato, 1990). In addition, the study shows that
major institutions held 45.92 per cent of the stock of the top twenty five
companies. In fact, there has been a growth in the total assets, particularly a
switch to equities, under the institutions' control: in 1950 it was 6 per cent, in
1981 it was 32 per cent, and in 1990 it was 39 per cent.
In the UK, partly because the UK's tax arrangements favour collective
savings — particularly pension funds — the proportion of equity shares in the
hands of those who administer them now predominates. According to the
Central Statistical Office, by 1989, 30.4 per cent of the UK equities were held
by pension funds, 18.4 per cent by insurance companies, 5.9 per cent by unit
trusts and 3.2 per cent by other financial companies (Charkham, 1994). Once
again, the diversification policy, including a tendency to keep up with the
index, is favourable by institutional investors in the UK, the same as in the
U.S. As more than two-thirds of the UK equities are in the hands of
institutions, this may lead to the conclusion that institutional investors in both
the U.S. and the UK do not play a proactive role in corporate governance.
2.2.1.1.1 The effectiveness of shareholders monitoring
In this section the researcher addresses the question of the extent to
which the concentrated ownership, in comparison to individual dispersed
ownership, is effective in influencing corporate decisions and performance.
95
The answer to this question has two basic perspectives: an economic
perspectives and legal perspectives.
As for the economic perspectives, the role of the individual
shareholders is still as Berle and Means (1932) described it. The underlying
issue is that as corporations grew and required ever greater infusion of capital,
ownership became dispersed to thousands of individual small shareholders
who lacked the power or the commitment to hold corporations accountable.
This fragmented ownership left effective control of the corporation with
management — ownership and control became separated. Even though the
board's role was to oversee management for the benefit of the shareholders
(who elected the directors), the management itself chose the one slate of
nominees, which presumably consisted of persons with whom the managers
felt comfortable. Thus, although directors had a duty to shareholders, the board
was essentially governed by a clubhouse ethos that tended to favour the
managerial status quo. The board was generally collegial and supportive of
management. Its practical role was to assure that no blatant excesses or abuses
occurred. Shareholder's principal recourse with underperformance was to sell
their interests. In theory, if enough shareholders wanted to sell their stock, the
price would drop and management would get the signal (Millstein, 1995).
As for the institutional investors, one must look at them as agents to
other small individual investors. In this sense, the institutional investors have
the motive when investing in stock, which is maximum profits in a very short
time horizon. The fact is nicely summarised by Charkham (1994) as he says:
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"It is quite wrong to suppose that anyone concerned
with institutional investment wakes up in the morning
with corporate governance in his mind as the
determining issue in choice of manager, portfolio
strategy, or stocks. What they want of course is
profitable investment, and the traditional way of
achieving it is through straightforward market
operations. If a stock disappoints one sells (EXIT).
This is the so-called Wall Street Walk." (Charkham,
1994: 206).
What differentiates between the institutional shareholder's investment
policy and the individual shareholder's investment policy is that the former
can not concentrate its investment in a few companies portfolios. It has to
spread the risk through the common strategies of portfolio diversification
(Longstreth, 1991). For example, one U.S. public pension fund has 1,400
stocks and does more than 8,000 stock transaction a year. Moreover, since
1985 the use of stock index futures and other derivatives by pension managers
has more than doubled. That is, 34 per cent use futures of one kind or another,
where the emphasis is not on companies but on market timing with very hale
regard for the constituent companies (Lowenstein, 1991). It seems that the
more the institutional investors keep diversifying, the less they are able to
monitor corporate and/or managers performance and the less the role they can
play in corporate governance.
The passive role of institutional shareholders in the UK is apparent.
The Institutional Shareholders Committee encourages companies to consult
institutional investors as insiders, which leads to disclose some information
about the companies policies, under the condition that the latter suspend their
ability to deal in the company's shares. The situation does, however, remain
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unsatisfactory as shareholders quite properly refuse to receive information that
might inhibit them from trading because they would be insiders (Charkham,
1994).
However, there are some empirical evidences of the large shareholders
activity in the market for corporate control. Shivdasani (1993) shows that large
outside shareholders increase the likelihood that a firm is taken over, whereas
Denis and Serrano (1996) show that, if a take-over is defeated, management
turnover is higher in poorly performance firms that have block holders.
This situation is also observed in some of the newly capitalist
economies. The active role of large shareholders has created a reaction on the
part of the corporate management. In this respect, in Russia, the role of
management in dealing with the control of large shareholders is quite obvious.
As one Russian investment banker has pointed out, a Western investor can
control a Russian company with 75 per cent ownership, whereas a Russian
investor can do so with only 25 per cent ownership (Shleifer and Vislmy,
1997). This comment is easy to understand once it is recognised that the
management can use a variety of techniques against foreign investors,
including declaring some of their shares illegal, requiring super majorities to
bring issues on the agenda of shareholder meetings, losing voting records, and
so on. While managers can apply these techniques against domestic investors
as well, the latter have more mechanisms of their own to protect their power
including better access to other shareholders, to courts, as well as in some
cases to physical force. The effectiveness of large shareholders, then, is
intimately tied to their ability to defend their rights. This, again, raises the
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importance of both legal protection and large ownership for exercising good
corporate governance.
As for the legal perspectives, Gilson and Kraakman (1992) explain in
details that the U.S. law includes number of regulatory barriers that prevent, if
not prohibit, co-operative electoral action by institutional investors to elect
professional directors, thus eliminating the proactive role the institutional
investors can play in corporate governance. Firstly, there are the Federal proxy
rules: particularly Rule 14a-8 does not require a company to include an
institutional investor's nominees for director in the company's proxy statement
or to provide a place on the company's proxy card for shareholders to vote for
such nominees. It is obvious, therefore, that the proxy rules operate to deter
institutional investors from electing professional directors.
Secondly, there are the regulations of the Securities Exchange Act §
13 (d). The first of these regulations are Rules 13d-1 and 13d-2. Rule 13d-1
requires any shareholder, or group of shareholders, that acquires over 5 per
cent of an issuer's stock to file a Schedule 13D statement with the SEC setting
forth information concerning the beneficial owner of the securities, including
the number of shares owned, and the purpose and method of finance of the
acquisition. Rule 13d-2 requires that a Schedule 13D be amended in the event
of a material change, including a change of one pre cent or more in the
percentage of the issuer's stock held. Because most institutional investors do
not own more than 5 per cent of an issuer's stock, this filing requirement
seems irrelevant at first.
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Thirdly, there are the filings under Hart-Scott-Rodino that includes
Section 7A of the Clayton Act, which was added by Title II of the Hart-Scott-
Rodin° Antitrust Improvement Act of the 1976. In order to give federal
enforcement agencies sufficient time to prevent anticompetitive acquisitions,
this statute requires a party who intends to acquire a significant amount of an
issuer's voting stock to file a lengthy notification form and wait thirty days
before actually acquiring the stock. A broad exemption relieves institutional
investors from the duty to comply as long as their acquisition is solely for
investment purposes and involves less than either 15 per cent of the
outstanding stock or securities valued at less than $25 million. As Gilson and
Kraakman (1992) emphasis, the phrase "solely for the purpose of investment"
requires that the holder have "no intention of participating in the formulation,
determination, or direction of the basic business decisions of the issuer. The
Statement of Bases and Purposes, which accompanies both the exemption rule
and the definition of the relevant terms, further states that "nominating a
candidate for the board of directors" may constitute conduct inconsistent with
an investment intent.
2.2.1.2 The German shareholding structures
The scene in the Communitarian economies is different. In Germany,
large share holdings in some form are the norm. Large commercial banks play
a substantial role in corporate governance. The German large commercial
banks through proxy voting arrangements often control over a quarter of the
votes in major companies, and also have smaller but significant cash flow
stakes as shareholders or creditors (Franks and Mayer, 1994; OECD, 1995;
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Schmidt et al., 1997). In addition, one study estimates that about 80 per cent of
the large German companies have an over 25 per cent nonbank large
shareholder (Gorton and Schmid, 1996). In smaller German companies, the
norm is family control through majority ownership or pyramids, in which the
owner controls 51 per cent of the company, which in turn controls 51 per cent
of its subsidiaries and so on (Franks and Mayer, 1994). Pyramids enable the
ultimate owners to control the assets with the least amount of capital (Barca,
1996).
The German capital market has undergone two main courses of change.
The first was in the 1980s and the second is in the 1990s. Firstly, in the 1980s
the German capital market has been an underdeveloped institution. Its under
development has been compared to the situation in the U.S. prior to the
enactment of the Securities Act of 1933. As compared to other industrialised
economies, Germany has a surprisingly small number of stock corporations.
As of 1988, there were 2373 stock corporations in Germany, only 503 (21.2
per cent) of which were listed on one of the eight German stock exchanges. In
1987 and 1988, there were only twenty one and fourteen new listings,
respectively, among which a large number are either family-owned or
subsidiary firms with a minimal public float. It is estimated that only about
thirty corporations are widely held with readily traded shares (Kim, 1995).
Consequently, the underdevelopment state of the German capital market has
created a lack of liquidity and compels the major shareholders, German banks,
to exercise their voices (Coffee, 1991; Knauss, 1981).
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Although Germany has a mandatory disclosure system, the market for
corporate information and disclosure has been underdeveloped. Information on
companies listed on the stock exchange is insufficient (Meier-Schatz, 1986;
Kallfass, 1988). Even where disclosure requirements exist, liability for
incomplete disclosure is less harsh than under U.S. securities laws (Dilworth,
1993). Dilworth points out that the reason for the lower level of protection of
investors is most likely due to the fact that private persons do not participate in
the German securities markets to as great as in the United States. This means
that the system whereby companies describe their development in annual
financial statements and quarterly reports has not been regulated. There are no
generally accepted accounting principles or auditing standards comparable to
those in the U.S. Nevertheless, Germany introduced the available accounting
options to comply with relevant European Community Directives (Kim, 1995).
The empirical studies of the German stock market suggest that the
Efficient Market Hypothesis meets its ultimate test in Germany (Kallfass,
1988). Moreover, in the 1980s, insider trading has been widespread and
unregulated. The securities market is supervised by either the German federal
bank (Deutsche Bundesbank) or one of the eight German stock exchange.
Recently, Germany has begun to consider creating a central securities
regulatory body where the German government has proposed adoption of
comprehensive legislation aimed at establishing an effective and
internationally recognised system to supervise German securities markets.
Before that, the absence of governmental supervision of securities markets has
greatly been compensated by the role of German banks as strict disciplinarians
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(Dilworth, 1993). The underdevelopment of the German capital market also
may be a result of the predominance of credit-based capital market, which in
turn enhances the power of banks. This is the main characteristic of the
German corporate governance mode: that is it dependence on banks' credit and
the enterprises have maintained strong relations with their "house banks."
Germany market capitalisation is a good indicator of the role of the stock
market. In this concern, in 1992 Market Capitalisation/GNP was 20.44 per
cent and in the 1997 it was only 26.22 per cent (International Financial
Statistics, 1997).
Consequently, the German enterprises are more leveraged than their
U.S. counterparts. In 1983, the equity-capital percentage in balance sheet
terms was 20.9 per cent for all German firms, as compared with 63.4 per cent
for U.S. firms (Kim, 1995). Kim further indicates that large industrial
corporations had a much higher rate of self-financing: between 1963 and 1970,
for instance, the self-financing rate for German stock corporations hovered
between 70 and 80 per cent. However, they also rely upon the banks for access
to various forms of external financing. In Germany, the banks handle most
new issues of marketable securities (Cable, 1985). Moreover, banks have
privilege to apply for admission of securities to trading on the exchange and
they are very careful to avoid risky issues in their function as guarantors. As a
matter of fact, the German capital market would have been an unreasonably
risky place for investors without banks having this privilege because of the
limited governmental regulations (Kallfass, 1988).
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The trend of national stock market internationalisation in the 1990s had
influenced national investment structures. In general, internationalisation
invariably increases the proportion of voting rights held by foreign
shareholders. In addition, foreign shareholders' interest in corporate
performance is limited in that it is primarily tied to the stock price, not to the
corporation's long-term business prospects. As for Germany, on one hand, the
inactivity and lack of interest shown by foreign institutional investors, who are
alleged to hold close to a 20 per cent stake in German corporation, are viewed
as problems. The main concern is that decreasing attendance at general
meetings will produce random majorities and facilitate unfriendly take-overs
(laibler, 1991). On the other hand, the European Community's financial
market integration program is fundamentally changing the German capital
market (Warren, 1990). More importantly, Germany is now addressing, with
more vigour than ever before, the problem of insider trading in accordance
with the European Community directive on insider trading. On 1 st August
1994, the Securities Trading Act (Wertpapierhandelsgesetz) finally entered
into force under which insider trading is a criminal offence punishable by fines
or imprisonment of up to five years (Kim, 1995).
2.2.1.3 The Japanese shareholding structures
The Japanese corporate governance mode presents distinct features
which are mainly closely related to the unique Japanese style of industrial
organisation. The latter affects the ownership structure and corporate
performance, both of which determine the corporate governance structure. In
this regard, Lichtenberg and Pushner (1994) prove that equity ownership by
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financial institutions in Japan may effectively substitute for the missing
external take-over market by resulting in monitoring and intervention which
minimise the danger of lapses in productivity. In contrast, they found evidence
that high levels of inter corporate shareholding insulate firms from their own
problems, at the expense of firm performance. They also found a notable
influence of insider ownership, but no evidence that the influence of financial
institutions has diminished in the globalisation and prosperity of the 1980s.
In Japan, the major principals are financial institutions and other
corporations. The former often hold debt as well as equity. Firms affiliated
with financial "keiretsu" groups typically show a large ownership share by
financial institutions and/or a high level of intercorporate shareholding among
business group members. These affiliated firms represent about 61 per cent of
the market capitalisation of the Tokyo Stock Exchange (Shale, 1990). While
the shares of financial institutions and other corporations vary considerably
across firms. Nakatani (1984) finds that the average level of financial
institutions and corporate shareholding are similar among group affiliated and
independent firms. Subsidiary firms, however, show lower institutional
shareholdings and higher corporate ownership shares on average. Gerlach
(1993) proposes an underlying structure of share ownership in Japan that is
shaped by a "logic of intercorporate, strategic interests," where investors are
concerned with a more complex set of goals than capital market returns.
Gilson and Roe (1993) describe the Japanese ownership structure as a system
of contractual governance which influence both corporate governance and
industrial organisation. This system is intended to facilitate relational
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investments, of which financial capital is just one component. Cross-
ownership can thus reduce the costs of information transfer and increase the
incentives and means for intervention by stockholders. Kester (1991) argues
that the Japanese corporate governance system has obviated the need for an
external corporate control market. As Kester puts it:
"It (Japan) has not needed such a market because of the
efficiency with which the traditional Japanese
corporate governance system has dealt with the trading
hazards of the marketplace and the agency problems of
large organizations." (Kester, 1991: 271).
Sheard (1989) also contends that the combination of main bank
monitoring and interlocking shareholding effectively substitute for the
"missing" external take-over market in Japan. It is obvious, therefore, that the
Japanese system of monitoring and governance seeks to maximise value by
supporting efficient long-term production relationships among financial and
manufacturing firms. In Japan, although ownership is not nearly as
concentrated as in Germany, large cross-holdings as well as share holdings by
major banks are the norm (Prowse, 1992; Berglôf and Perotti, 1994; OECD,
1995). The role of the main bank is considered particularly important. Each
bank can hold a maximum of 5 per cent of firm's equity by law (reduced from
10 per cent as of the end of 1987). Typically, there is one main bank that is
responsible for monitoring the firm's business affairs and intervening in times
of crises. The potential threat of bank take-over may play an important
monitoring function when the financial system is viewed as a whole. One can
not deny that in the Japanese practice there is a close positive relationship
between the degrees of management freedom from bank control and the level
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of corporate rate profits. Nevertheless, in normal circumstances the main bank
does not exercise explicit control over corporate policy or management
selection (Aoki, 1990).
In contrast to the active reputation of institutional shareholders,
Japanese corporate cross-shareholding relies on the premise of inactivity,
leaving management unconstrained. Since interlocking corporate stockholding
has developed to such a degree that the take-over of the firm through open bids
is virtually impossible: management of the firm is free from the discipline
exercised by stockholders through the stock market (Aoki, 1989). Corporate
cross-shareholding developed with the express aim of deterring external take-
over, and seems to have been successful, as take-overs remain rare in Japan
(Lichtenberg, 1992). While this management freedom can enable improved
long-range planning, it may also insulate management from positive external
influences by keeping control in the hands of friendly fellow business group
members.
2.2.2 Advantages and disadvantages of concentrated ownership
Advantages of concentrated ownership
As concentrated share holdings and a predominant controlling
ownership seems to be relatively the norm around the most of the world, a
recent literature presents an evidence of the active role of large shareholders in
exercising corporate governance. In Germany, Franks and Mayer (1994) find
that large shareholders are associated with higher turnover of directors. Gorton
and Schmid (1996) show that bank block holders improve the performance of
German companies in their 1974 sample, and that both bank and nonbank
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block holders improve performance in a 1985 sample. For Japan, Kaplan and
Minton (1994) and Kang and Shivdasani (1995) show that firms with large
shareholders are more likely to replace managers in response to poor
performance than firms without them.
In most of the rest of the world, including most of Europe (e.g., Italy,
Finland, and Sweden), as well as Latin America, East Asia and Africa,
corporations typically have controlling owners who are often founders or their
offspring.
Obviously, permanent large shareholders and banks, such as those
dominating corporate governance in Germany and Japan, have some
advantages such as the ability to influence corporate management by patient,
informed investors. These investors may be better able to help distressed firms
as well. As Charkham (1994) has shown, German banks are large public
institutions that effectively control themselves. There is little evidence from
either Japan or Germany that banks are very tough in corporate governance.
Nevertheless, in Germany, large investor-oriented governance system
discourages small investors from participating in financial markets.
The advantages of concentrated ownership can also be shown through
the literature that links corporate large investors and corporate performance.
Cantillo (1995) indicates that Pujo investigation, which prompted Morgan and
other investment bankers to leave the many corporate boardrooms, the stock
prices of Morgan's client firms declined. While the reasons for the decline
could be several, one plausible interpretation is that the governance structure
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would be weakened, at least for a time. Adaptation, even if effective, usually is
not costless: the stockholders at the time adaptation takes place pay a price.
Roe (1997) indicates the financial advantages of large investors: large
investors can reduce a firm's cost of capital through reducing monitoring
costs, information costs, and industrial organisation costs. As for monitoring
costs, it is plausible to say that directors representing institutions with large
blocks of stock would presumably have the means, and their institutions have
the incentives, for more effective monitoring of managers in firms where these
institutions invest their money in. In principle, monitoring and corporate
governance should matter least in highly competitive markets with little fixed,
long-term capital and lots of growth opportunities. In these markets, managers
who destroy value, or fail to increase it fast enough, will be unable to raise
capital for growth and eventually be replaced.
But when markets are concentrated, or the firm's fixed investments are
large and its growth opportunities few, managers will be relatively free from
competitive and capital market pressures. In that setting, managers who fail to
use their capital efficiently need not face the consequences of error
immediately: whether because oligopoly provides slack, or the firm has lots of
long-lived capital in place, the firm can slowly waste away until one of the
governance mechanisms kicks in to make managers do their job better, or
replaces them. As for information costs, practices in the stock markets lead to
the result that the higher the information costs are, the higher the firm's cost of
capital. The idea is, when information about a company's strategy or prospects
is complex or soft (i.e., difficult to quantify), management often finds it hard
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to communicate it to outsiders. Stockholders with small holdings - and the
equity analysts who write research reports for them - may not have the
incentives to spend much time trying to understand complex, technological
information, so they might choose to ignore it and just look at the bottom line.
And managers with good, but proprietary information would not want to
reveal such information to the stock market because it could benefit their
competitors. Therefore, in either event, the stock market never gets the
information and, to the extent the market discounts share values for greater
uncertainty (i.e., assumes the worst), information costs end up raising the
firm's cost of capital.
Here the benefits of concentrated ownership can be realised. That is,
these soft, complex and proprietary information may be more readily
conveyed to those who sit regularly in the boardroom. In addition, the ability
to communicate the prospective value of a high-quality and cohesive middle
management team, or the import of technical data generated inside the firm,
may well be greatly improved by regular, private interaction between large
stable stockholders and managers. In this sense, concentrated ownership may
be able to lower the cost of capital by reducing information costs. It is obvious
that concentrated ownership structures can improve the flow of information
from inside the firm to large shareholders, thus helping to deter the short-
termism often seen in both managers' and investors' behaviour. The benefits
of concentrated ownership can also be realised by avoiding the shortcomings
of dispersed ownership and careless investors. In terms of the agency theory,
managers as well may incur some agency costs resulted from deappreciation of
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their efforts. That is, if managers increase the long run value of the firm in
ways that dispersed investors can not see right away, the managers may not get
the benefits right away (say, in the form of bonuses or payoffs from short term
stock options). Therefore, managers may pass up profitable investments with
long term payoffs while blaming the short termism of the stock market. Here it
is plausible to say that if the ownership is relatively concentrated enough, a
mutual appreciation between managers and large investors is likely. In
addition, large holdings give the owner the scale economies needed to justify
investing in the capability to acquire and process complex information. For
example, big block holders can afford to hire an engineering or marketing
consultants that a small stockholder would not think of hiring.
As for industrial organisation costs, they refer to costs incurred in
vertical integration where customers and suppliers are combined together in a
single organisational unit. This vertical integration may reduce managerial
accountability for each, thus lower incentives for efficiency. A promising
alternative lies in the multiple cross-holdings of stock by customers and
suppliers (Gilson and Roe, 1993; Roe, 1997). Roe (1997) states that:
"A customer that partly owns, say, 5% of the stock of a
supplier has less incentive to exploit the supplier than
one who doesn't. A customer that is a 5% stockholder
and sits on a supplier's board gets information with
which to monitor management not just as buyer of the
supplier's products, but also as a board member and
stockholder. If the customer tried to take advantage of
the supplier after the supplier has committed itself, a
"Keiretsu-like" coalition of shareholders could
intervene to stop the opportunism." (Roe, 1997: 19).
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The above concentrated ownership may take another form: a third-
party concentrated ownership. A third-party financier could cement these
partial relationships by owning some of the equity of both the suppliers and
the customers. In this regard, institutional investors are big enough to have
block holdings of each of the suppliers and customers in a co-ordinated
networks (Flath, 1996). As Roe (1997) suggests, that alternative, if it was
adopted by the U.S. companies, could have resulted in another governance
structure with better outcomes. Roe argues that, although there's evidence of
this in Japan, one could also imagine a role for such arrangements in the U.S.
Using such financing, for example, the pitfalls of the 1980s could have taken a
somewhat different course. In the U.S. the choice has tended to be an
"either/or" one, with possibilities lying only at the ends of the spectrum of
independence versus integration. But, with third-party financing, some related
companies might have been broken off from large vertical organisations, but
networks of co-ordination could have been retained when it was important to
do so.
Disadvantages of concentrated ownership
The benefits of large investors are theoretically clear: they have both
the interest in getting their money back and the power to demand it. But there
may be costs of large investors as well. That is, large investors are not
diversified, and hence bear excessive risk (Demsetz and Lelm, 1985).
However, the fact that ownership is so concentrated almost everywhere in the
world suggests that lack of diversification is not as great a private cost for
large investors to bear as relinquishing control.
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As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain the costs of large investors,
large investors may work within the context of the agency problem as well as
dispersed shareholders do. That is, it is quite possible that the large investors
represent their own interests, which need not coincide with the interests of
other investors and stakeholders in the firm. In the process of using his control
rights to maximise his own welfare, the large investor can therefore
redistribute wealth - in both efficient and inefficient ways - from others. This
cost of concentrated ownership becomes particularly important when others -
such as employees or minority investors - have their own firm-specific
investments to make, which are distorted because of possible expropriation by
the large investors. In this regard, one of the potential costs of having large
investors is a straightforward expropriation of other investors, managers, and
employees.
This straightforward expropriation can be inferred from the literature.
Large investors might try to treat themselves preferentially at the expense of
other investors and employees. Their ability to do so is especially great if their
control rights are significantly in excess of their cash flow rights. This happens
if they own equity with superior voting rights or if they control the firm
through a pyramid structure, i.e., if there is a substantial departure from one-
share-one-vote (Grossman and Hart, 1988; Harris and Raviv, 1988). In this
case, large investors have not only a strong preference, but also the ability not
to pay out cash flows as pro-rata distributions to all investors, but rather to pay
themselves only. Inefficient expropriation by large investors through pursuit of
personal (non-profit-maximising) objectives is evidenced as well. That is, the
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literature provides some work that shows that shares with superior voting
rights trade at a large premium, which gives an evidence of significant private
benefits of control that may come at the expense of minority shareholders.
Interestingly, the two countries where the voting premium is the lowest -
Sweden and the United States - are the two countries for which the studies of
expropriation of minorities have been made. Bergstr6m and Rydqvist (1990)
for Sweden and Barclay and Holderness (1989, 1992) for the United States do
not find evidence of substantial expropriation. In contrast, the causal evidence
provided by Zingales (1994) suggests that the expropriation problem is larger
in Italy, consistent with a much larger voting premium he finds in Italy.
Morck et al., (1988) present evidence on the relationship between cash
flow ownership of the largest shareholders and profitability of firms, as
measured by their Tobin's Qs. They found that profitability rises in the range
of ownership between 0 and 5 percent, and falls afterwards. One interpretation
of this finding is that, consistent with the role of incentives in reducing agency
costs, performance improves with higher manager and large shareholder
ownership at first. However, as ownership gets beyond a certain point, the
large owners gain nearly full control and are wealthy enough to prefer to use
firms to generate private benefits of control that are not shared by minority
shareholders. Thus there are costs associated with high ownership and
entrenchment, as well as with exceptionally dispersed ownership.
As Shleifer and Vishny (1997) explain, many countries do not do much
to protect minority investors rights, yet have large investors in the form of
families or banks. While this governance structure may control managers, it
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leaves potential minority investors unprotected and hence unwilling to invest.
Perhaps for this reason, countries in Continental Europe, such as Italy,
Germany and France have relatively small public equity markets. In this
regard, the existence of large equity market in Japan despite the weak
protection of minority investors is puzzling. The puzzle may be explained by
the predominance of low powered incentives within large Japanese institutions
or in the workings of reputations and implicit contracts in Japan. The Japanese
example brings up a very different view of large investors, namely that they
are too soft rather than too tough. This can be so for several reasons. First,
large investors, whether shareholders or creditors, may be soft when they
themselves are corporations with their own agency problems.
Another example is presented from Germany. Charkham (1994)
presents an evidence of the relatively soft large investors (e.g., banks) and
weak public stock market. The reason is that German banks virtually control
themselves. Charkham points out that at general meetings in recent years,
Deutsche Bank held voting rights for 47.2 per cent of its shares, Dresdner for
59.25 per cent, and Commerzbank for 30.29 per cent.
2.3 The Banks Governance
Banks, as well as large bond holders, are considered as an active
players in corporate governance. The empirical evidence of their role is
relatively small in comparison with the role of large shareholders. However, a
significant role of banks in corporate governance is observed more in Japan
and Germany than in the United States. Roe (1997) indicates a historical view
of the role of the American banks in corporate governance. U.S. banks could
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not play a full range of roles because (national banks were limited to a single
location) and limited powers (they could not own stocks). In the U.S. at the
turn of the century, there were no financial institutions of sufficient size and
geographical diversity to provide the bulk of needed capital directly to
America's new large enterprises. For Japan, Kaplan and Minton (1994) and
Kang and Shivdasani (1995) document the higher incidence of management
turnover in response to poor performance in companies that have a principal
banking relationship relative to companies that do not. For Germany, Gorton
and Schmid (1996) find evidence of banks improving company performance
(to the extent they hold equity) more than other block holders do in 1974,
although this is not so in 1985. For the United States, De Long (1991) points
to a significant governance role played by J. P. Morgan partners in the
companies J. P. Morgan invested in the early 20 th century. More recently, U.S.
banks started to play a major governance role in bankruptcies, when they
change managers and directors (Gilson, 1990).
As banking finance is quite substantial in Germany and Japan, the
powers of the banks vis-a-vis companies are very significant because banks
vote significant blocks of shares, sit on boards of directors, play a dominant
role in lending and operate in a legal environment favourable to creditors. In
other countries, especially where procedures for turning control over to the
banks are not well established, bank governance is less likely to be effective as
in Italy (Barca, 1996).
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2.4 Corporate Governance through the Board of Directors
In this stage, it is important to determine the magnitude of the board of
directors' influence over corporate decisions. That is, there is a need to
examine the differences between the influences of the board of directors, in
different business systems, on corporate decisions, thus its influence on the
way the firm responses and interacts in the marketplace.
The structure of corporate boards in international contexts varies
greatly ranging from two-tier supervisory and management boards in
Germany, to insider-dominated boards in Japan, to mixed boards in the United
States. In business, accountability is essential as a means of maintaining
standards of competence. The question of board effectiveness in any of these
countries has proved to be controversial.
2.4.1 The effectiveness of the board of directors: A comparative
international perspectives
2.4.1.1 The U.S. board of directors: Advantages and disadvantages
The typical function of the U.S. board of directors is to check on
management. Typically, the structure of the U.S. board of directors is formed
when the shareholders elect the board. This means that the shareholders can
propose a slate of their own. In practice, this seldom occurs and even when it
does, it usually fails, which means that the American corporate board is single
tier (Charkham, 1994). The board consists of executive directors, who are
members of the management team, and nonexecutive directors, who are
outsiders. Recently, the tendency has been for outside directors to constitute a
significant minority or, more usually, a majority (Hart, 1995). It is very
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common to find that the Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is the only executive
on the board. However, the CEO may have fellow executives on the board.
Typically, these fellows are the president or the Chief Operating Officer,
Financial Officer, or a senior vice-president.
As the CEO practically dominates the corporate power, his/her role on
the overall direction of the firm has been examined by many works. Mace
(1971) described the directors as merely 'Ornaments on a corporate Christmas
tree.' More recently, Lorsch and McIver (1989) stated that directors have
become more responsible than before because of litigation and public concern
which means that directors who accept appointment to a board are not
generally looking for troubles. Therefore, the relationship between the CEO
and the directors he/she has appointed, or who have appointed him/her, makes
this a natural attitude among members of the board. The directors' role is
enhanced when take-overs threaten because these have given rise to so much
litigation. What is different in the U.S. corporate governance system is that in
the normal course of business, directors have little to fear from the courts
because of the 'business judgement rule.' That is, the courts are most reluctant
to double-guess management decisions. This 'rule' may be enhanced if
directors do not have significant shareholdings. Rock (1991) argues that
because directors do not generally have significant shareholdings and do not
depend on the shareholders, they lack any significant economic incentive to
discipline management. To the extent that they are economically or
psychologically dependent on management, they have significant incentives
not to act as the shareholders' champion.
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In the United States, boards, especially those dominated by outside
directors, sometimes remove top managers after poor performance (Weisbach,
1988). However, a true performance disaster is required before boards actually
act (Warner et al., 1988). The general feeling in the U.S. among thoughtful
commentators is that U.S. management is often not accountable enough. The
board does not often work properly and shareholders, especially when they are
dispersed and/or their shareholdings are fragmented, seldom work at all. The
management may fear the market but its tendency will be to entrench and
reward itself well enough to reduce the financial consequences of
displacement (Lowenstein, 1988).
Jacobs (1991) refers to the problem of lack of communication between
the board of directors and investors as another reason for the ineffectiveness of
the U.S. board. Lack of communication prevents investors from understanding
management's long-term goals and objectives. Shareholders trade stocks so
often and hold such broadly diversified portfolios that they can not possibly
keep up with the business activities of the companies they own. Because most
U.S. investors are detached from the businesses they fund, they rely on
outward manifestations of what is really going on within the company;
namely, quarterly earnings and other accounting measures of performance.
These numbers only measure the past and do not explain the future. When they
are dissatisfied with corporate performance shareholders sell stock, rather than
trying to discern the causes of poor performance and using their collective
voice to communicate their concern to management. Jacob further explains
that companies exacerbate the problem by staking their boards with directors
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hand-picked by top management and insulating themselves from the oversight
traditionally provided by shareholders and lenders. In recent years, companies
have consistently disenfranchised their owners: they want access to capital
with no strings attached. But a lack of trust makes investors hesitant to fund
projects with no visible results for extended periods of times.
The above suggests that there is a need to improve the boards to work
better. In this concern, the Competitiveness Sub-Council Report (1993) states
that boards should ensure they have processes in place which enable them to
function independently in their task of monitoring and evaluating corporate
performance. One of the key aspects in so doing is establishing appropriate
procedures at the full board level to oversee the formulation and realisation of
the long-term strategic, financial and organisational goals of the corporation. It
is obvious that the report is trying to overcome the problems arise from the
directors' myopic, self-interested behaviour. The other key aspect states that
boards should establish criteria and procedures for evaluating their own
processes and performance, as well as that of the CEO. These criteria should
be based on a clear understanding of the board's accountability to shareholders
and, as appropriate, to various other constituencies of the corporation. This
criteria emphasises implicitly on the role of other constituencies, i.e.,
stakeholders in improving the board's awareness. This criteria, in conjunction
with the emphases on the long-term strategic, financial and organisational
goals, show what the U.S. board of directors lack to improve corporate
competitiveness.
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The effectiveness of the outside directors
An emphases has been put on the directors' monitoring role and the
role of outside directors in enhancing the effectiveness of the U.S. board of
directors. On one hand, it would hardly be reasonable to expect the executive
directors to monitor themselves. On the other hand, the nonexecutive directors
may not do a very good job of monitoring for several reasons. Allen (1992)
explains how the corporate business is run by both of the inside directors and
the outside directors. He states that one of the principal duty of the U.S. boards
of directors is monitoring the performance of senior management in an
informed way. Outside directors should function as an active monitors of
corporate management, not just in crises, but continually; they should have an
active role in the formulation of the long-term strategic, financial and
organisation goals of the corporation and should approve planes to achieve
those goals. They should as well engage in the periodic review of the short-
term and long-term performance according to plan and be prepared to press for
correction when in their judgement there is need.
For outside directors to assume a more active role in corporate
monitoring may require implementing changes of many kinds. They must
understand that their duty requires more of them than simply acting as advisers
and requires more than acting once a crises has arisen, which assumes that
they are to monitor the corporate performance on a long-term basis. In this
concern, effective long-term monitoring also requires a sympathetic and
productive relationship between the outside board members and the CEO and
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the acknowledgement by the CEO of the legitimacy of the monitoring role and
its requisites.
The effectiveness of long-term monitoring can be realised when the
outside directors have enough commitment of time and resources especially
information, and sometimes independent advice. As it goes in the U.S. system,
a few hours a quarter may satisfy the role of passive adviser in good times, but
it is never sufficient to meet the obligation to act as a monitor. Furthermore,
the demands of the director position are inconsistent with service on an
impressively long list of boards. Finally, nonexecutive directors may owe their
positions to management who proposed them as directors in the first place. As
well as feeling loyal to management, they may want to stay in management's
good graces, so they can be re-elected and continue to collect their fees (Hart,
1995). Non-executive directors may also represent companies that do business
with this company; major purchasers or suppliers, the company's lawyers, ...,
etc. This further compromises their independence (Weisbach, 1988).
2.4.1.2 The German and Japanese board of directors: Advantages and
disadvantages
When the comparative effectiveness of the board of directors across
different business systems is examined, the common factor of the comparison
is to be due to differences in corporate law with regard to the main purpose(s)
of corporation, therefore, what permits or prohibits a particular action. In this
concern, trends incorporate law in both Europe and Japan favour a
"community of interests" model of the corporation: a model of corporate
governance that constituency statutes may encourage in the United States
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(Wallman, 1990). A brief international overview reveals that much of the rest
of the industrialised world has a different idea of "what the corporation is" and
"whom it is for."
The "codetermination" corporate laws in Germany, which mandate
employee representation on second-tier supervisory boards of directors that
oversee lower-tier managing boards, apparently have proven successful
(Buxbaum, 1991; Ktibler, 1991). "Codetermination" in some ways resembles
the approach recommended in constituency statutes, which do not require, but
permit, board representation of employees and other nonshareholder interests
(Orts, 1992).
In the UK, a country sharing many legal similarities with the U.S., a
clause in the Companies Act provides as follows:
"The matters to which the directors of a company are
to have regard in the performance of their functions
shall include the interest of the company's employees
in general as well as the interests of its members."
(Conard, 1991: 80).
Unlike most constituency statutes, it is obvious that considering the
interests of employees is mandatory. More importantly, the European
Community is poised to adopt corporate harmonisation of the laws of its
member states and to institute a new 'European company.' The EC company
law includes provisions permitting corporations to take into account interests
beyond those of shareholders. As Kolvenbach (1990) writes:
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"The company law harminazation program of the
European Community has as its principal components
the coordination, safeguarding, protection and
equivalence necessary to protect shareholders,
creditors, customers, potential investors and, last, but
not least, the employees of companies in the Member
States." (Kolvenbach, 1990: 709).
As for the Japanese corporate governance mode, it also shares an
affinity with constituency statutes. The typical large Japanese corporation is a
coalition of stakeholders — suppliers, lenders, customers, shareholders —
holding a complex blend of senior and junior, short-term and long-term,
conditional and unconditional, implicit and explicit claims against the
company (Kester, 1991). This shows that, in terms of head-to-head
competition, the Japanese communitarian companies have been impossible to
beat (Thurow, 1992). What is different in the Japanese corporate governance
mode is that it is due more to cultural and historical, rather than legal,
differences. Custom and perhaps a difference in ethics — along with a large
dose of economics — are more responsible than law in shaping the
development of the Japanese corporation (Coffee, 1991; Aoki, 1990).
The evidence on Japan and Germany (Kaplan, 1994a,b) similarly
indicates that boards are quite passive except in extreme circumstances. Mace
(1971) and Jensen (1993) argue very strongly that, as a general rule, corporate
boards in the United States are captured by the management. The U.S. board'
practices are a good example of the power of the CEOs. In theory, large firms
elect the board of directors, and the board appoints the CEO. But the actual
flow of power in the U.S. boards ran in reverse: the CEO recommended
nominees to the board. Board members were typically either insider-
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employees or other CEOs with little reason to invest time and energy in
second-guessing the incumbent CEO. The CEOs recommendation for the
board went out to the shareholders, whose small shareholdings gave them little
incentive (i.e., the free rider problem is an example) to find alternatives: they
checked off the proxy card and returned it to the incumbents. In this fashion,
the CEO dominated the election and the firm. In addition, although the balance
of power may have shifted with the recent increase in shareholder and board-
level activism, as recently as the 1980s, many directors continued to 'feel they
are serving at the pleasure of the CEO-Chairman."( Lorsch and MacIver,
1989).
2.5 Non-Governing Corporate Finance
It is obvious that corporate governance mechanisms include a
relatively high agency costs, which means conflicts of interests between
managers and financiers still do exist to the extent that managers, in most
cases, are in a good position to expropriate shareholders by taking decisions
that benefit the managers rather than the shareholders. The puzzle is, despite
the prevalence of agency costs, the external finance is prevalent in most of the
developed countries, which means that investors, in some cases, do not mind
to be apart of their money.
The literature of corporate governance presents two explanations for
this puzzle. Both of them do not rely on governance insights, rather on the
hope that investors will make money in the future. Firstly, the idea that firms
and managers have reputation that, by losing it, they may not be able to raise
external finance. In general, reputation-building is a very common explanation
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for why people deliver on their agreements even if they can not be forced to
(Kreps, 1990). In the financing context, the argument is that managers repay
investors because they want to come to the capital market and raise funds in
the future, and hence need to establish a reputation as good risks in order to
convince future investors to give them money (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
Several articles have presented reputation-building models of private
financing. Diamond (1989, 1991) shows how firms establish reputations as
good borrowers by repaying their short term loans. Gomes (1996) shows how
dividend payments create reputations that enable firms to raise equity.
Investors optimism give a explanation for why investors give their
money to companies without receiving control rights in exchange. That is,
when investors get excited about a company, they finance it without thinking
much about getting their money back, simply counting on short run share
appreciation. In practise, the prevalence of investors optimism has created
what is so-called "Ponzi scheme" (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). In this scheme
promoters raise external funds sequentially, and use the funds raised from later
investors to pay off initial investors, thereby creating an illusion of high
returns. Even without Ponzi schemes, if investors are sufficiently optimistic
about capital gains in the short run, and are prepared to apart with their money
without regard for how the firm will ultimately pay them back, then external
finance can be sustained without effective governance.
On the other hand, another schemes called "Pyramid schemes" have
been an essential element of all major financial markets (Shleifer and Vishny,
1997). In this regard, most railroad booms in the world were financed by
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investors who had virtually no protection, only hope. These schemes
commonly occur where legal protection of investors is weak. For example,
Russia, as a transition economy, has a pyramid scheme called "MMM." In this
scheme, millions of people subscribed to shares of a company that used the
proceeds to advertise on television while running a Ponzi scheme. Investors
optimism is illustrated also in the rapidly growing East Asian economies,
where investors optimism about near-term appreciation lead them to overlook
the weakness of the mechanisms that can force managers to repay investors.
2.6 Conclusion
This chapter highlights the basic institutional characteristics of
corporate governance mechanisms in each business system. In general, the
Anglo-Saxon business system is a stock market-driven system, which means
that corporate performance is determined by outsiders who relate corporate
performance to the stock market valuation. This is because their relatively
dispersed ownership and the relatively high transaction costs do not allow
them to scrutinise corporate performance on internal basis.
The German business system is characterised by relatively dominant
role by banks' large ownership and the pyramids of family large ownership.
The tendency towards corporate self-financing is observed as well. This allows
the German business system to relatively internalise the evaluation of
corporate performance.
The Japanese business system is characterised by a different capital
structure: corporate cross-ownership. This affiliated structure of ownership
results in what is so-called "keiretsu" groups, which entails financial and
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business reciprocal relationships. This results in corporate performance to be
reciprocally evaluated as well.
In this concern, the role of the board of directors in each corporate
governance system is crucial in determining the criteria against which
corporate performance is to be measured. That is, the boards role is one of the
determinants of corporate competitiveness.
128
CONCLUSION OF PART ONE
Part one focuses primarily on the current practices of corporate
governance as equivalent to practices of corporate finance. The existence of
the agency problem has resulted in measuring corporate performance
according to transaction costs analysis which focuses on what can be easily
and less costly measured. In this regard, it is worth to note that the differences
between and among the three corporate governance systems are inherent in
certain institutional infrastructure that affects the adopted corporate
governance mode. In this sense, the common corporate governance practices
tend to focus on only one aspect of conducting business affairs: the financial
aspects. Although the financial aspects and criteria are important for
measuring corporate performance, there are also additional aspects and
measures that are to be focused on. This is the core of the part two of this
study.
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PART TWO
CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND CORPORATE
COMPETITIVENESS: AN INTERNATIONAL
PERSPECTIVES
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INTRODUCTION
This part empirically examines issues related to non-financial
governance structures that may help companies to enhance their relative
competitive position in the marketplace. In this sense, there is an extensive
research done in the role of the stock market mechanisms, bank debt
mechanisms, and the board of directors mechanisms in monitoring corporate
management's incentives.
In general, the stock market financial control mechanisms are those
stated in the market for corporate control. Bank control mechanisms are those
stated in the role of bank loans in disciplining management including
bankruptcy. The board mechanisms are those stated in the role of the board of
directors in monitoring management such as adoption of poison pills, payment
of Greenmail, Golden Parachutes, and management Buy-Outs.
The mechanisms mentioned above do not explore the contribution
from business-social studies that provide an additional governance structures.
The social-business studies draw attention to the influences of the collective
and collaborative actions on corporate affairs. In addition, the most
distinguished characteristic of the social-business studies is that they are
common factors that affect corporate affairs in any international business
system and they are effectual as well in any development stage.
In this sense, this part empirically examines two issues inherent in
corporate social affairs: the corporate orientation towards its stakeholders
interests, and the corporate orientation towards strengthening its identity, thus
its relative competitive position in the marketplace. The last issue examined in
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this study is the monitoring of corporate transitional performance in Egypt on
the basis that active monitoring ultimately enhances companies' relative
competitive position and helps to avoid drastic social pitfalls in a transitional
stage.
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Chapter 3
Corporate Stakeholders, Performance and Governance:
Empirical Evidence from the Banking Industry.
s A version of this chapter is forthcoming in the Academy of Management Journal.
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3.1 Introduction
The issue of shareholders versus stakeholders orientation has been
debatable in the literature. The debate is intense in different business systems
with different corporate orientations that stem from different institutional
infrastructures. The scholars who examined the magnitude of this debate
focused on the legitimacy of shareholders versus stakeholders supremacy. This
resulted in an extensive theoretical frameworks to this issue rather than to its
practicality. Accordingly this chapter examines the practical aspects of this
issue.
The chapter begins with a brief legal view of corporate stakeholders
orientation on the ground that a 'company' is a legal entity in the first place
and its business affairs are to be conducted in accordance with legal
boundaries. Here, the researcher discusses the role of the boards orientation in
running the corporate affairs. As long as the differences in the institutional
infrastructures in different business systems result in different corporate
orientations, the banking industry, as a financial institution, was chosen to
examine the practical aspects of corporate shareholders versus stakeholders
orientation.
3.2 Corporate Stakeholders and Corporate Law
The idea of stakeholding seems to have first emerged in the 1960s,
developing as a deliberate play on 'stockholders,' the American equivalent of
'shareholders' (Goodpaster, 1991; Jones, 1995). In the 1980s, the discussion of
stalceholding company has centred on the responsibilities and duties of
managers, with the proponents of stakeholding making a variety of different
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proposals for legal reform, most notably an extension of directors' fiduciary
duties, board representation or voting rights for stakeholders groups, greater
disclosure of corporate information, and severance payments for employees.
Handy (1994), for example, asserts that the 'modern corporation' is an
'existential company' with a life and future of its own, an end in itself not an
instrument owned by others. It is apparent, therefore, that Handy rests his
analysis on the fact that shareholders are not regarded in law as the owners of
the company's assets, thus the company has to develop its own 'sense of
identity'. In addition, he argues that the satisfaction of shareholders (mere
'financiers') is a corporate requirement but not a corporate purpose. Handy
concludes that companies need to be `reconceptulaised' as communities which
need customers, suppliers, financiers and community support if they are to
survive and prosper in the interests of all.
Another stakeholding model developed by Parkinson (1996) is
advocating not the replacement of profit seeking with multiple, co-equal goals,
but the adoption of constraints on profit seeking. In this regard, the Anglo-
American labour lawyers support proposals to reconceptualise the company as
a means to improving the lot of the workers: their renewed interest in the
company law has been prompted by a growing awareness of the limitation of
collective bargaining (Collins, 1993). Although these limitations had long
been apparent, they have been exacerbated in recent years by the dramatic
labour market changes brought about by the transition from a Fordist to a post-
Fordist or flexible regime of production, prominent among them a decline in
Union density and strength, a rise in job insecurity and a growth in the part-
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time or 'contingent' workforce. Here, labour law is one of the cornerstones in
a stakeholding model that recognises the workforce as one of the corporate
stakeholders. For example, Klare (1993), referring to the stakeholding debates
taking place in the U.S. in the early 1990s, argued that labour law reform must
close the representation gap, giving all employees some form of participation
in enterprise governance. In his view, public and legal policies need to
encourage new and revitalised forms of workplace representation that ensures
that enterprises are structured and governed in a democratic manner, hence his
support for the entrenchment of works councils similar to those found in
Europe. In this context, he calls for a legal reconceptualisation of the
corporation, arguing that radicals should seek an `enlarge[d] vision of the firm
to see it as a political and social institution with its own organisational and
industrial relations dynamics'.
Collins' (1989) arguments are markedly similar to Mare's. Labour law
'as a vocation' seeks to address and to relieve a fundamental social and
economic problem in modern society: the subordination of labour to capital, or
of employees to employers. Like Mare, Collins expresses doubts that
proposals based on contractual models of the company can achieve significant
changes in the distribution of corporate power, advocating instead the use of
'an alternative organisational paradigm.' Collins argues that by promoting a
perception of the productive organisation as a 'public institution' with
responsibilities which go beyond the 'residual claims of capital,' it might be
possible to force owners of capital to respect a social obligation to minimise
the social costs of their action[s].' Crucially, such a reconceptualization would
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radically alter the status of employees, elevating them to members of the
organisation to be treated with respect and consulted over corporate plans, and
helped in the event of redundancy. It is clear that both Klare and Collins thus
echo Handy's (1994) stakeholding assertion that there is a need 'to rethink
what we mean by a company.' In this regard, the question is whether such a
radical reconceptualization of the company is capable of achieving the desired
goals. Ultimately, this is to be determined by the market forces, market
organisation and, at the end, a proper political institutions' support.
Kay and Silberston are presenting another contribution to the
stakeholders debate (Kay and Silberston, 1995). They point to recent corporate
collapses, frauds and scandals, trying to paint a picture of managers liberated
from direct shareholders control pursuing their own self-interest at the expense
of the company. Drawing parallels with the totalitarian political systems of
Eastern Europe before the fall of the Berlin wall, they suggest that large
corporations are in the hands of self-perpetuating governing elites who defend
themselves by claiming to act in the interests of the shareholders while fiercely
resisting the shareholders' interventions. In Britain, they suggest that the only
restraint on executive pay and perks appears to be the modesty of executives
themselves, and that is a commodity in increasingly short supply.
Again, Kay and Silberston stress on the fact that shareholders are not,
in law, the owners of the assets of companies, simply because they do not, and
are not in a position to, exercise the rights of ownership as traditionally
understood. In this context, they draw a clear distinction between the Anglo-
American and the German and Japanese conception of the corporation. In both
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Britain and America, corporations are seen as creations of private contract, as
private bodies defined by set of relationships between shareholders principals
and manager agents, a view which fails to recognise the reality of their
independent existence.
In continental Europe and Japan, on the other hand, a more realistic
view is adopted in which the large corporation is recognised as a public
institution with personality, character and aspiration of its own and as an entity
with a 'life independent from its shareholders or stakeholders. Therefore,
managers are inclined to view the development of the company as an end in
itself and corporate objectives are quite properly thought to 'encompass the
interests of a wide range of stakeholder groups - investors, employees,
suppliers, customers and managers. In this view, corporations are perfectly
naturally perceived as social institutions with public responsibilities.
In effect, Kay and Silberston's argument is that by embracing a
principal-agent conception of the company in which managers are meant to
'maximise shareholder value' and operate the company exclusively in their
interests, the Anglo-American law fails fully to recognise the reality of the
company's autonomous existence. They, therefore, advocate the adoption of a
trusteeship model of corporate governance in which boards of directors are
regarded, and regard themselves, as 'the trustees of the tangible and intangible
assets of the corporation, rather than as the agents of the shareholders.'
Directors' duties would be to 'preserve and enhance the value of the assets
under [their] control and to balance fairly the various claims to the returns
which these assets generate.' These assets would include the skills of the
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company's employees, the expectations of its customers and suppliers and its
reputation in the community. They assert that, while the agency model
'expects the manager to attach priority to the current shareholder interest,' the
manager as trustee would be expected to 'relate to the broader purpose of the
corporation, and not simply to the financial interests of shareholders.' The
trusteeship model, thus, embraces the German conception of the company as a
'social institution,' requiring the manager to 'balance the conflicting interests
of current stakeholders and additionally to weigh the interests of present and
future stakeholders.' More concretely, Kay and Silberston proposed fixed four-
year terms for public company chief executive, the appointment of board
chairs who are independent (in the sense of not receiving substantial
remuneration from the company) and the appointment of at least three
independent directors appointed only after proper consultation with
stakeholders. Although they rule out supervisory boards along German lines,
they hint that this model of corporate governance might entail adopting other
'noted institutions of the German social market economy.'
For Key and Silberston, the ultimate justification for the adoption of
the stakeholding model is to be found not in legal theory but in economic
performance. Stakeholding-organised companies are advocated not because
they are more democratic or socially responsible, but because they are more
competitive than those organised on more traditional Anglo-American lines.
Nevertheless, the stakeholding model that Key and Silberston have developed
is conservative because it advocates the idea that companies should not be
139
asked to promote social welfare or to be particularly socially responsible, but
to be 'good businesses.'
The idea of stakeholders addresses a number of pressing legitimation
problems. At a time when many are unemployed or experiencing chronic job
insecurity, for example, the recent scandals surrounding director's pay have
become a growing embarrassment, creating an impression not only of
managerial autonomy and unaccountability, but also of managerial greed.
They have provided fertile ground for the advocates of business ethics, social
audits and wider performance measures (Freeman, 1984; Preston and
Sapienza, 1990; Wood, 1991a,b; Hill and Jones, 1992; Donaldson and Preston,
1995; Swanson, 1995; Mitchell et al., 1997). Significantly, the Tomorrow's
Company report is at pain to stress the competitive importance to companies
of maintaining public confidence in the legitimacy of their operations and
business conduct, and of the need to be able to respond rapidly to changing
market conditions. That is, companies which are insensitive to changing
standards, as the report observes, can find themselves at the centre of media
and public outcry (Royal Society of Arts, 1995).
The above idea has to do with the ground roots of the different
capitalism orientations. That is, corporate competitiveness should be adaptable
enough to consider the strengths and weaknesses of the western capitalism. As
Ireland (1996a) states:
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"...western capitalism is itself experiencing
legitimation problems, despite its seeming economic
and political inviolability and the growing acceptance
of alleged market inevitabilities. Whereas in the past it
derived legitimation from the successful provision of
higher living standards, its very survival now appears
to require mass unemployment or underemployment,
poverty, homelessness, and the depression of living
and working conditions." (Ireland, 1996a: 306).
The Economist (1996) highlights another phase of the weakness of the
western capitalism, that from the White House to the Palace of Westminster
the cry is going up that higher profits and productivity are failing to deliver the
higher wages and job security they are supposed to. Therefore, the popularity
of stakeholding, with its notion of partnership and of the caring socially
friendly corporation, stems from being regarded as little more than the
currently fashionable remedy for a growing legitimation crisis which is
reflected by improperly run companies and insensitive managers.
Another important reason for the stalceholding popularity lies in the
globalisation of markets and the ever faster technological change: the rules of
the competitive race have been rewritten with rapidity of response and
flexibility becoming increasingly crucial. Thus the advocators for reforming
corporate law is considering that competitiveness organisational and
managerial forms adopted by the enterprise are becoming among the crucial
factors of corporate success. In this regard, Teubner (1994) argues that
contemporary problems of corporate governance and legitimation might best
be resolved by a radical autonomization of the corporation and its interests, not
merely from its shareholders but from all of the 'resource-holding interest
groups' associated with it. That is, Teubner builds his view on the
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differentiation of 'organisation' and 'contract' so as to encompass system and
environment. He advocates that all corporate resource holders - meaning
owners of capital, workers and management, as well as suppliers and
customers - should be interpreted not as 'part of the organisation' but as part of
its 'environment.' Thus the contractual network which links resource holders
should be viewed as `govern[ing] the external relationships between the
environment of the organisation and its members.' According to Teubner,
legal policy should direct its efforts at the institutional strengthening of the
corporate actor (Teubner's term of corporate autonomy or company as an
independent legal person). In this sense, corporate governance has been
abstractly cast as one between 'flexibility through contract' and 'flexibility
through organisation.' According to Teubner, flexibility through contract -
which can be applied to methods of financing and technologies, as well as the
employment of labour - is essentially premised upon dispensability, upon
keeping a firm's long-term ties and commitments to a minimum so as to
maximise its ability to respond rapidly and at short notice to changes and
fluctuations in its environments.
But some argue that flexibility obtained in this way tends to undermine
long-term relationships of co-operation, destroying 'organisational surplus
value.' Only through deepened relationships with, and between, employees,
customers, suppliers, investors and the community, companies will be able to
anticipate, innovate and adapt fast enough and maintaining public confidence
as well (Royal Society of Arts, 1995). In this regard, only by developing an
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'organisational approach to flexibility,' the long-term relationships which
enable the organisation to flourish will be preserved.
The above two alternatives of flexibility are viewed as a choice
between 'Americanisation' and `Japanisation,' or between the `neo-American'
and 'Rhine' model (Albert, 1993). The idea is that German and Japanese
corporations, with their emphasis on the autonomous interest of the company
and on its wider social duties and responsibilities, are competitively superior
to their Anglo-American counterparts with their emphasis on shareholder
rights and profits maximisation. Corporate competitiveness, therefore, is
linked to a more stakeholding-oriented organisational and management
arrangements by considering the modern methods of production, in which the
nature and composition of industrial capital has undergone significant changes.
Tomorrow's Company report highlights those changes, thus their link
to stakeholding-orientation perspectives (Royal Society of Arts, 1995). The
report states that 'the centre of gravity in business success is shifting from
exploitation of a company's physical assets to the realisation of the creativity
and learning potential of all the people with whom it has contact.' Moreover,
the report claims that the human capital and knowledge worker are becoming
increasingly important to the extent that it demands a more 'inclusive'
organisational structure and management style for outstanding businesses see
continuity and stability in their relationship with employees, customers and
suppliers as essential for a flexible and co-operative response to change. In this
regard, Reichheld (1996) focuses on the importance for management to build
long-term relationships with all corporate constituencies. Moreover, he warns
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against focusing narrowly on financial measures of short-term profits, and
advocates 'loyalty-based management' which emphasises the long-term
preservation of human capital from the pressures of raising short-term
earnings.
3.3 Corporate Board-Stakeholders Orientation: A Case of Exploitation or
Exploration?
The legal embededdness of corporate autonomy, viewing the company
as a separate legal entity, does include that non of the corporate constituencies
is attached to the corporate legal identity. This means that corporate managers
are in a good position to consider what is in the best interest to the company as
a whole. They are not obliged, by law, to act to the interest of one corporate
group at the expense of the others. Therefore, a practical explanation for the
differences among corporate managers' orientation in different industries and
in different business systems can be found in the common practises in the
market for corporate control. That is, managers who are focusing more on
shareholders' interests than other corporate constituencies' interests are doing
so merely because of their fear from take-overs, thus the fear that a new
owners may dismiss them. This idea is shows in figure (3-1).
Stakeholding	 Corporate autonomy
Capitalism	 (Legal entity)
Figure (3-1): The board of directors and corporate law
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Philip Goldenberg argues in Tomorrow's Company report (Royal
Society of Arts, 1995) that not only is the traditional shareholder-only view of
the firm mistaken ( a historic misconception), but so too is the idea that
stakeholding means serving the interests of shareholders, employees,
customers and community equally (the modern misconception). Goldenberg
emphasises on the view that directors' duties should be owed to the company
as a separate entity, not to any third party group (Caulkin, 1996). Therefore,
the fear from dismiss is a logic explanation for what is referred to, in the
literature of corporate governance, as managers discretion behaviour, i.e.,
considering shareholders' interests as a high priority over other corporate
constituencies' interests. Thus managers discretion behaviour is aiming at
defending solely their interests in the company rather than the company's
interests. In fact, this is a result from a dilemma in corporate law. That is,
although the corporate law, as referred above in the legal embeddedness of
corporate autonomy, does not recognise any of the corporate constituencies as
owners of the company, it (corporate law) does, implicitly and practically,
recognise shareholders the upper hand and/or the reference group in electing
the board. Non of the other corporate constituencies, by law, has anything to
do with electing the board. This is one of the main reasons that explains why
corporate governance has been always attached to corporate finance.
In that context, shareholders power over electing the corporate board is
the major characteristic of the Anglo-Saxon business system. But that power
has alternative business strand which is observed in the other business systems
that allow cross-holding, or cross ownership: this is the main characteristic in
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the German and Japanese business systems. In these two systems, the clients
of a company, its suppliers, and even other companies in the industry are
shareholders in that company. Here, when the company is considering the
shareholders' interests, it is in fact considering other corporate constituencies'
interests. Despite this orientation is still attaching corporate governance to
corporate finance, it forces the company not to ignore the other corporate
constituencies' interests. Therefore, the difference in ownership arrangements,
ranging from concentrated ownership to dispersed ownership, are explained by
differences in institutional arrangements. The latter, in the context of
institutional analysis, have their origins in differences in the cultural
orientation that made an institutional path dominant over other alternatives
(North, 1996; Hirsch and Lounsbury, 1996). Therefore, there is a need to
consider the effects of the cultural orientation on possible corporate
governance arrangements: one of them is the stakeholding orientation.'
In this regard, Fukuyama (1995) highlights the importance of culture to
international competitiveness. He embraces the claim that henceforth the
primary identification of people will be cultural not ideological, extending it to
argue that culture will be crucial to competitive success in the global economy.
More specifically, he asserts that 'a nation's well-being, as well as its ability to
compete, is conditioned by a single, pervasive cultural characteristic: the level
of trust inherent in the society.'
The above thoughts about the role of trust in industrial organisation is
relevant to the stakeholders argument, in a sense that stakeholding company is
all about building long-term and mutually beneficial relationships with all
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corporate constituencies in a way that helps the company to respond and
compete successfully (Hosmer, 1995). In that sense, Fukuyama shows the
relevance of trust to industrial organisation through number of examples.
Toyota, one of the forerunners of 'lean' production are able to delegate to
workers great power, including the power to actually stop the production line,
precisely because they know that their trust will not be abused. Similarly, the
German workplace is flexible and egalitarian because workers trust their
managers and fellow workers to a higher degree than in other European
countries. Fukuyama, thus, claims that there is a need, both at the level of
society as a whole and at the level of the individual firm, for a sense of
community and solidarity, a sense capable of ensuring that people are
motivated by something broader than individual self interest. There is a need
for communities who 'share norms and values' and who are 'able to
subordinate individual interest to those of large groups.' Economic success in
the liberal democratic capitalism which constitutes history's end thus needs
more than law, contract, rights, and rationality, it needs 'reciprocity, moral
obligation, duty toward community and trust: certain premodern (not
postmodern) cultural habits.'
At the level of the productive enterprise, this is particularly important
in the post-Fordist era of flexible production precisely because of the
increasing reliance in production on the knowledge, skills, adaptability of
human beings and on rapid organisational innovation. Therefore, Fukuyama is
supportive of certain forms of worker participation and democratisation, such
as German-style works council, seeing them as giving institutional form to the
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'idea of community of interest between workers and management.' In that
sense, companies seeking to downsize might have to submit planes for
compensating, retraining, or relocating workers to be laid off - but they help to
develop among workers greater flexibility and a better sense of the need to
keep their companies competitive. In fact, the co-operative relationships and
trust are themes which underlie many stakeholding models with their emphasis
on industrial partnership (Parkinson, 1996). Tomorrow's Company report also
stresses the need to move away from an adversarial 'us' and 'them' business
culture toward one of 'reciprocal relationships' and 'shared ambitions.'
Therefore, the interest of the company' directors is to be essentially a long-
term interest in the productive assets of an organisation, including the skills of
its labour force, particularly those of its core workers, while the interest of the
shareholders is a money capital interest in revenue and in the fictitious capital
value of the share, an interest which is potentially short-term and transient.
Thus, Tomorrow's Company report arguing that many CEOs mistakenly
believe that their legal duty is to their current shareholders when, in fact, their
duties are owed to 'the company, not to any specific third party group' (Royal
Society of Arts, 1995). As fiduciaries, they must have regard to the interest of
shareholders, but that obligation is not related to the holders of shares at one
particular time, it is related to the general body of shareholders from time to
time. The need is for directors to arrive at a balanced judgement about
maximising the company's value on a sustainable basis, and not necessarily to
take a short-term view of maximising returns for current shareholders.
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The above discussion, therefore, explains the role of managers in the
stakeholding company by stressing on the need for managers to switch their
attention away from pleasing the current body of shareholders, which might
for example lead to pressure to cut development expenditure to meet
immediate profit targets, and to redirect it towards the strategic, long-term
health of their companies (Day and Nedungadi, 1994). Therefore, one of the
concepts that animates the report is that of 'sustainable success,' in which
people and relationships are more than ever the key.
In this sense, the literature of corporate governance provides an
alternative financial governance structure in line with the above co-operatives.
This alternative is what is so-called third-party financier, which is common in
the Japanese style of corporate governance (Flath, 1996). This alternative
means that an institutional investor have a blockholding in two related
companies: one company provides supplies to the other company (i.e.,
customer-supplier relationship). In this alternative arrangement, the third-party
financier is supposed to co-ordinate relationships between the customer
company and the supplier company to the extent that results in low co-
ordination costs which might have been incurred by each or both. In this
regard, the financing institution may broker deals when disputes between
customers and suppliers come up, and smooth relationship during normal
times.
The point is that this pattern of co-ordination is apparently
characterised as a "financial-based co-ordination," where suppliers of capital
can have financial stakes by joining together in a Keiretsu -like structure.
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Although this structure can be looked at from the viewpoint of "stakeholders
theory," it is actually a part of this theory. The reason is that this structure is
feasible only in the cases of industrial organisation where customers, who are
commonly firms, can join with suppliers, who are commonly firms as well, in
such ways that both can Influence each other's decisions.
The complete picture of the stakeholders theory can be drawn by
considering that suppliers of capital can also be small investors with small
financial stakes in the firm. These small investors are much likely to be
customers or suppliers or even the firm's employees (ESOPs are an example)
who are all investing their money in. Therefore, these stakeholders are more
influential since they are suppliers of capital, sources of revenues, and services
providers as well.
3.4 Shareholder versus Stakeholder Systems: An International
Comparison
The growing literature on inter-corporate relationships, control and
governance such as Gerlach and Lincoln (1992), Jensen (1993), Kester (1993)
and Gilson and Roe (1993) compare the legalistic, stock market-driven
approaches of the United States and the United Kingdom, or Anglo-Saxon
countries, with the more informal cross share holding system adopted in Japan
and Germany. Legal contracts with ultimate redress to courts are fundamental
to the operation of Anglo-Saxon business culture. It is extensively discussed
in works such as that of Jensen and Meekling (1976). What the United States
tradition treats as inefficient, especially collaboration among multiple groups,
is the means of doing business in countries such as Japan and Germany. Such
150
Financial
Markets
Financial
Markets
trust mediated relationships through major banks are the means by which
external stakeholders exercise control over internal management. This
"communitarian" approach is also evident in other continental European
countries such as Holland, Belgium, and the Scandinavian countries (Gilson
and Roe, 1993). As shown in works by Dobson (1990), Jones et al., (1997),
informal mechanisms based on trust, obligation and exchange of hostage
collateral may be fundamental to the effective business environment in
societies such as those of Germany and Japan. These two major systems are
compared in the figure (3-2) below.
Figure (3-2): Shareholders versus Stakeholders Systems
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Since the late 1980's, there has been an ongoing academic debate
between the relative strengths of the shareholder and stock market-driven
Anglo-Saxon countries such as the United States, United Kingdom versus the
stakeholder and bank-driven countries such as Germany and Japan (Gilson and
Roe, 1992; Kester, 1993). In order to better understand either the Japanese or
German stakeholder system, there is a need for greater understanding of the
institutuions, especially the "banks" that work with the private corporations in
establishing a strong institutions network for the whole country.
3.5 Banking Governance: An International Perspective
The evolving governing role of financial intermediaries is indicated
through a distinct body of literature that examines the screening and
monitoring activities of debt holders. It has evolved separately because it is
largely unconcerned with the self-interested behaviour of managers. Instead, it
assumes that managers are perfect agents of their shareholders and focuses on
the conflict between debt holders and equity holders. This literature explains
lending through financial intermediaries as delegated monitoring: the
intermediary pools money from investors, lends it, and monitors on their
behalf (Diamond, 1984; Leland and Pyle, 1977; Scott, 1986). In addition, the
benefits of the governing role of the intermediaries are indicated by
considering that intermediation resolves the problems of free-riding and
duplicative monitoring efforts. Moreover, the intermediary itself typically
enjoys information-producing economies that make it a superior screening and
monitoring agents (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Fama, 1985).
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The role of the banks in particular as a delegated monitors for their
depositors is well established in the literature (Benston and Smith, 1976;
Black, 1975; Campbell, 1979; Campbell and Kracaw, 1980). For the United
States, despite the relatively low range of roles that the American banks could
play due to historical restrictions (Roe, 1997), the banks could play an
influential role in monitoring and reacting to managerial slack (Triantis and
Daniels, 1995; Booth, 1992). For example, the definition of debt covenants
and events of default in lending agreement raise the likelihood that the lender
exit is prompted by slack rather than lender opportunism and thereby enhances
the information value of exit. As the presence of free cash facilitates
managerial slack, the governing phase of the bank loans is emphasised when
the lender is given either a security interest in assets of the borrower or some
other form of priority rights: these features constrain the ability of managers to
liquidate non-cash assets or to raise new funds by selling debt in the future.
Therefore, in the United States the governing role of banks is supportive to the
'stakeholders management,' since the concerns about the managerial slack are
shared to some degree by all parties who contribute to the enterprise. That is,
interdependencies exist even across classes of stakeholders (Levmore, 1982;
Adler, 1993, Stiglitz, 1985).
The benefits of banks governance are produced at several periods
throughout the relationship between the lender and its borrower. First, the
decision to lend signals to other stakeholders and potential stakeholders the
quality of the borrower (Fama, 1985, 1990). Second, other stakeholders know
that the imposition of fixed obligations under the loan agreement forces
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managers to avoid misusing free cash, thus reducing managerial slack in the
form of managerial perks or empire building (Jensen, 1986; Buckley, 1992).
As the stakeholders approach permits interrelationships between and
among stakeholders, then mutual benefits between and among them, Triantis
and Daniels (1995) promulgate a theory of 'interactive corporate governance'
based on the role of corporate banks debt as a mechanism that is able to
support other stakeholders' interests. As they put it:
"Under the theory of interactive corporate governance, this
system of interstalceholder signals permits information
gathered by dispersed stakeholders with concentrated
expertise and heterogeneous perspectives on the firm's
affairs to be communicated to those stakeholders best able
to correct the managerial slack. It is this interaction among
stakeholders who share governance responsibilities that
distinguishes our theory from interdependent government
theories that envision crisp delegations of responsibility."
(Triantis and Daniels, 1995: 1081).
It is obvious that the theory of interactive corporate governance imply
that the stakeholders benefit not only from the ability of banks to deter and
detect managerial slack by monitoring, but also from the actions taken by
banks following the detection of slack. A bank may respond by scaling down
or terminating its relations with the borrower (exit). Alternatively, the bank
may use its threat of exit to intervene in the decisions of the firm (voice)
(Hirschmann, 1970; James, 1987; Lummer and McConnell, 1989).
At a more general level, the banking industry play a fundamental role
in successful stakeholder systems. For example, the U.S. public corporations,
which operate under a shareholder business system, are required by securities
laws to disclose most instances of "exit" by a prominent lender (Block, 1985).
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The banks' exit may send an early signal to other stakeholders that prompts
them to act earlier than they might have otherwise in order to correct slack
(Ofek, 1993). The gains from voice are a function of the ability to influence
management and thereby improve firm performance. In exercising its "voice,"
the bank can draw on expertise and information acquired in the monitoring
stage. In addition, it may hold sufficient debt to have an incentive to intervene
on its own without facing the obstacles to collective action that impede the
exercise of governance rights by other diffuse stakeholder groups. In
particular, whereas dispersed shareholders may be unable to discipline
management effectively through their voting rights, a bank with a large
enough investment will have sufficient incentive to intervene effectively.
In addition, the U.S. legal arrangement assures bank's voice to be more
influential despite the known bias of lenders in favour of conservative
strategies that may not be value-maximising: the courts are prepared to permit
the exercise of bank voice to influence firm decisions. In this regard, the
exercise of bank voice prior to the firm's insolvency sends timely signals to
other stakeholders who may then react to correct any slack. The bank may
defer exit and use the threat of exit as a lever to intervene in the firm's
decisions. The leverage confers considerable discretion on the bank in its
exercise of voice (Triatis and Triantis, 1994). Moreover, the availability of
Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings offers corporate management a way to
forestall the collapse and correct its slack under the close scrutiny of its
creditors and the bankruptcy courts (Triantis, 1996; LoPucki and Triantis,
1994; Triantis and Daniels, 1995). De Long (1991), For example, points to a
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significant governance role played by J. P. Morgan partners in the companies
J. P. Morgan invested in the early 20 th century. More recently, U.S. banks
played a major governance role in bankruptcies when they change managers
and directors (Gilson, 1990).
In contrast, for stakeholder countries such as Japan, Kaplan and Minton
(1994) and Karig and Shivdasani (1995) document the higher incidence of
management turnover in response to poor performance in companies that have
a principal banking relationship relative to companies that do not. In addition
the Japanese main banks effectively monitor their debtors, helping to prevent
business failure (Gilson and Roe, 1993). These benefits are a result of the
Japanese system of corporate governance which is characterised by a complex
network of inter-corporate equity holdings, with Japanese banks at the centre
of the network (Morck and Nakamura, 1993). As a large number of
commentators have observed, bank oversight replaces the market for corporate
control in Japan (Sheard, 1989; Hoshi, et al., 1990; Prowse, 1992; Kaplan and
Minton, 1993; Aoki, et al., 1994; Gilson and Roe, 1993; Morck and
Nakamura, 1993). Alternatively, it is essential to ensure that the Japanese
system of federal deposit insurance guarantees the incentive of financial
institutions to monitor and influence corporate performance (Fruin, 1992;
Lichtenberg and Pushner, 1994; Bergleof and Perotti, 1994).
For Germany, it is characterised by its distinct 'Universal Banks
System,' which is the main focal point of German corporate governance
(Gilson, and Kraakman, 1993). The German firms obtain most of their external
financing from bank borrowing rather than capital markets: the German
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financial markets were suppressed for the benefit of big banks. Few individual
owners of shares attend shareholders' annual meetings in Germany, even by
proxy, except when their shares are deposited with big banks (Carney, 1997).
As a result, these banks cast over 82 per cent of the votes at meetings of
widely held corporations, and in most cases hold a majority of the shares
present and voting. Because these banks generally hold over three-quarters of
all shares present and voting, they have the power to amend articles of
incorporation and bylaws. In addition, most corporations have bylaw
provisions preventing any one shareholders from voting more than 5 per cent
of the company's stock, with an exception of shares voted by banks in their
capacity as custodians (Baums, 1992).
The effects of the universal banks on the German corporate
performance is empirically evidenced in the literature. Cable (1985), for
example, finds a significant, positive relationship between the degree of bank
involvement in a firm and its financial performance. As a result, bank
involvement supposedly improves the profitability of firms. Gorton and
Schmid (1996) find evidence of banks improving company performance (to
the extent they hold equity) more than other block holders do in 1974,
although this is not so in 1985. Commentators argue that German banks have
the position, information and power to effectively monitor the activity of
management and, when necessary, to discipline management (Gilson, and
Kraakman, 1993). In this regard, the most striking aspect of the AGs (the
German Aktiengesellschaft: the corporate organisational form) is that fixed
claimants, banks and employees, almost completely dominate the supervisory
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boards of these firms. Because German banks are heavily represented on the
supervisory boards (Roe, 1993b) and the boards of companies with more than
2000 employees must have employee representation equal to that of the
shareholders (laibler, 1991), the combined power of the fixed claimants
dominates the board.
Although banks account for only about 6 percent of large stakes in
German firms, they tend to exert effective control over a majority of the shares
voted in annual meetings. This is due to a prominent characteristic of the
German corporate governance system: German banks vote bearer shares that
they hold as custodians for small shareholder-clients of the banks brokerage
operations (Macey and Miller, 1995). This distinct characteristic shows the
ability of the German banks to consider and support corporate stakeholders'
interests, including the interests of the shareholders themselves. Furthermore,
Franks and Mayer (1992, 1997a,b) present an empirical evidence that bank
ownership is of significant importance through proxy votes, voting right
restrictions and board representation in the minority of widely held companies
with no single shareholder in excess of 25 per cent.
As banking finance is quite substantial in Germany and Japan, the
powers of the banks vis-a-vis companies are very significant because banks
vote significant blocks of shares, sit on boards of directors, play a dominant
role in lending and operate in a legal environment favourable to creditors. In
Italy, even where procedures for turning control over to the banks are not well
established, both macro-studies and micro-evidence show that Italian banks
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have played a central and crucial role in financing economic growth by
assessing the credit-worthiness of borrowing firms (Barca, 1996).
The overall picture of banks governance in the Anglo-Saxon countries
such as the United States and United Kingdom and Communitarian countries
such as Germany and Japan shows that banks have been positively
contributing to companies performance whether they invest in, or lend to,
these companies. Whatever the degree of their involvement in corporate
affairs, banks are able to monitor, and if necessary react to, corporate
performance (Triantis and Daniels, 1995). In addition, banks can overcome the
free rider problem in information gathering which afflicts lending by a large
number of dispersed investors (Diamond, 1984). Recent studies suggest that
there may be advantages to long-term relations between banks and firms: long-
term relations improve banks' evaluations of the quality of firms (Mayer,
1988, 1997; Sharpe, 1990; Vonthadden, 1995). Therefore, the positive effects
of banks' contribution on the economic growth in both of the Anglo-Saxon
and the Communitarian business systems encourage to claim that banks are
more capable of supporting the stakeholders' interests than the commonly
known stock market mechanisms of corporate governance.
Most notably, the study of the stakeholders' interests are not, and
should not be, an objective per se, rather it should incorporate these interests
to corporate competitiveness. As monitoring corporate competitiveness
requires institutional entities capable of producing and exploiting useful
information about companies performance, banks can provide solid
institutional governance that benefits other corporate stakeholders. In this
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regard, if the stock market is considered a qualified institution within which
corporate governance mechanisms provide tangible measure of corporate
performance, banks can provide an institutional certification capable of
producing and monitoring both of tangible and intangible measures of
corporate performance.
3.6 Banks-Corporate Stakeholders Orientation, Governance, and
Performance: An Empirical Evidence
3.6.1 Sample Consistency
As the two groups chosen in this study (the Corporate Loans Managers
and the Finance Directors) represent two point of views regarding the role of
creditors and the role of shareholders in the issues of corporate stakeholders,
an ANOVA analysis is carried out to show the significance of the two point of
views. To determine the extent of consistency between the two samples, a
simple factorial ANOVA is carried out for both of the two groups of the study
under the following assumption:
Ho /11 =1/2
1-11:1.11 ^ 11,2
Where p. 1 = mean of the first sample (Corporate Loans Managers).
p. 2 = mean of the second sample ( Finance Directors).
Table (3-1) shows summary of the results of the simple factorial
analysis for each of the dependent variables. As the simple factorial analysis
requires dependent variables (Ys), the researcher uses the banks performance
measures included in POLK World Banking Profiles (1996).1
. To avoid any source of bias when selecting any of the numerous measures of banks
performance, a correlation matrix was carried out between the dependent variables. The
dependent variables used in the simple factorial analysis are not those highly correlated with
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Table (3-1): Summary of simple factorial ANOVA2
Variables Y1 Y5 Y6 Y8 Y10 Yll Y12 Y13
p-value 0.917 0.459 0.515 0.735 0.458 0.368 0.581 0.435
The results of the simple factorial ANOVA show that p-value > 0.05
which means that the difference between the two samples is not significant.
3.6.2 Data Normality
The data normality is tested by carrying out x 2 test. The results are
shown in table (3-2).
Table (3-2): The statistical results of 2C 2 test of the variables of banks'
stakeholders orientation3
Variables p-value Variables p-value
Employees' contribution 0.061 Unions-relationship
development
0.057
The effects of the
suppliers
0.078 Suppliers-relationship
development
0.071
Customers' contribution 0.058 Interests of community 0.041
Creditors' contribution 0.053 The role of the employees 0.056
Shareholders' contribution 0.081 The role of the managers 0.054
Managers' contribution 0.043 The role of the suppliers 0.064
Community's contribution 0.071 The effects of the
shareholders
0.044
Unions' contribution 0.058 The role of the industrial
unions
0.081
Customers satisfaction 0.092 Governmental-relations
development
0.073
Employees development 0.032 Stakeholders-oriented
policies
0.055
Table (3-2) shows that four out of the twenty variables used in the
study are not normally distributed (p-value <0.05). That is, 80 per cent of data
are relatively normally distributed.
each other (in general, the correlation coefficients that are less than 0.50 are chosen). The
correlation matrix is included in the Appendix (3-1).
2 Y1 = Net Interest Income/Total Revenue; Y5 = Liquid Assets/Deposits & Borrowings; Y6 =
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans; Y8 = Provisions/Gross Loans; Y10 = Capital
Funds/Total Assets; Y11 = Return on Investment; Y12 = World Ranking (According to
Return on Assets), Y13 = Country Ranking (According to Return on Assets).
3 The x2 test is carried out at the significance level 95%.
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3.6.3 Data Validity
3.6.3.1 Content and construct validity
As for the content validity, after completing the questionnaire, it was
sent by mail to randomly selected 9 banks (which represent around 10 per cent
of the population of the study). The respondents were asked about the validity
of the measures for addressing the variables, ambiguity and difficulty in
responding. Six of those piloting banks replied and the questionnaire was
modified accordingly.
As for the construct validity, the variables used in the study have
basically been examined separately in other related studies in the literature of
corporate social responsibility, corporate social performance and stakeholder
management. In fact, there is an agreement between the scholars who
examined those variables on the operational definition of those variables.
Therefore, this provides an adequate evidence for construct validity.
3.6.3.2 Discriminant validity
A single-factor test was performed on the data in order to test for
discriminant validity (Podsakoff, and Organ, 1986). In order to provide a
multivariate perspective on the 20 variables included in the study, a Principal
Components Factor Analysis with varimax rotation is carried out. The decision
to include a variable in a factor was based on factor loadings greater than 0.50
and all factors whose eigenvalue was greater than one were retained in the
factor solution. (Tabachnick and Fide11, 1989; Hair et al., 1995). This analysis
yielded a five factor solution which accounts for 77.9 per cent of explained
variance. Table (3-3) shows a summary of the results of the Principal
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Component Factor Analysis. The loading solution resulted in virtually unique
significant factor loading as the resulted factors represent a principal issues
addressed in the literature of corporate governance and corporate stakeholders.
Therefore, the analysis provides evidence of discrimination between those
issues on the part of the respondents, and suggests that common method
variance is not problematic. This result is particularly important in validating
the respondents' perceptive ability to differentiate between the issues raised in
the questionnaire.
Table (3-3): Results of single-factor test for discriminant validity
Variables Factor 1 Factor 2 Factor 3 Factor 4 Factor 5
Employees' contribution 0.80
The effects of the suppliers L 0.72
Customers' contribution 0.76
Creditors' contribution 0.62
Shareholders' contribution 0.71
Managers' contribution 0.64
Community's contribution 0.88
Unions' contribution 0.68
Customers satisfaction 0.51
Employees development 0.82
Unions-relationship development 0.86
Suppliers-relationship development 0.89
Interests of the community 0.54 I
The role of the employees 0.90
The role of the managers 0.95
The role of the suppliers 0.97
The effects of the shareholders I	 0.96
The role of the industrial unions 0.58
Governmental-relations development 0.94
Stakeholders-oriented policies 0.55
Eigenvalue 6.97 3.21 2.49 1.64 1.26
Percentage of Variance 34.9 16.0 12.4 8.2 6.3
Reliability Analysis
alpha 0.81 0.76 0.82 0.74 0.71
F-Ratio
*21.36 *14.19 *94.05 
..
4.13
..
4.32
. Significant at the significance level 99%.
.. Significant at the significance level 95%.
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3.6.4 Data Reliability
The reliability of the variables retained in each factor is tested by
carrying out a Reliability Analysis (alpha). The results of the Reliability
Analysis are shown in table (3-3). The coefficient greater than or equal to 0.70
are considered acceptable and a good indication of construct reliability
(Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978).
3.6.5 Empirical Results
As the x 2
 test indicates that the data is relatively normally distributed,
the parametric one-way ANOVA analysis is carried out to assess the relative
role the banks can play to support corporate stakeholder orientation. The
ANOVA analysis is carried out to each of the five factors resulted from the
Principal Component Analysis.
Factor 1: The relative role of stakeholders in corporate decisions
The one-way ANOVA is carried out under the following hypothesis:
II0:p1=jJ2 =
	 = i-t 5
H 1 : not all pt i are equal ( i = 1,...,5)
Where: g i	 5 = means of the Employees' role, Managers' role, Suppliers'
role, Industrial unions' role, and Stakeholders' role respectively.
Table (3-4) shows the extent to which the Corporate Loans Managers,
as representatives of corporate creditors, and the Finance Directors, as
representatives of corporate shareholders' orientation, support the idea of
getting corporate constituencies involved in, or at least sharing in, making
corporate decisions.
164
Table (3-4): ANOVA analysis of the relative role of each of corporate
stakeholders in making business and /or managerial decisions
Groups of	 Corporate Loans Managers
the study	 (Commercial Banks)
Finance Directors
(Investment Banks)
Mean F Levene TUKEY Mean F Levene TUKEY
Variables Ratio statistic4 HSD5 Ratio statistic HSD
Employees'
role
0.26 3.50 differ2
Managers'
role
0.84 differ 3.00 differ2
Suppliers'
role
0.08 50.3 •	 50.1* 1.86 26.4	 39.2 * cafferl
Industrial
unions' role
0.22 0.86
Stakeholders 2.53 differ 1.95 differl
-oriented
policies
Significant at the significance level 99%.
As for the Corporate Loans Managers, the differences between the
numerical values that represent corporate constituencies' role in decision
making are statistically significant. This means that the Corporate Loans
Managers see some differences in corporate constituencies' role in decision
making. This conclusion is supported by the result of the TUKEY -HSD test
where it shows significant difference between managers' role, stakeholders-
oriented policies, and the rest of corporate constituencies. Specifically,
managers' role and stakeholder-oriented policies are recognised in one group
and, therefore, do not differ from each other. This supports the idea that
corporate orientations toward its stakeholders interests depends upon the role
managers can play as active agents in the process of corporate decision
making.
4 Levene test is a measure for the Homogeneity of Variance.
5 The TUKEY -HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) is a multiple range test which is used to
compare each pair of groups to see whether the difference between them is significant at the
significance level 95%. The notion 'differ' refers to a significant difference, and the associated
number refers to whether the certain group is similar to another group.
165
In contrast to the Corporate Loans Managers, the Finance Directors
differentiate between corporate constituencies' role in the process of decision
making. In addition, the differences between the numerical values that
represent corporate constituencies' role are statistically significant. TUKEY -
HSD test shows significant differences between the role of corporate
constituencies. Specifically, the role of both of corporate managers employees
does not differ significantly and, therefore, is grouped in one group, while the
role of corporate suppliers and stakeholders-oriented policies is grouped in a
separate group. It is clear that the managerial phase of corporate decision
making is different from corporate external orientation which is represented by
both of the suppliers and the stakeholders-oriented policies.
Factor 2: External relationship development
The one-way ANOVA is carried out under the following hypothesis:
= [1'2 = 	 = /13
H 1 : not all t, are equal ( i = 1,...,3)
Where: II 1 ,...,m, 3 = mean of Unions-relationship development, Suppliers-
relations development, and Governmental-relations development
respectively.
Table (3-5) shows the importance of building strong relationships with
number of corporate external stakeholders: the unions, suppliers, and
governmental relationships respectively.
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Table (3-5): ANOVA analysis of the external relationship development
Groups of the
study
Unions-relations
development
Suppliers-relations	 Governmental-
development	 relations
development
Corporate Loans
Managers
(Commercial Banks)
Mean 1.92 2.00 0.20
F-Ratio
Levene test statistic
876.41*
.
6.09 
TUKEY -HSD test differ differ
Finance Directors
(Investment Banks)
Mean 1.81	 I	 1.83	 I	 2.38
F-Ratio
Levene test statistic
8.83 *
*
8.97
TUKEY -HSD test I	 differ
Significant at the significance level 99%.
The results show that the Corporate Loans Managers consider both of
unions' and suppliers' relations development of equal importance since the
two groups do not differ significantly from each other and, therefore, is
grouped in one group. It seems that the governmental relations development is
left out because, according to the theory of political institutions, banks are not
the institutions that can interface and/or intermediate between companies and
governments. Political and legal entities in the society are responsible for
institutionalising those relationships. This conclusion does not apply to the
finance Directors where they consider only the governmental-relations
development quite different from those of unions and suppliers. This result
reflects the shareholders' concern about any governmental regulations that
may affect the private investment in the society and, therefore, affect the
returns on the stocks they are investing their money in.
Factor 3: The orientation towards Stakeholders Management
The one-way ANOVA is carried out under the following hypothesis:
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H0 : 1 1'11 2' 	
 =1,18
H I : not all 1.1 i are equal ( = 1,...,8)
Where: IA , . . • , 8 = means of Employees' contribution, Customers'
contribution, Managers' contribution, Community's contribution,
Unions' contribution, Customer satisfaction, Employees development,
and Interests of community respectively.
Table (3-6) presents an aggregate view of both of the two groups of the
study regarding a number of the basic components of 'stakeholder
management.' The table includes the respondents' opinions about the extent of
corporate managers' orientation towards the importance of eight of the basic
components of 'stakeholders management': the employees' contribution, the
customers' contribution, managers' contribution, community's contribution,
unions' contribution, customers satisfaction, employees development and
taking interests of the community into account respectively.
Table (3-6): ANOVA analysis of the orientation towards 'Stakeholders
Management'
Groups of	 Corporate Loans Managers
the study	 (Commercial Banks)
Finance Directors
(Investment Banks)
Mean F Levene TUKEY Mean F Levene TUKEY
Variables Ratio statistic HSD Ratio statistic HSD
Employee's
contribution
3.60 differ3 3.50 differ3
Customers'
contribution
2.88 differ2 3.00 differ3
Managers'
contribution
2.90 differ2 3.10 differ3
Community' 1.15 1.04
S
contribution
42.1 *
	0.7 • 64.7	 13.5 =lInions'
contribution
1.65 0.86
Customers'
satisfaction
1.50 1.81 differ2
Employees
development
1.51 1.53 differl
Interests of 2.15 differl 1.36 differ2
Community
Significant at the significance level 99%.
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As for the Corporate Loans Managers, the results show that the
differences between the numerical values of the eight components are
statistically significant, which means that there are some differences between
the eight components. Specifically, interests of community is recognised in
one group, both of customers and managers contribution is recognised in
different group, and finally employees contribution is recognised in separate
group. These results show that a close relationship exists between customers
and managers contribution which means that managers orientations, as internal
constituencies, are directed to customer orientations as external constituencies.
Therefore, the close internal and external relationships is considered a basic
component of the 'Stakeholders Management.'
Since community's contribution, unions, contribution, customers
satisfaction, and interests of community are considered of relatively
importance, these four components present an additional evidence that shows
the close relationship between corporate external and internal orientations.
That is, employees development is one of the internal components of the
stakeholders management, while the other three are three components of the
stakeholders management. The conclusion is that the Corporate Loans
Managers clearly recognise the basic components of the stakeholders
management.
The .results of the Finance Directors show a different perspective. The
differences between the numerical values of the eight components are
statistically significant which means that they are some differences between
them. Specifically, the Finance Directors recognise employees contribution,
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customers' contribution, and managers contribution in one group, customers
satisfaction and interests of community in another group, and employees
development in a different group. As long as both of employees, customers
and managers contribution is grouped in one group, this shows a clear
recognition of one of the basic components of stakeholders management.
Another component is the orientation towards corporate external relationship
which is represented by customers satisfaction and interests of community as
one group. The conclusion is relatively the same as the one of the Corporate
Loans Managers where the Finance Directors recognise clearly the basic
components of the stakeholders management.
Factor 4: The financial phase of corporate governance
The one-way ANOVA is carried out under the following hypothesis:
110:1-11=1-1,2
H 1 : p ^  1_1,2
Where: t 1 = mean of the first sample (Creditors' contribution).
IA 2 = mean of the second sample (Shareholders' contribution).
Table (3-7) shows both of the Corporate Loans Managers' and the
Finance Directors' opinions toward what can corporate creditors and corporate
shareholders contribute to keep their company functioning well.
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Table (3-7): ANOVA analysis of the financial phase of corporate governance
Groups of the
study
Creditors'
contribution
Shareholders'
contribution
Corporate Loans
Managers
(Commercial Banks)
Mean 2.38 1.42
F-Ratio
Levene test statistic
13.50*
49.29*
Finance Directors
(Investment Banks)
Mean 1.50 I	 1.68
F-Ratio
Levene test statistic
0.44
2.00
• Significant at the significance level 99%.
As for the Corporate Loans Managers, they do not see both of these
constituencies' contributions of equal importance, where the difference
between the numerical values of both of them is statistically significant. As for
the Finance Directors, they see both of these constituencies' contributions of
equal importance to keep a company functioning well. The difference between
both of the two groups of the study has its roots in the role of debt versus
equity in the literature of corporate governance. The Corporate Loans
Managers, as representatives of corporate creditors, favour a dominant role of
debt on the process of corporate governance, while the Finance directors, as
representatives of shareholders' orientation, favour relatively equal
contributions from both of corporate creditors and shareholders, then
recognising the fact that in most cases the dispersed, ill-informed shareholders
would not have a dominant role in the process of corporate governance. Thus,
this process requires both of corporate creditors' and shareholders'
171
contributions. This result is well evidenced in the literature of corporate
governance mechanisms.
Factor 5: External effects on corporate operations
The one-way ANOVA is carried out under the following hypothesis:
H o : 1  1 — p 2
H 1 : 11 i ^
 P2
Where: li t = mean of the first sample (Supplier's effects).
p 2 = mean of the second sample (Shareholders' effects).
Table (3-8) shows both of corporate suppliers' and shareholders' effect
on corporate operations.
Table (3-8): ANOVA analysis of the external effects on corporate operations
Groups of the
study
Suppliers'	 shareholders'
effects
	 effects
Corporate Loans Managers
(Commercial Banks)
Mean 1.15 0.22
F-Ratio
Levene test statistic
141.81*
*6.79
Finance Directors
(Investment Banks)
Mean 1.86	 I	 2.18
F-Ratio
Levene test statistic
9.79*
17.79 •
• Significant at the significance level 99%.
As for the Corporate Loans Managers, the differences between the
numerical values of both of the suppliers and shareholders are statistically
significant which means that they are not of equal importance. This is the same
as the result of the Finance Directors.
Banks-Corporate Stakeholders Orientations and Banks Performance
This section focuses on whether banks are in a position to support the
'Stakeholders Management.' In this regard, the banks-corporate stakeholders
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orientations are regressed against banks performance measures. To reach an
acceptable conformity about the banks performance measures, the researcher
uses those measures published by POLK World Banking Profiles (1996). A
Principal Component Factor Analysis (varimax rotation) is carried out for the
banks performance measures as more than one measure are measuring the
performance dimension. These measures, therefore, are minimised to the most
basic (principal) measures. The results of the Principal Component Factor
Analysis are shown in table (3-9).
Table (3-9): Results of Principal Components Factor Analysis of banks'
performance measures
Variables Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
3
Factor
4
Net Interest Income/Total Revenue 0.52
Operating Income/Total Assets 0.95
Liquid Assets/Total Assets 0.93
0.94
0.98
Liquid Assets/Total Deposits
Liquid Assets / Deposits & Borrowings
Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans 0.91
0.92
0.76
Reserves/Gross Loans
Provisions/Gross Loans
Shareholders Equity/Total Assets 0.96
0.97Capital Funds/Total Assets
ROI 0.96
0.94
0.95
World Ranking
Country Ranking
Eigenvalue 4.50 2.82 2.53 1.55
Percentage of Variance 34.6 21.6 19.5 11.9
Reliability Analysis
alpha
F-Ratio
0.94
42.41*
0.96
38.2*
0.77
25.77*
0.98
70.38*
, Significant at the significance level 99%.
Table (3-9) shows the results of the Principal Components Analysis of
banks' performance measures. The table shows that those measures are
classified to four principal factors (e.g., groups). They are as follows.
• Factor 1: Profitability Measures: which comprise the Operating
Income/Total Assets, Return on Investment (ROI), World ranking
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(according to Return on Assets), and Country ranking (according to Return
on Assets).
• Factor 2: Liquidity Position: which comprises the Net Interest
Income/Total Revenue, Liquid Assets/Total Assets, Liquid Assets/Total
Deposits, and Liquid Assets/Deposits & Borrowings.
• Factor 3: Assets Quality: which comprises the Non-performing Loans
/Total Loans, Reserves/Gross Loans, and Provisions/Gross Loans.
• Factor 4: Capital Adequacy: which comprises the Shareholders
Equity/Total Assets and Capital Funds/Total Assets.
Table (3-9) shows also the results of the Reliability Analysis of the
performance measures retained in each factor. The high alpha coefficients
indicate a good construct reliability, and the coefficients are all statistically
significant at the significance level 99%. The four banks' principal
performance measures are stepwise regressed against the five principal factors
of banks-corporate stakeholder orientations presented in table (3-3). The
results are shown in table (3-10) which shows the results of the Stepwise
Regression Analysis. The results indicate a very logic and practical
perspectives in the relationship between banks-stalceholding orientations and
their performance measures.
174
Table (3-10): Results of Stepwise Regression between banks performance
measures and their stakeholding orientation'
Banks-Corporate
stakeholders orientation
Profitability
Measures
Liquidity
Position
Capital
Adequacy
Asset
Quality
Constant 0.11 0.08 -0.003 0.17
(1.33) (1.44) (-0.04) (1.21)
The Relative role of
stakeholders in making
corporate decisions
External relationship 0.56
development (2.27) **
The orientation towards 0.47 0.34
'Stakeholders (2.71)* (2.44)*
Management'
The financial phase of 1.32
corporate governance (4.94)*
External effects on
corporate operations
Adjusted R 2 0.18 0.55 0.25 0.31
F-Ratio 5.18" 24.49* 7.35* 6.81*
VIF 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00
D-W statistic 1.67 1.75 1.81 1.74
N 20 20 20 20
1 t-statistics are given in parentheses.
„ Estimates are significant at the significance level 99%.
„„ Estimates are significant at the significance level 95%.
An autocorrelation test is carried out using D-W (Durbin-Watson) test
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977; Gujarati, 1992; Greene, 1997) under the following two
hypothesises:
H : p = 0 (the u's are not autocorrelated)
H 1 : p # 0 (the u's are serially dependent)
where p = the coefficient of the autocorrelation relationship.
The results of the autocorrelation analysis show that the null
hypothesis is accepted since the observed values of the Durbin-Watson test
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(d * ) are greater than d ,, (with n - k degree of freedom and significance level p
< 0.01). Therefore, the four regression equations are free from autocorrelation
among u' s.
As for the multicollinearity, it is carried out using the VIP (Variance
Inflationary Factor) test under the following two hypothesises:
H 0 : the X's are orthogonal
H 1 : the X's are not orthogonal
where X's = Factors of banks-corporate stakeholders orientation.
The results of the VIF test show that the X's are not multicollinear
where the scores of the VIF test are equal, or very close, to 1.00 [the
correlation matrixes of the explanatory variables are listed in Appendixes (3-3)
- (3-6)].
The results show that the correlation between the external relationship
development, represented by unions, suppliers and governmental relationships,
and profitability measures is supported by the literature on the importance of
corporate strong ties and corporate communications and their effects on
corporate performance (Granovetter, 1973, 1985; Burt, 1982; 1992a, b; Burt
and Talmud, 1993; Podolny, 1993). The financial phase of corporate
governance, represented by creditors'and shareholders' contribution is
correlated with measures of liquidity position. This result is supported by the
numerous findings on the literature of corporate governance that the principal
corporate financiers are keen to make sure that the company they are investing
their money with is managed efficiently and, therefore, is capable of meeting
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its financial obligations in due times (Grier and Zychowicz, 1994; Triantis and
Daniels, 1995; Hart and Moore, 1995; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997).
The orientation towards 'Stakeholders Management' is correlated with
measures of capital adequacy. Once again, this result is supported by the
empirical findings on the literature of the importance of corporate indices as
good indicators of corporate orientations. That is, corporate orientation
towards its stakeholders interests provides good indices to encourage its
stakeholders to support the company's plans, including raising the needed
capital (Preston and Post, 1975; Sethi, 1975; Fleming, 1981; Wartick and
Cochran, 1985; Wood, 1991a; Clarkson, 1995). The orientation towards
'Stakeholders Management,' is also correlated with measures of asset quality.
This result is supported by the literature on corporate stakeholders that
describes the importance of their relative contributions to keep a company
functioning well (Clarkson et aL, 1992; Reichheld, 1996). That is, the
governing role of managers and employees is realised as they are practically
responsible for conducting and improving corporate assets, customers
contribution and satisfaction is one of the major factors that determine the
company's relative competitiveness in the market place, and finally, if a
company is not neglecting the interests of the community, it would be able to
improve its asset quality.
In sum, Table (3-10) shows that the Adjusted R 2 of the four
performance measures are acceptable. This result is supported by the results in
Table (3-3) where three out of the five factors of banks-corporate stakeholders
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orientations affect the basic banks four performance measures. This means that
if banks support corporate stakeholders orientations, their (banks) performance
would be affected positively. These results extend Cornell and Shapiro's
pioneering idea of incorporating stakeholders interests into corporate finance
(Cornell and Shapiro, 1987). That is, corporate stakeholders' interests and
capabilities can be considered as financial assets and liabilities.
3.7 Conclusions
The role of stakeholder frameworks in the success of business and
society has recently become a crucial area of academic research. The purpose of
this chapter was twofold. Firstly, the researcher followed a qualitative
comparison of successful shareholders systems such as the United States and
United Kingdom, with successful stakeholder systems such as Japan, Germany,
and most of continental Europe. It is an important factor that the concept of
shareholder versus stakeholder systems can have wide applicability throughout
the world, for example, Japan has similarities to countries in Western Europe.
Secondly, the researcher focused on the banking industry which plays a crucial
role in the success of stakeholder systems in Japan, Germany and most
continental European countries. Through empirical analysis the researcher shows
the compatible role of banking in successful shareholders and stakeholder
systems.
The scope and analysis of this chapter was not to conclude, through
international comparisons, general superiority of either shareholder systems in
countries such as the United States and United Kingdom or stakeholder systems
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in countries such as Germany and Japan. The purpose of this chapter was to
show the close compatibility between relatively strong banking industry and the
values of stakeholder systems. In this sense, the value of the stakeholders can be
realised when a firm conceives the fact that its competitiveness is related to
collective appreciation and identification from its stakeholders rather than from
only its shareholders. Here, it can be concluded that the interests of stakeholders
are major factors that determine corporate identity in the market place as a non-
financial aspect of corporate governance. This is what the next chapter discusses
in details.
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Chapter 4
Corporate Identity, Performance and Competitiveness:
Empirical Evidence from the Banking Industry
180
4.1 Introduction
Chapter three has shown that banks as a viable financial institutions
can act as good monitors to corporate stakeholders orientation. Furthermore,
banks may benefit from their support to stakeholders interests. This chapter
extends corporate orientations toward stakeholders interests to further examine
their role in identifying corporate capabilities, thus its identity in the
marketplace. This chapter examines the idea of corporate identity in the
banking industry on the basis that product intangibility necessitates product
identification to be done by more than one actor in the marketplace.
4.2 Dynamic Capabilities and Strategic Group Identity
The work in strategic group identity (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997)
provides a useful framework on how different groups recognise each other
dynamically. Peteraf and Shanley focus on the group characteristics as the
distinguishing factors of group identity. As they define it:
" A strategic group identity is a set of mutual
understandings, among members of a cognitive
intraindustry group, regarding the central, enduring, and
distinctive characteristic of the group." (Peteraf and
Shanley, 1997: 166).
This definition parallels what is provided in the work of organisation
identity by Albert and Whetten (1985). Peteraf and Shanley's definition
highlights two important cognitive factors: mutual understanding and common
understanding among group members that a group of some sort exists. In this
sense, the definition is consistent with the general principles governing
cognitive categorisation (Rosch, 1978) and importance of groupings based on
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relative rather than absolute identity factors (Frank, 1988). Traditional identity
factors include gender, age, ethnic background, income level.
According to Albert and Whetten (1985) and Peteraf and Shanley
(1997) the mutual understanding must be in regard to the central
characteristics of the group. The central characteristics may take the form of
family traits, or a set of core relationships or activities. Central traits include
observable features such as firm size, as well as nonobservable (intangible)
features such as product quality. Core relationships and activities include
features such as overlapping social networks and common institutional
histories.
The researcher believes that the strategic group identity framework
develops further the ongoing academic debate about the strengths of more
economics-based frameworks of competition such as transaction cost
economics (Williamson, 1975) and the more institutional and social structure-
based approaches to competition (Granovetter, 1985; Simon, 1991; Burt,
1992a; Barney and Hansen, 1994; North, 1996). Recent empirical research
such as Masten et al., (1991) and Monteverde (1995) show that activities may
be internalised within organisations, not because of the high transaction costs
in the market, but because there are various unique benefits created within
organisations such as lower communication costs. Related research by
Holmstrom and Milgrom (1994) also show that organisations can also help to
overcome the complexity of multitask activities, and where the costs of
measurement are high, these effects are not necessarily linked to the
transaction costs of carrying them out in the market. Their works also confirm
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the empirical analysis of Anderson and Sclunittlein (1984) and Anderson
(1985) which show that the difficulties of measurement of performance, and
the importance of nonselling activities, such as helping other agents in the
organisation were the crucial determinants of whether an activity was carried
out within the organisation, or in the market. Again, the reasons for
internalisation were not necessarily driven by the level of transaction costs in
the market.
Furthermore, the strategic group identity framework raises the
importance of intangibility and measurement costs within industries. Recent
works in the institutional aspects of competition such as North (1996), Kogut
and Zander (1996), Hill (1990), Ring and Van de Yen (1994) show the
importance of the social structure and the social embeddedness of market
transactions (Burt, 1992a,b; Barzel, 1982; Granovetter, 1985) which help to
influence such measurement and reduce intangibility. The purpose of this
chapter is twofold. Firstly, the researcher analyses the general issue of
intangibility and measurement costs, and how organisations may respond to
such problems. The researcher shows that "indices" or truthful signals may
become important indicators for certain organisations to prove their value and
strengths under problems of measurement and intangibility. These indices then
provide additional "identity" measures to the traditional signals and other
indicators used to evaluate organisations by the market. The strategic
formation of such indices may be crucial for greater competitive success,
adding a component of dynamics to the existing frameworks of analysis.
Secondly, the researcher applies this framework to the banking industry where
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such intangibility and measurement costs exist. The researcher empirically
tests this framework to show the importance of such indices in influencing
strategic group identity and, in turn, the nature of competition when there are
measurement costs and intangibility. By so doing, the researcher takes further
the ongoing academic debate between the importance of the pure economics-
based market competition, and the more institutional and social structure-
based type of competition.
Teece et a/.(1997) provide a framework of dynamic capabilities that
outline the role of strategic management. They define dynamic capabilities as:
"...the firm's ability to integrate, build, and reconfigure
internal and external competencies to address rapidly
changing environments." (Teece et al., 1997: 516).
The cornerstones of the above definition are the firm's resources and
competences. According to Teece et al. (1997), resources are firm-specific
assets that are difficult, if not impossible, to imitate. When firm-specific assets
are assembled in integrated cluster spanning individuals and groups so that
they enable distinctive activities to be performed, those activities constitute
firm's competences. In this regard, one aspect of the strategic problem facing
an innovating firm in a world of Schumpeterian competition is to identify
difficult-to-imitate internal and external competences most likely to support
valuable products and services.
The dynamic capabilities approach, therefore, seeks to provide a
coherent framework which can both integrate existing conceptual and
empirical knowledge, and facilitate prescription. In so doing, it builds upon the
theoretical foundations provided by Schumpeter (1934), Penrose (1995),
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Williamson (1975, 1985), Barney (1986), Nelson and Winter (1982), Teece
(1988) and Teece and Pisano (1994). Firms in the financial services industries
provide a good example of firms characterised by hard-to-imitate firm-specific
resources. These firms' relatively important resources are the intangible
resources that constitute the firm's portfolio of difficult-to-trade knowledge
assets. The difficulty-to-trade raises an important dimension in the
mechanisms of resources exchange: firm's resources and value will be affected
by other's recognition concerning the firm's value. To develop and strengthen
other's recognition, it requires how to convey and prove firm's identity to
others and to the general market.
As for the enduring aspects of group identity, Peteraf and Shanley
(1997) mean that there must be some degree of temporal stability or perceived
continuity to the group and its central traits. Enduring characteristics may be
the product of long-lived (sunk) capital investments or path-dependent
research strategies. The distinctive characteristics of group identity allow
members to distinguish between the group and other categories. They also
permit observers to distinguish between core and peripheral members of the
group. Distinctiveness has to do with how group characteristics are different
from those of other groups. It is supported by mobility barriers which impede
entry into the group by outsiders (Caves and Porter, 1977; Porter, 1980, 1985).
In sum, the continuity aspect of strategic group identity implies a dynamic
capability.
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4.3 Strategic Group Identity and Indices
Strategic group identity enables mutual recognition between and
among groups. This mutuality, thus, requires continuous and strong
communications and references between and among groups. In this regard, the
group's central characteristics are used as indices of the group identity, which
imply an informational link between and among groups, thus determine the
relative position of each group in the marketplace. In this sense, indices
determine the extent and the scope of competition between groups that lead to
what is called "disProportionate Competition" (Choi and Baden-Fuller, 1995).
In order to better understand such a framework, it is important to make
the distinction between market signals and "indices." Market signals
(Schelling, 1969; Spence, 1973) help communication and identification under
uncertainty. Milgrom and Roberts provide a definition of signals:
"...signals demonstrate to others the actor's intentions
or abilities or some other characteristic about which the
actor has private, unverifiable information." (Milgrom
and Roberts, 1992: 154).
An example of a signal would be a firm's willingness to provide a
money back guarantee for its products, to signal to consumers the firm's
commitment and confidence in the product.
There are at least two potential problems of signals, in determining
firms' identities in the market for industries such as financial services, which
have a high element of intangibility in the value of their products and services.
Firstly, a particular firm's network in the search for a co-operative exchange
partner, such as a strategic group, may be screening according to certain path-
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dependent, homogeneous beliefs, and cognitive maps of reality which may not
be an accurate measure of reality. As analysed by Burt (1992a,b) and Burt and
Talmud (1993), certain networks may become so dense that they may actually
hold back the dissemination of important changes in reality that have occurred
outside the network. Related to this issue is the analysis of Granovetter (1973,
1985), Oliver et al., (1985), Oliver and Marwell (1988) and Marwell, et al.,
(1988) concerning the importance of certain weak ties, or relatively less
homogeneous relationships, in developing objective views of the external
environment and judging the capabilities and assets of a potential co-operative
exchange partner. Secondly, signals can be manipulated by actors for strategic
ends. In an increasingly media dependent world with decreasing
communication costs, there is a plethora of signals from numerous actors in
the society: signals can be fuzzy. To that end, a distinction now needs to be
made between signals and indices. "Indices" as defined by Jervis (1985) are:
...statements or actions that carry some inherent
evidence that the image projected is correct because
they are believed to be inextricably linked to the actor's
capabilities or intentions." (Jervis, 1985).
Indices, unlike signals, can not be easily manipulated. Examples
include private messages the perceiver overhears or intercepts. In some sense,
indices are an "external" type of signals that can not be manipulated (Spender
and Grant, 1996; Choi and Lee, 1996). The ability to use indices depends on
an actor's particular, or rare experience such as past success which other
competitors can not imitate. Thus, only certain types of actors would have an
incentives to use indices. But such indices help to overcome the intangibility
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inherent in industries such as financial services by providing a more accurate
and truthful information about value.
4.4 Identity Strength and Indices
Group members vary in the strength of their identification with a
group. Peteraf and Shanely define identity strength as:
"...the level of identification of members with the
group." (Peteraf and Shanely, 1997: 173).
Therefore, group identity must have an effect(s) on firm's performance.
This effect must be positive, that is associated with strong identity. When a
group identity is weak, the existence of the group itself must be called into
question (flatten and Hatten, 1987; Barney and Hoskisson, 1990). Therefore,
strong group identity is associated with strong firm performance.
Identity strength is not only determined by the degree of social learning
and social identification, but also by the ability to communicate a firm's value
and resources more accurately to the market (Choi and Baden-Fuller, 1995).
This is important especially in industries such as financial services where the
quality and value may be difficult to ascertain and measure. Therefore, the
greater the degree to which individual members engage in social learning and
social identification behaviour, the stronger their identification with the group.
The degree of social learning and social identification are accelerated by
mutual understanding and mutual modelling. The higher the degree of both
mutual understanding and mutual modelling, the higher the valuation of the
association, and the stronger the identification with group. This is linked to the
idea of market "indices" which provide a strong references to facilitate mutual
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understanding. Providing that indices, rather then signals, are inextricably
linked to the actor's capabilities (Jervis, 1985), indices are associated with
stronger identity. The stronger the indices projected to group members, the
trustful the group's image, and the stronger the group's identity. Thus, indices
provide conditions that maintain the dynamic aspects of strategic group
identities (Peteraf and Shanley, 1997). Providing information on an actor's
age, or information about the number of branches and stores implying the size
of the client base are indices, rather than signals. Indices are more truthful and
trustworthy. In this sense, actors who can provide indices rather than signals
can provide much stronger trust and more sustainable co-operative exchange
(Heil and Robertson, 1991; Barney and Hansen, 1994).
45 Strategic Group Identity, Indices and Sustainable Competitive
Advantage
A firm's competitive advantage is seen as resting on distinctive
processes, ways of co-ordinating and combining, shaped by the firm's specific
assets positions such as the firm's portfolio of difficult-to-trade knowledge
assets (Teece et al., 1997). Dierickx and Cool (1989) and Hall (1993) focus
precisely on those kinds of resources and capabilities which are of central
concern to resource-based theory: nontradeable assets which develop and
accumulate within the firm. Such assets tend to defy imitation because they
have a strong tacit dimension and are socially complex. This is considered one
of the cornerstones of firm's competitive advantage as long as knowledge
assets are characterised by imperfect mobility as well (Peteraf, 1993).
Therefore, strategic group identity, in terms of its intangibility and its
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hardness-to-imitate, should be considered a source of sustainable competitive
advantage.
This idea is linked to a recent analysis of sustainable competitive
advantage that combines the institutional and resource-based view of
sustainable competitive advantage. Oliver's (1997) institutional theory
suggests that institutionalised activities are the result of interrelated processes
at the individual, organisational and interorganisational levels of analysis. At
the individual level, managers' norms, habits and unconscious conformity to
traditions account for institutionalised activities (Berger and Luckmann,
1967). At the firm level, corporate culture, shared belief systems and political
processes supporting given ways of managing perpetuate institutionalised
structure and behaviours. At the interorganisational level, pressures emerging
from government, industry alliances and social expectations, rules, norms and
standards about product quality, occupational safety, or environmental
management, define socially acceptable firm conduct. Those social pressures,
which are common to all firms in the same sector, cause firms to exhibit
similar structures and activities (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983).
The basic premise of institutional theory, then, is that firms' tendencies
toward conformity with predominant norms, traditions and social influences in
their internal and external environments lead to homogeneity among firms in
their structures and activities. In this sense, successful firms are those that gain
support and legitimacy by conforming to social pressures. In contrast, the
basic argument of the resource-based view is that rare, specialised, inimitable
resources and resource market imperfections cause firm heterogeneity, and
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that successful firms are those that acquire and maintain valuable idiosyncratic
resources for sustainable competitive advantage.
Strategic group identity, therefore, can be viewed as associated with
both the institutional and resource-based view of sustainable competitive
advantage. The basic premise of the institutional theory, that is conformity
with social influences, implies and ensures the core of strategic group identity:
that is the mutual understanding between and among group members.
Conformity requires mutual understanding. At the same time, the basic
premise of the resource-based view is resources' inimitability which leads to
gain a sustainable competitive advantage. Once again, the distinctive
characteristics of group identity, in terms of its intangibility, provide a
condition for sustaining competitive advantage. The inimitable, i.e., intangible
resources constitute a central element in Oliver's model of sustainable
competitive advantage (Oliver, 1997). Thus, strategic group identity
contributes significantly to sustaining group's, then firm's, competitive
advantage. In that sense, indices, rather than signals, provide a sufficient
condition to convey intangible resources to both the internal and the external
environment. Therefore, indices are very important for knowledge-based
industries to gain and sustain competitive advantage.
4.6 Strategic Reference Point Theory and Indices
The literature of the role of strategic management is rich of tools,
mechanisms and insights that help to match and close the gap between internal
organisational capabilities and external environmental demand (Andrews,
1987; Hofer and Schendel, 1978). This requires deep comprehension of how
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the organisational capabilities are evaluated and against what criteria these
capabilities are evaluated. In this regard, Fiegenbaum et al. (1996) present
"strategic reference point theory." It states that a firm's choice of 'reference
points' can help achieve strategic alignment capable of yielding improved
performance and potentially even a sustainable competitive advantage. In fact,
the strategic reference points theory has its underlying roots in several major
theoretical perspectives from economics, psychology and organisational
theory. They all sought to identify targets or reference groups which expose
gaps and thereby raise individual or organisational aspiration levels upon
different elements or areas of content in establishing reference points. In sum,
motivation theory (Latham and YuId, 1975), prospect theory (Tversky and
Kahneman, 1981) and the resources-based view of the firm (Wernerfelt, 1984;
Barney, 1991) emphasise the importance of internal goals and capabilities to
organisational behaviour and effectiveness. Similarly, industrial organisation
economics (Porter, 1980), resources dependence (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978)
and institutional theory (Meyer et al., 1983) all posit, in one way or another,
the importance of external points of reference to strategic choice or firm
survival. Finally, the literature on corporate identity (Dutton and Dukerich,
1991) and strategic intent (Hamel and Prahalad, 1989) both emphasise, among
other things, the importance of time, with the former focusing on past
traditions and values and the latter on future, long-term purpose and direction.
The theoretical perspectives described above show that they all share
one common factor: the selection of a "reference point" against which strategic
choice or organisational behaviour is judged. The core of the strategic
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reference point theory, therefore, is that by signalling organisational priorities
and overall direction, top managers, whether knowingly or not, focus the
attention of organisational members on particular goals and objectives.
Therefore, strategic behaviour of organisations and their subsequent
performance can be influenced directly by management's choice of reference
points. In this sense, understanding a firm's choice of reference points is one
way to achieve strategic alignment (Andrews, 1971; Hofer and Schendel,
1978; Itami, 1987). In this regard, the reference points imply that the
management must work hard to send consistent messages and align strategies,
systems and processes to achieve high performance. However, the organisation
must also keep challenging to acquire new competencies so that it might be
positioned for the future (Hart, 1992).
It is obvious that the strategic reference points require the
organisational capabilities, goals and objectives to be well defined otherwise
the reference points will be distorted. In this sense, indices, rather than signals,
given they are inextricably linked to the actor's capabilities and intentions
(Jervis, 1985), provide an accurate and well defined strategic reference points.
By the same logic, it is necessary for top managers to focus on certain goals
and objectives such as strategic reference points or indices that reflect, develop
and enhance their firm's identity, otherwise the organisational performance
will be distorted and turn out to be uncompetitive. This shows the link
between strategic reference points theory, indices, and firm's identity.
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4.7 Drivers of Identity in Financial Services Industries: Theoretical
Framework
In financial services industries, external intermediaries can also play a
potential role in "certifying" the content and value of an actor's products or
services. Burt and Knez (1996) analyse in detail the importance of passive as
well as more active intermediaries, or third parties, and their role in the
sustainability of co-operative relationships. The key issue is that a firm's
identity in the market place for financial services based industries is
determined by four "Drivers of Identity," which help to "certify" the quality,
value and content of the actor's products or services. This idea overlaps with
recent works such as Podolny (1993), Camic (1992) and Haunschild (1994)
which have recently further developed the earlier works of White (1970),
Sorensen (1983), Burt (1982), Bonacich (1987) and Simmel (1950) to show
that an actor's position in the social structure can turn affect not only rewards,
but can reduce the actor's ability to interact with actors with different social
status. The researcher believes that the basic idea of interdependence can be
taken further. With assets such as knowledge, where the value and content of
the product or service being exchanged are uncertain, external cues like
intermediaries help to identify and certify an actor and its products or services'
value and quality in the market place. The ability to develop long-term trust
relations with certain "drivers of identity" will in turn determine an actor's
competitive advantage in the market place.
The literature includes four major indices or drivers of identity for
actors in financial services industries (Choi and Lee, 1996). Firstly, an actor's
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client base is a driver of identity. The position or status (Podolny, 1993; Frank,
1988) of the particular clients can in turn help to elevate and provide an index,
rather than signal, of the firm's ranking and identity. Secondly, the ability and
reputation for being innovative such as developing new products and a
dynamic corporate culture are another type of index in the market place for
financial services based industries (Haunschild, 1994). Thirdly, a firm's
networks, whether they be with collaborators, or with competitors can also be
an index in the market place. An example of this would be top ranked business
schools (D'Aveni, 1996) being competitors but holding executive programmes
or other conferences together in a network. Fourthly, outside or external
sources of information (external intermediaries) such as Standard and Poor
indexes in financial markets, consumer reports written by private
organisations, business magazines and commentaries all help to serve as an
index of quality.
In financial services industries, because of the intangibility and
difficulties in measuring the value and content of products and services, the
market tries to identify such quality, content and value through "indirect"
ways. Such external cues, which provide indirect information, are indices and
are provided by these four major drivers of identity. These four major indices,
which are linked to firms through trust-based "institutional" relationships, can
help determine an actor's identity and relative position. The four 'drivers of
identity' are shown in figure (4-1).
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Figure (4-1): Four Drivers of Identity
4.8 Drivers of Identity: An Empirical Evidence
4.8.1 Content Analysis
The four drivers of identity are examined in the banking industry as an
example of an industry characterised by product intangibility. A content
analysis (manifest content and latent content) has been undertaken for each of
the bank's advertisements to determine what information each bank mentions
and emphasises. Then, a number of measures were derived as a proxy for each
of the four drivers of identity mentioned earlier. Bank's reputation for clients
is taken as a proxy for the first driver of identity: List of Client. Information
about banks' Chief Executive Officer (CEO) is taken as a proxy for the second
driver of identity: Reputation for innovation and change. Information about
banks' age and geographic spread is taken as a proxy of the third driver of
identity: Network of partners or competitors. Information about banks' profits,
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size and country of origin is taken as a proxy of the fourth driver of identity:
External intermediaries. Proxies of drivers of identity are taken as the
independent (explanatory) variables.
4.8.2 Data Normality
For testing the normality of the data, a 'chi-square goodness of fit'
(x 2) test is carried out for each of the variables used in the study. The results
are shown in table (4-1).
Table (4-1): The statistical results of x 2 test of the variables:
"Drivers of Identity" 6
Variables p-value
Bank's reputation for clients 0.054
Bank's chief executive officer 0.059
Bank's age 0.057
Bank's geographic spread 0.06
Bank's profits 0.043
Bank's size 0.053
Bank's country of origin 0.07
The results in table (4-1) show that only one variable (Bank's profits)
out of the seven variables is not normally distributed (p-value < 0.05). This
means that approximately 85.71 per cent of the data is normally distributed.
4.8.3 Data Validity
4.8.3.1 Content and construct validity
The variables used as proxy of drivers of Identity are considered basic
factors that determine the importance and strength of the corporate social ties
and external cues. The literature on corporate social structure and social
networks focuses basically on the firm's relative position, or its status, as one
6 The x 2 test is carried out at the significance level 95%.
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of the important factors that determine its relative position in the marketplace
(Feld, 1981; Coleman, 1990). The magnitude of this literature provides an
adequate source of the content validity of the variables drawn from this
literature.
The construct validity of these variables is assured since those
variables have been examined by many scholars in various social and business
studies. In addition, those variables are well defined in the literature. In this
regard, it is worth to mention that this study extends this applied literature to
the financial services industries, e.g., banks as the application sector in this
study.
4.8.3.2 Discriminant validity
The discriminant validity in this study can adequately be assessed on a
descriptive basis. That is, there is no overlap between or among those variables
in terms of their definition or their application. Therefore, each variable is
considered a discriminant factor to firm's status in the marketplace.
4.8.4 Data Reliability
As the main objective of the study is to explore the effects of the
drivers of identity on the financial services industries, e.g., banks, the study is
designed to examine the effects of the drivers of identity for each bank under
three different cases. Firstly, when the drivers of identity are not mentioned in
the bank's advertisement, secondly when they are mentioned, thirdly when
they are emphasised upon. Therefore, a Reliability Analysis is carried out for
each case separately (Churchill, 1979; Nurmally, 1967). Table (4-2) shows the
results of the analysis.
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Table (4-2): Reliability Analysis of the "Drivers of Identity"
Drivers of
Identity
Alpha F-Ratio p-value
Not mentioned 0.60 20.92 0.00
Mentioned 0.67 7.42 0.00
Emphasised 0.73 14.36 0.00
The results in table (4-2) show that the Alpha coefficients are relatively
acceptable as the "Drivers of Identity" themselves, and the three cases under
which the "Drivers of Identity" are examined is considered a new type of study
(Churchill, 1979; Nunnally, 1978). All of the Alpha coefficients are significant
at the level 5%.
4.8.5 The Dependent Variables
As for the dependent variables, they are drawn from POLK World
Banking Profiles (1996) which include variety of banks performance
measures. The measures are classified into four basic categories as follows.
1. Profitability measures: which include Operating Income/Total Assets and
Net Interest Income/Total Revenue. The researcher included the Return on
Assets (ROA) to these measures considering it is an acceptable and
commonly measure of financial performance.
2. Liquidity measures: which include Liquid Assets/Total Assets, Liquid
Assets/Deposits and Liquid Assets/Deposits & Borrowing.
3. Assets Quality measures: which include Non-performing Loans/Total
Loans, Reserves/Gross Loans and Provisions/Gross Loans.
4. Capital Adequacy measures: which include Shareholders Equity/Total
Assets, Capital Funds/Total Assets and Deposits/Total Assets.
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Four of the above measures are used as dependent variables. The four
dependent variables are chosen according to the results of the correlation
matrix (Appendix 4-1). The four dependent variables are as follows.
1. Return on Assets (ROA).
2. Non-performing Loans/Total Loans (NPL).
3. Shareholders Equity/Total Assets (SHE).
4. Deposits/Total Assets (DEP).
4.8.6 Empirical Results
The empirical results are divided into three levels. Each of them
indicates different and distinguished phase of the impacts of the drivers of
identity. These three levels are:
Level 1: The impact of the drivers of identity on banks' performance
measures. This level tests which of the drivers of identity' is (are) most
influential on the banks' performance measures.
Level 2: The impact of the drivers of identity on 'Highly versus Lowly
ranked banks.' 7 This level tests the impact of the most influential drivers of
identity on performance measures of the 'Highly versus Lowly ranked banks.'
Level 3: The importance of the drivers of identity of 'Highly versus
Lowly ranked banks' to each business system. This level tests whether any of
the most influential drivers of identity makes any difference in each business
system.
7•
'Highly ranked banks' denote to those banks that are given high ranks using different criteria
adopted by many of the well-known ranking organisation such as 'Financial Commitments'
adopted by Standard & Poor, 'Financial Strength' adopted by Moody's, 'Credit-Worthiness'
adopted by IBCA, 'Financial Stability' adopted by Thomson Bank Watch, and banks' role as
M&A advisers adopted by Institutional Investor.
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Level 1: The impact of "Drivers of Identity" on banks' performance
measures
As for level 1, table (4-3) shows the results of the Stepwise Regression
Analysis for the drivers of identity on banks' performance measures. The
regression analysis is carried out when drivers of identity are emphasised upon
by banks. 8 The results show that five out of the seven drivers of identity have
statistically significant impacts on the four banks' performance measures (the
four regression equations). The five drivers of identity are banks' Age, CEO,
Country of Origin, Reputation for Clients, and Size respectively.
s The drivers of identity (the explanatory variables) are symbolised as follows. Bank's
Reputation for Clients = Reputation; Bank's Chief Executive Officer = CEO; Bank's Age -%
Age; Bank's Geographic Spread = G.spread; Bank's Profits = Profits; Bank's Size = Size;
Bank's Country of Origin = COO.
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Table (4-3): Results of the Stepwise Regression of "Drivers of Identity" on
banks performance measures: When 'Drivers of Identity' are
emphasised'
Performance
measures
ROA NPL SHE DEP
Constant 40.01 -0.39 6.11 48.36
(3.77)* (-0.51) (10.42)* (8.38)*
Reputation 0.02
(1.76)***
CEO 0.85
(3.70)*
Age 0.48
(1.78)***
G.spread
Profits
Size 0.41
(3.86)*
COO 0.04
(2.21)**
Adjusted R 2 0.23 0.09 0.08 0.26
F-Ratio 6.98* 4.92** 3.08*** 14.88 `
VIF Age COO Reputation Size
1.14 1.00 1.00 1.00
CEO
1.14
D-W statistic 2.24 2.31 2.53 2.15
N 40 40 38 40
1 (-statistics are given in parentheses.
. Estimates are significant at the significance level 99%.
•, Estimates are significant at the significance level 95%.
*** Estimates are significant at the significance level 90%.
Each regression equation is tested for multicollinearity among the
explanatory variables (drivers of identity) using the Variance Inflationary
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Factor (VIF) under the following two hypothesises:
H 0 : the X's are orthogonal
H I : the X's are not orthogonal
where X's = Drivers of Identity
The results show that the four equations are free from multicollinearity
among the explanatory variables the correlation matrixes of the explanatory
variables are listed in Appendixes (4-2) - (4-5)].
An autocorrelation test is carried out using D-W (Durbin-Watson) test
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977; Gujarati, 1992; Greene, 1997) under the following two
hypothesises:
H 0 : p = 0 (the u's are not autocorrelated)
H I : p 0 (the u's are serially dependent)
where p = the coefficient of the autocorrelation relationship.
The results of the auto correlation analysis show that the four regression
equations are free from autocorrelation among u's where d * > du at the
significance level 1%. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted.
The impacts of the five drivers are not equal on the four regression
equations according to the different statistical significant level (p-value) for
each equation. The first and the fourth equation show higher significance (p-
value < 0.01), then the second equation (p-value < 0.05), and finally the third
equation (p-value < 0.10). The most influential drivers are banks' Size, CEO,
Country of Origin, Age and Reputation for Clients respectively.
The results show that banks' ROA is affected to a large extent by the
quality of the management represented by the CEO and to a less extent by the
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banks' age. Banks' non-performing loans (NPL) equation is affected by the
Country of Origin. This result reflects the effects of the different institutional
infrastructure in different business systems the banks belong to. That is, the
general idea behind the significance of the institutional infrastructure tells that
the stronger the enforcement laws, the less the NPL and vice versa. The banks'
Shareholder Equity/Total Assets (SHE) equation is affected by banks'
Reputation for Clients. This indicates that shareholders are not only affected
by the banks profits (the conventional measure) but they can also be affected
by the strength of the banks-clients networks. The last regression equation
shows that banks' Deposits/Total Assets (DEP) is affected significantly by the
size of the bank. This result matches the reality of the banking business. That
is, the size of a bank determines the deposits the bank does have in the present
and what is expected in the future as well.
Level 2: The impact of 'Drivers of Identity' on Highly versus Lowly
ranked banks
As for level 2, tables (4-4) and (4-5) show the results of the linear
regression of drivers of identity on the performance measures of the highly
versus lowly ranked banks. As the main issue in this level is to test the impact
of drivers of identity on performance measures, the analysis focuses on the
data that represents the emphasised drivers of Identity. The reason for
choosing this option is that these drivers are the most likely to influence
banks' performance.
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Table (4-4): Results of the Stepwise Regression of the 'Highly ranked banks:'
when 'Drivers of Identity' are emphasised'
Performance
measures
ROA NPL SHE DEP
Constant 1.14
(5.79)*
7:9
c.)
i
'0
7.23
(12.73) .
65.84
(7.50) *
›-,
71
Reputation .!-2.-,-.Cl, 0.54
0 (2.68)
Cl'
.CEO
ci)0 0.02 0.45
(1.87) 4...
 
•
Age 1
(2.82)
V
.4
G.spread
(4-,
o
0
o
Z
Profits
0.34
(1.75)*"Size
COO 0.02 0.06 0.71
(3.11)* (4.46)* (3.25)*
Adjusted R 2 0.33 0.50 0.36
F-Ratio 9.72 . 10.06* 3.56**
VIF COO CEO CEO
1.00 1.11 1.14
COO COO
1.11 1.16
Profit
1.19
Reputation
1.17
D-W statistic 1.82 2.17 1.82
N 19 19 19
1 t-statistics are given in parentheses.
* Estimates are significant at the significance level 99%.
.. Estimates are significant at the significance level 95%.
..* Estimates are significant at the significance level 90%.
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Table (4-4) shows the results of the linear regression for the 'Highly
ranked banks.' Each regression equation is tested for multicollinearity among
the explanatory variables (Drivers of Identity) using the Variance Inflationary
Factor (VIF) under the following two hypothesises:
H 0 : the X's are orthogonal
H I : the X's are not orthogonal
where X's = Drivers of Identity
The results show that the four equations are free from multicollinearity
among the explanatory variables [the correlation matrixes of the explanatory
variables are listed in Appendixes (4-6) - (4-8)].
An autocorrelation test is carried out using D-W (Durbin-Watson) test
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977; Gujarati, 1992; Greene, 1997) under the following two
hypothesises:
H 0 : p = 0 (the u's are not autocorrelated)
H I : p 0 (the u's are serially dependent)
where p = the coefficient of the autocorrelation relationship.
The results of the autocorrelation analysis show that the three
regression equation are free from autocorrelation among u's where d * > du at
the significance level 1%. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted.
The results show that banks' drivers of identity have different impacts
on performance measures taking into account the different degrees of adjusted
R 2 of each regression equation. Moreover, only four out of the seven drivers of
identity are statistically significant. These are banks' CEO, Country of Origin,
Profits and Reputation for Clients. The four drivers of identity explain most of
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the variations in banks' Deposits/Total Assets. This result proves that these
drivers of identity are significantly contributing to banks' performance taking
into account that deposits represent one of the core components of the banking
business. Nevertheless, it seems that shareholders equity is influenced to a
relatively high degree by banks' CEO and Country of Origin. The results also
show that banks' drivers of Identity are not statistically significant when
explaining banks' Non-Performing Loans/Total Loans. This result can be
explained by the fact that banks' non-performing loans represent clients'
defaults which are more associated with their business types and/or conditions
than with what banks emphasis on to convey their identity.
Nevertheless, table (4-4) shows that drivers of Identity are contributing
less to banks' ROA where only one variable (Country of Origin) is statistically
significant in this equation and it is associated with the lowest adjusted R 2 .
This seems logic where the results of the Stepwise Regression Analysis in
table (4-3) show that banks' profits is not selected among the drivers of
identity.
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Table (4-5): Results of the Stepwise Regression of the 'Lowly ranked banks'
when 'Drivers of Identity are emphasised 1
Performance
measures
ROA NPL SHE DEP
Constant 0.21 4.75 7.23 65.22
(0.48) (4.09)* (2.75)* (9•79)*
Reputation 0.02 0.15
(1.91) *** (2.34)**
CEO 0.03 -0.07
(1.69) *** (-2.08)**
Age 0.55
(2.71)*
G.spread
Profits 0.52
(2.40)**
Size
COO
Adjusted R 2 0.12 0.09 0.23 0.25
F-Ratio 3.67" 2.86*** 3.98** 4.30**
VIF Reputation CEO Reputation Age
1.00 1.00 1.06 1.4
CEO Profit
1.06 1.4
D-W statistic 1.52 1.75 2.64 2.75
N 21 19 21 21
I (-statistics are given in parentheses.
. Estimates are significant at the significance level 99%.
.. Estimates are significant at the significance level 95%.
... Estimates are significant at the significance level 90%.
The results in table (4-5) show that the performance measures of the
'Lowly ranked banks' are affected by four out of the seven drivers of identity.
These are the banks' Reputation For Clients, CEO, Age and Profits
respectively.
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Each regression equation is tested for multicollinearity among the
explanatory variables (Drivers of Identity) using the Variance Inflationary
Factor (VIF) under the following two hypothesises:
H 0 : the X's are orthogonal
H I
 : the X's are not orthogonal
where X's = Drivers of Identity
The results show that the four equations are free from multicollinearity
among the explanatory variables [the correlation matrixes of the explanatory
variables are listed in Appendixes (4-9) - (4-12)].
An autocorrelation test is carried out using D-W (Durbin-Watson) test
(Koutsoyiannis, 1977; Gujarati, 1992; Greene, 1997) under the following two
hypothesises:
H 0 : p = 0 (the u's are not autocorrelated)
H I : p # 0 (the u's are serially dependent)
where p = the coefficient of the autocorrelation relationship.
The results of the autocorrelation analysis show that the four regression
equation are free from autocorrelation among u's where GI * > du at the
significance level 1%. That is, the null hypothesis is accepted.
The four drivers of identity are associated with the highest adjusted R 2
of the banks' equation of Deposits/Total Assets, although it is not as high as
that of the 'Highly ranked banks.' The results also show that the 'Lowly
ranked banks' share the 'Highly ranked banks' in emphasising on three drivers
of identity: the banks' CEO, Profits and Reputation for Clients. The 'Lowly
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ranked banks' differ in their emphasis on their 'Age' which shows a
statistically significant impact on the banks' Deposits/Total Assets.
The comparison of the results in table (4-4) and table (4-5) to those of
table (4-3) shows a significant implication. Firstly, banks' drivers of identity -
excluding only banks' Geographic Spread - affect to a significant degree the
banks basic performance measures. Secondly, the comparison between the
adjusted R 2 of the 'Highly' versus the 'Lowly' ranked banks shows that
banks' drivers of identity explain larger percentage of the performance
measures for the 'Highly ranked banks' than they do for the 'Lowly ranked
banks.' This emphasises the fact that 'Highly ranked banks' gain some
benefits by emphasising on the six drivers of identity when conveying
information to their stakeholders. This conclusion, therefore, is of special
importance to 'Lowly ranked banks.' That is, the latter should give special
attention to those drivers of identity that help their stakeholders to highly
identify their products and services, thus their identity and performance
measures.
Level 3: Influences between different business systems
As this level is focusing on comparing the three basic business systems
(the Anglo-Saxon, the Communitarian, and the Asian/emerging business
systems), TUKEY 'S HSD (Honestly Significant Difference) test is used to
carry out pairwise comparisons under the following general hypothesis:
H 0 : p, for any two business systems is equal
H 1 : 11 for any two business systems is not equal
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Table (4-6): TUKEY -HSD test for the Highly ranked banks (when banks
emphasise on "Drivers of Identity") '
Business Systems
Anglo-Saxon Communitarian Asian/Emerging
Variables
Size
Mean 49.99	 48.80	 23.61
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.41
Age
Mean 29.74	 38.35	 29.16
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.69
CEO
Mean 25.10	 23.94	 23.61
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.01
Country of Origin
Mean 43.24	 36.14	 47.22
TUICEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.31
Reputation for Clients
Mean 41.59	 52.07	 41.66
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.82
Geographic Spread
Mean 61.20	 58.19	 56.94
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.05
ROA
Mean 0.68	 0.52	 0.38
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.51
NPL
Mean 4.74	 4.35	 2.33
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.55
SHE
Mean 4.88	 5.02	 4.16
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.42
Dep
Mean 67.25	 76.18	 64.09
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.27
1N= 19
Table (4-6) shows the means of the 'Highly ranked banks' when they
emphasise on drivers of Identity, in addition to measures of performance. It
seems that drivers of identity are of equal importance to all banks whatever the
business system they belong to.
211
Table (4-7): TUKEY -HSD test for the Lowly ranked banks (when banks emphasise
on "Drivers of Identity") I
Business Systems
Anglo-Saxon Communitarian Asian/Emerging
Variables
Size
Mean 40.30	 52.13	 37.96
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.16
Age
Mean 31.85	 41.38	 43.51
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.15
CEO
Mean 5.55	 31.52	 24.53
TUICEY-HSD test The Communitarian banks differ significantly from Anglo-
Saxon and Asian/Emerging banks at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 5.96*
Country of Origin
Mean 28.64
	 53.78	 68.05
TUKEY-HSD test The Communitarian and Asian/Emerging banks differ
significantly from Anglo-Saxon banks at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 10.75*
Reputation of Clients
Mean 41.49	 41.15	 39.81
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.02
Geographic Spread
Mean 55.53
	
49.72
	
39.35
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.54
ROA
Mean 1.54	 0.38	 1.19
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 3.03
NPL
Mean 25.54	 3.98	 2.81
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.35
SHE
Mean 8.61	 6.91	 7.61
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 0.16
Dep
Mean 62.43	 75.57	 63.89
TUKEY-HSD test no two groups are significantly different at the 0.05 level
F-Ratio 1.05
1 N = 21
. Significant at the significance level 95%.
Table (4-7) shows different results with the same variables for 'Lowly
ranked banks'. It shows that both of the CEO and the Country of Origin
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distinguish between the three business systems. As for the CEO, the results
show that the CEO is of special importance to Communitarian banks, and is of
equal importance to the other two business systems.
As for the Country of Origin, the results show that it is of special
importance to the banks that belong to Communitarian and Asian/emerging
business systems. This result may be explained by the fact that both of those
two business systems contain economies in-transition which are of major and
distinguished concern for investors around the world. This is why it makes
difference for banks in those two business systems to emphasise on their
Country of Origin. In general, the results of level 3 indicate that the drivers of
identity are relatively important to Communitarian and Asian/emerging
business systems than to the Anglo-Saxon business system.
4.9 Conclusion
This chapter concludes that bank's drivers of identity are considered
very important factors that determine its relative position in the marketplace.
That is, the drivers of identity are equivalent to, and in fact stem from, various
stakeholders interests. This issue is very important to the financial services
industries as long as product intangibility is considered a distinct feature that
necessitates to address non-financial measures of corporate governance.
More interestingly, the chapter shows that certain drivers of identity
positively affect banks performance, thus their relative competitive position in
the marketplace. Furthermore, the results show that Banks' drivers of identity
are relatively important to different business systems. More specifically, the
213
highly ranked banks benefit more from focusing on drivers of identity than the
lowly ranked banks.
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Chapter 5
Monitoring Corporate Performance and Governance in
Transitional Markets: An Application to Egypt
215
Corporate
Stakeholders
(Resources)
(Corporate
Performance
Corporate
Identity
5.1 Introduction
This chapter introduces in-depth insights concerning emerging markets
in transition. These markets have undergone radical changes since the 1980s.
The most notable change is their path to rapidly capitalise their economies
which has led many scholars to adopt the stock market measures used for
corporate monitoring in the capitalist economies. The recent decline in the
stock markets in emerging markets suggests that corporate performance in
transitional markets must be monitored through additional measures including
the stock market ones.
In this sense, as the two preceding chapters conclude that corporate
stakeholders orientation provides sources of identification that can enhance
corporate relative position in the marketplace, this chapter, therefore, explores
how this identification can be monitored in transitional emerging markets, and
what type of information can be released by companies to their stakeholders.
This idea is shown the Figure (5-1).
i Information	 i
Feedback
Corporate Performance Disclosure
(Z-score model as a tool for disclosing performance information)
Figure (5-1): Corporate governance and corporate performance: An extended
approach
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Figure (5-1) illustrates that corporate stakeholders provide
tangible/physical resources needed by a company for production purposes,
whereas corporate identity, which is closely related to stakeholders
identification, provides the intangible resources needed by a company to
strengthen its relative competitive position in the market place. It is obvious,
therefore, that corporate performance can be affected not only by stakeholders
contribution but also by their perception and evaluation of the company's
products and/or services.
For this purpose, this chapter builds a Z-score model, which is a
statistical model that has been recognised as a practical tool for monitoring
corporate performance. The work is applied to the textile sector in Egypt as it
is recognised a transitional economy.
5.2 International Business Systems in Comparative Research
The revival of interest in comparative economic, political, social
organisation and institutions in academic research has been around the issue of
competing models of capitalism, or business systems as the sustained success
of the German and Japanese economies provides an alternative model of
political economy often called, alliance or Communitarian capitalism (Choi, et
al., 1996; Gerlach and Lincoln, 1992; Dunning, 1996). There has also been an
intense debate on the reform of corporate governance systems coupled with
various initiatives of corporate restructuring in both the Anglo-Saxon countries
and the Communitarian countries (Bowman and Useem, 1995). In addition,
there is a compelling need for an applicable model of business systems for the
former Eastern bloc countries as well as other emerging market countries. The
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works in the international business environment such as Porter (1990), Ohmae
(1985), Thurow (1992) argue that the increasing homogenisation of demand,
technology and income levels in the three triad markets (United States,
Western Europe and Japan) tend to shape managerial mind sets and decision
making in global competition. This view is often extended to the argument that
globalisation of markets and the convergence of demand under this triad
framework allow firms to allocate their resources and activities freely across
these three regions, thus leading to increased economies of scale and scope by
standardisation of products and services, minimisation of costs, and the
formation of flexible organisational structure.
Other researchers have discussed the importance of national
institutions and capabilities: Stopford and Strange (1991), Lodge (1990) and
Doz and Prahalad (1984) on business government relations; North (1996) and
Williamson (1985a) on economic institutions; Kogut (1991) and Shan and
Hamilton (1991) on technological capabilities and national systems of
innovation; Sorge (1991) and Huntington (1996) on societal contingencies and
elective affinities; Whitley (1990) and Child and Monir (1983) on comparative
forms of business organisations and management systems. These works,
elaborating on the global standardisation and local adaptation debate, have
helped to analyse the complex realities of institutional and organisational
diversity that still persist in today's increasingly converging global business
environment. The researcher further suggests that the business system of a
country or a group of countries consisting of various institutional and cultural
factors is a crucial determinant in analysing the differential modes of
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organisation and strategy as well as differential rates of performance in today's
global competition.
As the researcher discussed earlier, the traditional analysis of the triad
popularised in works such as Ohmae (1985) and Thurow (1992) is defined by
the similarity of income and other demand factors across the triad. This is
shown in Figure (5-2). But that analysis does not take into account the role of
emerging market countries and their firms in global competition.
US
N Developin
EUrope Japan
Figure (5-2): Traditional models in international management: Geography and
wealth based
Figure (5-2) shows that global competition can be seen from the
viewpoint of what motivates and constrains firm strategy and behaviour in
today's global business environment. Such factors or constraints include
national culture, legal and regulatory environment, business-government
relationship, the role of financial institutions and corporate governance system
in the home market as well as the host countries of multinational firms.
It is worth to realise that globalisation and the competition between and
among competition-driven countries do not mean that differences between the
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latter and economics-driven countries do not exist. Accordingly, the
importance of the national business environment in influencing the organising
principles and competitive strategies of firms has been analysed in Stopford
and Strange (1991), Kogut (1991) and Albert (1993). According to their
analysis, domestic institutions play as important role in determining corporate
behaviour as the pressures of globalisation. For example, in many parts of
Asia, it is not financial markets but various government ministries that monitor
corporate performance and control financial allocation. In many continental
European countries such as Germany and Switzerland, the banking sector, as
institutional shareholders, monitors corporate performance and investment
decisions. Firm behaviour and strategy, especially investment decisions such
as new market entry, diversification and innovation and new product
development can be significantly constrained by the differences of home
market institutions while at the same time provide sources of competitive
advantages that may or may not be transferred across national boundaries.
These constraints, in turn, determine the scale and scope of collaborative
activities across national boundaries. That is, in spite of the global nature of
today's competition, the political, economic and socio-cultural effects of home
market institutions can have both positive and negative influence on firm
capabilities and competitive advantages.
The Anglo-Saxon business system, or capitalism (Albert, 1993) has been
economically dominant in the 19th and 20th centuries. Although the term
'West' is often used to describe both North America and Western Europe as a
relatively homogenous grouping of countries, in terms of economic and
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political systems, there is a significant difference between Anglo-Saxon
countries such as the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom and those
of continental Europe. The latter countries are also Western, but very different
from the Anglo-Saxon countries in terms of their domestic business system
which emphasises the role of the government in economic and social affairs,
the close linkages between banking and industry and the group orientation of
the society and Communitarian values.
The Emerging markets refer to a broad range of countries that are
rapidly entering the world business system. They include most of the Asian
countries, some of the Eastern European countries such as Russia, Hungary
and Czech Republic, and some of the Latin American countries such as
Mexico, Chile and Brazil. These countries, in turn, have to be distinguished
from the developing countries of the world. This can be shown in Figure (5-3).
Due to their phenomenal economic growth, the emerging markets have
become a key focus for personal and institutional investors as well as for
international corporations.
Anglo-Saxon
Business System
Developing
Communitarian
Business System
Emerging Market
Business System
Figure (5-3): Home market institutions and constraints
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5.3 Corporate Governance and Adaptable Governance in Transitional
Emerging Markets
The emerging markets represent undeniable commercial opportunities.
In the last decade, the ten big emerging markets - Mexico, Brazil, Argentina,
South Africa, Poland, Turkey, India, South Korea, the ASEAN region
(Indonesia, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore, and Vietnam), and the Chinese
Economic Area (China, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) - have opened their markets
to foreign investment and trade. The GDP of the big emerging markets has
been increasing two to three times faster than that of the developed countries.
At the same time, the emerging markets have made genuine progress in
putting deficits and inflation under control as well as in selling off bloated
state enterprises to private investors.
Until the late 1990s, the capitalist path of development has been
observed as the most favourable path to speed up economic reform in the
emerging markets. Private capital has been flowing to the emerging markets in
unprecedented amounts, rising from 19% in 1996 to a new high of $230
billion. Enormous potential exists for further expansion: for example, whereas
all emerging markets account for 40% of global production, they still represent
only 15% of global stock market value (Garten, 1997a,b). Nevertheless,
recently the East Asian crises raised concern about the viability of the
emerging market business system as a medium of continued economic growth
(Lee, et al., 1998). Figure (5-4) shows that the Market Capitalisation/GNP in
the big ten emerging markets has been rising sharply since 1993, then started
to decline since 1994.
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This gives rise the fact that the economic growth in emerging markets
has been financed by the stock market — the common institution in the
capitalist economies — as much as it has been by other institutions such as
banks. In addition, the private capital flows into the big ten emerging markets
at the beginning of the 1990s were aiming at benefiting from the so-called
first mover advantage (Andrews, 1996). This is the green light, as Andrews
points out, that has been encouraging private investors to turn to the new
markets seeking more profits from not-yet-saturated markets. However, it is
obvious that those investors have not been aware of the underlying economic
facts inherent in many of the emerging markets: low per capita income,
fragmented distribution systems and tariff and import limits. This is the
yellow light that investors should have been aware of.
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In terms of the distinct differences between the major international
business systems, the relative position of the emerging markets between the
Anglo-Saxon and the Communitarian business systems tells that market
capitalisation in emerging markets has been sloping downward since 1992 to
resemble relatively the Communitarian one. This trend is depicted in figure
(5-5).
Figure (5-5): Trend of Market Capitalisation/GNP of Comparative Business Systems
* Source: The values of each county's Market Capitalisation and GNP are drawn from The
International Financial Statistics, Vol. L, No. 11, November 1997; Emerging Stock Markets
Factbook, International Finance Corporation.
Therefore, there are considerable evidences to indicate that the tides of
capitalism, which rose so powerfully after the collapse of the Soviet Union,
are poised to recede (Garten, 1997a,b). In sum, the lack of well-adaptable
institutional infrastructure (Lee et al., 1998; Khanna and Palepu, 1997a,b;
Kuznetsova and Kuznetsov, 1998), the clash of capitalism and democracy
that has resulted in political turmoil in many emerging markets (Garten,
1997a,b)
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and the weak economic infrastructure (Andrews, 1996) have all resulted in a
considerable degree of uncertainty that led the private capital to drawback as
the economic, social, and political infrastructure could not help international
investors to sustain profits in the long run.
5.4 Corporate Governance, Disclosure and Monitoring Corporate
Performance
In terms of the transitional economies' business system, the
institutional infrastructure in most of the transitional emerging markets is
characterised by weakened bureaucratic controls and tolerance of private
ownership (Fischer and Gelb, 1991; Peng, 1994). As a result, the most
observable features of doing business in transitional economies are the rely on
network contacts and personal trust to minimise the uncertainties associated
with the changing environment (Xin and Pearce, 1994). However, personal
contacts and trust do not last long enough if the institutional infrastructure is
weak. This, therefore, can explain the recent turmoil in the emerging markets
when western investors started not to depend heavily on personal contacts and
trust as long as political, economic and social instability are observed and even
started to negatively affect their business in these transitional countries. In
fact, as the stock prices in transitional economies have played an important
informational role (Dow and Gorton, 1997) to reflect the deficiencies in their
stock markets, the weaknesses of the internal capital market, such as bank
relationships, have put the inadequacy of the institutional infrastructure on the
surface of the commercial transactions (World Bank: Directions in
Development, 1997).
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The above reveals the necessity of changing corporate governance
arrangements to cope with the relatively high degree of uncertainty associated
with the institutional infrastructure of transitional economies. In this sense,
disclosing more information about the corporate activities can play dual role at
the macro level and the micro level as well. At the macro level, more
disclosure can mitigate the negative effects of uncertainty, and at the micro
level more disclosure proves to both corporate insiders and outsiders that
corporate board of directors and corporate managers are accountable and
responsible for enhancing corporate performance to the benefits of its
stakeholders (Cadbury, 1993; Forker, 1992). Moreover, disclosure
arrangements have been the focal point of the proposals for corporate
governance reform proposals in number of developed countries. In the UK,
Tricker and Robert (1984), Charlcham (1989), Cadbury (1993) and the
Committee on the Financial Aspects of Corporate Governance (1995) discuss
the role of disclosure in proposals of corporate governance reform. In the U.S.,
the country where the major concern of the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC) is the disclosure reform, the inconclusive nature of the
disclosure quality is illustrated by successive revisions of the American Law
Institute proposals (American Law Institute, 1982, 1990; Gilson and
Kraakman, 1992). Nevertheless, in terms of Corporation Law, disclosure
reform proposals in the U.S. could not yet achieve full benefits to the
stockholders (Balck, 1991; Andre, 1991).
Williamson's (1985b) analysis of transaction costs provides a
framework linking disclosure quality to corporate governance. This is
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integrated with the positive 'theory of agency' developed by Jensen and
Meekling (1976) to provide a model of the disclosure decision of management.
Management are assumed to balance potential benefits from less disclosure
against costs in the form of lower share prices and increased threat of take-
over and to choose the quality of disclosure which minimises the costs they
incur. In this sense, disclosure quality is described by Verrecchia (1990) as the
distributional characteristic or variance of an uncertain event. In this chapter,
the researches is focusing on enhancing corporate stakeholders' confidence in
the progress of the transition process taking into account the relatively high
degree of uncertainty associated with this process. Therefore, corporate
governance in transitional economies can by improved through monitoring
corporate performance on the basis of improved and relevant disclosure
arrangements.
5.5 Corporate Governance in Transitional Economies, Privatisation and
Disclosure
Corporate governance in transitional economies is associated with the
fact that the transition to a market economy could be readily achieved by
privatising state-owned enterprises combined with introducing an equity
market. The latter would serve as the market for corporate control which is an
instrument for corporate governance and, hence, as an effective mechanism for
raising the external finance much needed by privatised enterprises for their
restructuring projects.
The most common consequence of the privatisation process in
transition economies is the strong insider control by managers and workers.
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Insider control has virtually blocked the development of an equity market
(Aoki and Kim, 1995). The most observed characteristic is that managers (and
employees under the ESOPs programs) are often conservative shareholders,
reluctant to sell their shares for fear of loosing control. Moreover, industrial
shares in insider-controlled enterprises are no longer attractive to potential
investors because of low dividends and the virtual impossibility of obtaining
large blocks of shares. Consequently, the equity markets tend to be thin and
incapable of providing adequate finance for enterprise restructuring. Gray
(1996) presents evidences from number of transition economies (such as
Estonia, Hungary, Russia, Slovenia, Czech, Slovak Republics, and Poland)
that show if the objectives of privatisation are to serve the links between the
state and the enterprises, to school the population in market basics, and to
foster further ownership change, the initial weight of evidence seems to favour
significant reliance on voucher privatisation, especially given the difficulty
most countries have finding willing cash investors. These insights, therefore,
reveals the importance of more open disclosure arrangements and policies to
strengthen investors confidence in the privatisation process.
It is clear that privatisation and, hence, the transition to a market
economy, raises the question of how to make management accountable to
shareholders and also to the requirements of law. Privatisation in transition
economies gives rise the common issues - and also problems - of corporate
governance in market economies such as the separation of ownership and
control, the duties of directors, the need for disclosure given that separation,
and the corporate charter as a vehicle for the direct participation of
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shareholders in governance. In this context, Klipper (1998) suggests that one
of the best models of corporate governance that transition economies can use
is that employed by the Leveraged-Buy-Out (LBO) and venture capital funds
operating in the West which, in turn, necessitate more disclosure arrangements
to corporate outsiders. Furthermore, Klipper (1998) recommends a greater
entrenchment of law and economics in transition economies because both have
greater impact than elsewhere. This is true as long as the institutional
infrastructure in transition economies is not as strong as it is in the West.
As the emerging markets provided alluring investment opportunities by
the beginning of 1980s, private capital did not hesitate providing the necessary
financing to reap as much profits as possible. Most, if not all, of this capital
has been flowing from the western countries. Considering that corporate
governance has been always associated with corporate finance (Williamson,
1988), the inevitable outcome of the western financial flows was an inclusion
of the western investment and corporate governance structure into different,
and sometimes diverse, cultural and business practises (Staber and Aldrich,
1994). The western corporate governance structures favour the stock market as
a readily institution for providing capital. Therefore, the western mode of
corporate governance turned out to be characterised by 'short-termism'
(Laverty, 1996) - the system that favours short-term outcomes over long-term
sustainable ones - and it could not sustain good governance even for the stock
market-driven economies (Bhide, 1994).
The aspects of the short-term corporate governance structures have
been empirically examined in many works. For example, Hayes and
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Abernathy (1980) focus on the fact that flawed management practice of
discounting techniques to evaluate investment projects results in an
undervaluation of the future. Kaplan (1984) highlights the fundamental
weaknesses in the accounting model to increasing the reported profits while
sacrificing the long-term economic health of the firm. Managerial opportunism
is emphasised in the works of Narayanan (1985), Holmstrom and Ricart i
Costa (1986) and Rumelt (1987) where they emphasise on managers' desire to
invest in projects that offer faster profits and short paybacks to enhance their
reputation and having their positions last as long as possible. In this sense,
managers and shareholders as well are motivated to manage and monitor what
can be readily measurable, e.g., changes in the stock prices and short-term
profits per share (Lowenstein, 1996). The stock market myopia, which is the
fundamental observable characteristic of the western investors' attitudes, is
emphasised on the works of Loescher (1984), Stein (1988,1989), Johnson and
Kaplan (1987) and Froot et al., (1992). These works due the myopic investors'
attitudes to the investors' eagerness to benefit from increases in the stock
prices in the short-term, otherwise they would easily sell off their shares of
stock as long as shares turned out to be traded as commodities. This can be
true particularly when shareholders have neither the interest nor the knowledge
to wait for the long run: this is what is so-called "impatient Capital" (Jacobs,
1991). In this regard, the uninformed and/or ill-informed traders in the stock
market tend to manipulate as long as his/her trades are observable to only
some traders in the market (Chalcraborty, 1997).
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Where uncertainty that characterises transitional emerging markets and
the western corporate governance structures - e.g., short-termism, managerial
opportunism, stock market myopia, fluid capital and impatient capital - joined
with different cultures and commercial practises in transitional economies, the
western governance structures do not appeal in most of the emerging markets.
This has very important implications for both international investors and their
business partners in transitional emerging markets as well. The need for
coping with local business conditions gives arise to the need to seek more
adaptable corporate governance structures rather than impose imported ones.
An important discerning feature of the recent East Asian crises is the lack of
monitoring mechanisms that can help to foresee the most adaptable path of
corporate governance that helps to achieve sound economic growth. In this
sense, transitional emerging markets can adopt an adaptable corporate
governance system through monitoring corporate performance at the micro
level that helps to achieve sound adaptable economic growth at the macro
level. The considerable amount of uncertainty of the business environment in
transitional emerging market and the resulted economic, social and political
turmoil recently observed raise an important question concerning the most
adaptable corporate governance structure(s) in these countries. As corporate
governance structures stem from the institutional arrangements in a certain
country, the transitional emerging markets are to examine and explore the
most adaptable governance structures as long as the interaction between
institutions and organisations shapes economic activity (North, 1996).
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Commercial transactions in transitional economies tend to depend on
personal relations. As a result, western companies may encounter difficulties
penetrating markets dominated by the kinship-based business practices
(Andrews, 1996). The personalities-based business conduct can easily lead to
'opportunism.' According to Williamson (1985a) opportunism .. . refers to the
incomplete or distorted disclosure of information, especially to calculated
efforts to mislead, distort, obfuscate or otherwise confuse.' Therefore,
disclosure policies that reduce the quantity and quality of information increase
the scope for opportunistic behaviour (Forker, 1992; Abrahamson and Park,
1994). This shows the importance for a company to explore monitoring
techniques that can convey relevant and reliable information to its
stakeholders, thus reduce the degree of uncertainty they encounter when
evaluating corporate performance. Monitoring techniques are very important
to transitional economies where high degree of insider control is observed. In
this sense, insider control may encourage some aspects of opportunism as long
as strategic decision making in the state-owned enterprises may reflect
insiders' interests - for example, higher revenues from improved productivity
might be distributed internally, perhaps as wage increases (Aoki and Kim,
1995; Vickers and Yarrow, 1988; Ramanadham, 1987).
5.6 Monitoring Corporate Transitional Performance: Theoretical
Framework
The inclusion of the different modes of corporate governance into the
emerging markets' business system has had very important implications
concerning how corporate performance in transitional emerging markets is to
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be measured and monitored. Considering that privatisation, which is the most
observed development path in transitional economies, does not necessarily
provide a complete incur to corporate deficiencies (Hemming and Mansour,
1988), corporate performance should be monitored through wider
measurements.
Although the works of Garten (1997a,b), Lee, et al., (1998), Andrews
(1996), Fischer and Gelb (1991), Peng (1993, 1994), Xin and Pearce (1994),
World Bank: Directions in Development (1997), Khanna and Palepu
(1997a,b), Kuznetsova and Kuznetsov (1998), Pannier (1996), Lieberman et
al., (1997) and Guislain (1997) emphasise on the different political, economic
and social aspects of the transitional economies, there is a general scarcity in
transitional economies research that explores and utilises quantitative models
to structure some of the dominant factors in these economies. Therefore, the
approach of this chapter takes a new research rout through which a statistical
model is built to formalise some of the underlying dominant factors that shape
the structure of corporate governance in emerging economies in transition.
The existing literature on the measurements of the competition-driven
corporate performance tells that western firms are motivated to grow
according to number of strategic choices to achieve growth (Child, 1972,
1994). In this regard, it is worth to examine whether those strategic choices,
and the resulted measurements of corporate performance, are relevant to
transitional emerging markets (Boyacigiller and Adler, 1991; Williamson,
1991; Peng, 1993, 1994; Peng and Heath, 1996). To select an appropriate
corporate strategy requires top management to inventory the internal strengths
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and weaknesses of the organisation as well as to evaluate the opportunities and
constraints the business environment presents (Child, 1972; Porter, 1980;
Chandler, 1996). Therefore, companies in transitional emerging markets are to
be monitored on the basis of their ability to reflect a strategic adaptable and
sustainable performance. Considering that there are a wide range of aspects of
strategic performance, the aspects that should be adopted are the ones that
enhance the business confidence in a stage of transition. In this respect, the
aspects that reflect the firm's transformation ability and those that enhance the
business confidence should be adopted. The measurement of corporate
performance has been examined in different studies throughout the literature
of finance, strategic management and international business. Considering that
there is little agreement on how strategic performance should be measured
(Cameron and Whetten, 1983; Goodman, 1979; Hannan and Freeman, 1977),
this necessitates to rely on the literature of finance, corporate strategy and
international business altogether to outline broader course of measures of
company performance that can be used in the case of emerging countries in
transition.
5.6.1 Corporate Financial Performance
As for the literature of finance, measures of corporate performance
rooted in financial accounting have come in for a lot of recent criticism. The
problems that have been cited with this approach are: (1) scope for accounting
manipulation; (2) undervaluation of assets; (3) distortions due to depreciation
policies, inventory valuation and treatment of certain revenue and expenditure
items; (4) differences in methods of consolidating accounts, and (5)
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differences due to lack of standardisation in international accounting
conventions. Moreover, accounting measures of performance record only the
history of a firm.
As the Z-score model has been primarily used in the literature of
corporate finance to predict bankruptcy (the Z values are essentially
constructed to predict bankruptcy). It can also used as an index of the
company's overall well-being. The higher the Z value is beyond 3, the more
healthy is the firm. By measuring distance from bankruptcy, Z factor could be
a surrogate index of strategic performance. Nevertheless, this measure is
obviously flawed in that a well-managed firm does not focus all its energies
only on staving off bankruptcy (Chakravarthy, 1986). In addition, the report of
the Royal Society of Arts (1995), is pointing out that of the eleven companies
named Britain's most profitable by Management Today between 1979 and
1989, four subsequently collapsed and two were acquired, the report identifies
one of the main obstacles to the United Kingdom competitiveness to be 'over-
reliance on financial measures of performance.' Monitoring firm's strategy
requires measures that can also capture its potential performance in the future
(Carroll, 1979). An empirical evidence suggests that conventional referents of
performance, whether they be measures of profitability or financial market
measures, for example like the 'market/book ratio' (M/B ratio), are
unsatisfactory discriminants of 'excellence.' For example, Chalcravarthy
(1986) has applied a profitability ratios as measures of strategic performance
and found that none of those ratios are capable of distinguishing between
'excellent' firms from `non-excellent' ones. As for the (M/B) ratio, it is not
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possible to give a credible and sustainable results in the case of the companies
in emerging countries in transition. The reason is that the stock markets in
these countries, especially in a stage of transition, are not efficient enough to
reflect a true market value. In addition, this ratio is not entirely free from
accounting manipulations, so the book value of a firm can be distorted.
Therefor, Chakravarthy's study concluded that financial and stock market
measures of performance have at least three major limitations: (1) they assume
that a single performance criterion can assess excellence; (2) they focus only
on outcomes to the exclusion of transformation processes within the firm, and
(3) they ignore the claims of other stakeholders besides the stockholders. In
sum, financial ratios (or broadly tools of financial analysis) reflect only the
ultimate financial profile of a company rather than the links between and
among the company's various activities including the financial activities. In
addition, from a strategic point of view, we should focus on the other company
activities as much as possible to find out the important cornerstones that
eventually lead to financial outcomes (Wallman, 1995). By focusing on the
company's activities, managers will have a good chance to develop a broader
view to analyse and find out the points of strengths and/or weaknesses in the
company strategies. Although external financial reports are generally prepared
on a going concern basis, the financial information solely can not reflect and
predict company's long-term capabilities and strategies that should, or should
not, be adopted to ensure long-term sustainable performance. The latter
requires a more broader perspectives which incorporate number of variables
that reflect, as much as possible, the basic activities of a company.
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Accordingly, there is an agreement to use number of financial ratios that show
company's aggregate financial profile, such as ROCE ( Return On Capital
Employed), Profit Margin and Asset turn (Eilon, 1988; Weston and Brigham,
1993; Damodaran, 1997). Buzzell et al., (1975) state that company's market-
share position is widely believed to be a determinant of profitability and,
therefore, would be a meaningful indicator of performance. Van Horne (1989)
and Van Horne and Wachowicz (1995) provide a model of 'Sustainable
Growth Rate' which can be used effectively to monitor a company's financial
growth. In addition, company's financial autonomy is measured by a number
of proxy measures of financial transformation such as Market-oriented
Financial Discipline and Transparency in Financial Relations (Ayub and
Hegstad, 1987; Hemming and Mansour, 1988). In addition, some inventory
and capacity utilisation-related measures are used to monitor the functional
aspects of an industry and/or a company (McTigue, 1993).
5.6.2 Corporate Strategic Performance
The literature of corporate strategy provides a variety of measures that
explore and examine company's business strategies. Chalcravarthy (1986)
suggests number of measures to monitor company's transformation process.
Nevertheless, it should be noted that Chalcravarthy has ignored measures that
are related to "market position" and "growth in sales and market share"
because they are not readily available for all businesses. Lev (1992) suggests
corporate information disclosure strategy that helps deterring political and
regulatory intervention and, at the same time, avoids misperceptions by non-
investors stakeholders. Venkatraman and Ramanujarn (1986), McGuire
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(1983), Taffler (1981, 1983, 1995) and Prahalad (1993) combine insights from
both of the literature of finance and corporate strategy by using the ratio of
corporate Value added/Average Total Assets as a measure of corporate
financial performance.
5.6.3 Measures of Corporate Governance
As for the literature of corporate governance, number of works focus
on the financial phase of the governance process: the phase that shows the
effects of corporate financial structures on managers reaction and, eventually,
on corporate performance. As most of the Anglo-Saxon corporate governance
mechanisms are not viable to transitional emerging markets, the researcher
focuses on the basic governance structures: those that emphasise the relative
importance of governmental, banking and foreign financing (Triantis and
Daniels, 1995; Carney, 1997; Borish et al., 1995; Kim, 1995; Kaplan, 1997;
Macey and Miller, 1995; Phelps, et al., 1993). Hoskisson and Turk (1990),
Grier and Zychowiccz (1994), Aoki and Kim (1995) and Pannier (1996)
combine the literature of corporate governance and corporate strategy to
provide proxy measures of alternative modes of corporate governance. In
terms of international business systems, these measures are very useful for
transitional emerging markets as long as the process of the transition itself
involves examining and re-examining alternative modes of governance so as to
adopt what is (are) relevant for each country according to the county-specific
characteristics of its economic, political and social infrastructure (Hillman and
Keim, 1995; North, 1996).
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5.6.4 Company's International Transitional Performance
The literature of international business provides some measures of the
process of internationalisation that are helpful in the cases of emerging
countries in transition (Aggarwal and Agmon, 1990; Sullivan, 1994, 1996;
Ramaswamy and Kroeck, 1996; Ellis, 1998; Ietto-Gillies, 1998). In general,
these measures focus on the role of exports as a stage of country and/or
company internationalisation process. Porter's works, by providing some
measures of company's competitiveness, incorporate some insights from the
literature of finance, corporate strategy and international business to highlight
some aspects of a company's competitiveness (Porter, 1980, 1985). In
addition, a standardised measure of risk is included as a measure of risk (Van
Horn, 1977, 1989; Van Horne and Wachowicz, 1995).
The above literature is very helpful to provide a variety of first-order
measures that can help examining and monitoring corporate transitional
performance in emerging markets, taking into account that the literature of
measuring corporate transitional performance quantitatively is relatively new.
In addition, these measures are to give company's stakeholders a realistic
information concerning the extent of its progress in the stage of transition.
This can eventually enhace the company's identity in the market place.
Accordingly, number of meaningful ratios are used to build a Z-score model
for monitoring corporate transitional performance in Egypt.
5.7 Egypt as a Transition Economy
The Open Door Policy in Egypt initiated in 1974 encouraged private
investment. The contribution of the private sector rose from 10 per cent of
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total investment in 1973 to 24 per cent in 1981. It accounted for 48 per cent of
the GDP in 1981-1982 (The Five-Year- Plan's Pillars and Policies, 1982/83-
1986/87). More insights regarding private investments are shows in table (5-1).
Table (5-1): Private investment in Egypt*
Sector Private investment as % of
total investment
Change
%
1977-82
Plane Period
1982-87
Plan Period
Agriculture and land reform
irrigation and drainage 29 27 -6.89
Industry and Military 23 21 -8.69
Petroleum - - -
Electricity - - -
Contracting 24 54 125
Total Commodity Sector 20 20 0
Transport and Communication 3 6 100
Suez Canal - - -
Commerce, Finance, Insurance,
and Tourism 14 33 135.71
Total Production Service Section 5 8 60
Housing 74 94 27.03
Public Utilities - - -
Education, Health, other services 16 26 62.5
Total Services Sector 36 45 25
Total Fixed Investments 20 23 15
• Source: The Five-Year- Plan's Pillars and Policies, 1982/83-1986/87. Part One - The
Present (Cairo), P. 63.
The Open Door Policy involved a variety of administrative and
legislative measures. Law No. 43 of 1974 concerning the Investment of Arab
and Foreign Funds and the Free Zones, as amended by Law No. 32 of 1977,
states that "projects may not be nationalised or confiscated... except by
judicial procedures" (Article 7) and offers the enterprises several privileges
and exemptions. The companies coming under this law are deemed to belong
to the private sector; and legislation and regulation applicable to the public
sector do not apply to them. For example, the conditions and procedures for
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electing labour representatives to the board of directors of public sector
enterprises do not apply to them except that the companies' own statutes shall
provide for labour participation in management by some method (Article 10).
Employees and board members are exempted from the provisions of Law No.
113 of 1961 that limits remuneration (Article 11).
Furthermore, the projects of the enterprises are exempted from a
variety of taxes (under article 16 and 17). Under Article 6 enterprises
established "entirely with Egyptian capital and owned by Egyptian nationals"
also enjoy many of the above-cited privileges. Joint ventures involving foreign
capital can be so organised as to allow "majority foreign ownership and
management control," with one exception, viz, banks, where the Egyptian
share should be at least 51 per cent (CitiBank, 1988).
There have been other elements of privatisation in government
policies. As regards the enterprises that stay in the public sector, the
government has established new policies in two important directions.
1. The managers are provided with a greater degree of autonomy that before.
In this regard, Handoussa (1980) refers to the measures of decentralisation
in control over public enterprises with the abolition of the General
Organisation, which were analogous to holding companies, and to the
granting of some autonomy to managers in the areas of employment, wage
payments and pricing.
2. The government has determined that there was no alternative to a careful
cost-benefit analysis of every project, to ensuring efficient implementation
of investment at the lowest costs possible, to the choice of efficient
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technical and management systems, and to the reducing of losses at every
stage of the production process (Ramanadham, 1987). The Plan document
(1982-87) is replete with such desiderata as "reconsidering the
management of the public sector to raise its productivity," reducing
subsidies, fixing prices on "economic basis," and 'fixing a remunerative
price that ensures a reasonable rate of profit enough to finance
investment." (The Five-Year- Plan's Pillars and Policies, 1982/83-
1986/87).
The empirical part of this paper is applied to the Egyptian Textile
Sector. According to the World Bank categories, Egypt is not categorised as
one of the Big Ten emerging markets and, at the same time, is not one of the
less developed countries any more. The Egyptian government started the
privatisation program and trade liberalisation by the end 1991 to take part of
the global economy. As most of the reform programs are in process, Egypt can
be considered an country in transition. Therefore, there is a need for the
Egyptian companies, and other companies in the same economic position as
well, to monitor its path of transition.
5.8 Monitoring Corporate Transitional Performance: An Empirical
Evidence
5.8.1 Research Variables
As mentioned above in the theoretical framework, the literature of
finance, corporate strategy, corporate governance and international business
result in number of ratios that are useful in monitoring transitional corporate
performance. Thirty one ratios are emphasised upon in the literature and,
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therefore, considered appropriate to the nature of the study. A list of these
ratios is provided in Appendix (5-1). To address the problem of
multicollinearity between and among those variables and to avoid its effects
on the final results, a correlation analysis is carried out and the correlation
matrix is provided in Appendix (5-2). As a result, seven out of the thirty one
variables were excluded from the analysis as their associated coefficients of
correlation are very high.
5.8.2 Data Normality
For testing the normality of the data, a 'chi-square goodness of fit'
(x 2 ) test is carried out for each of the variables used in the study. The results
are shows in table (5-2).
Table (5-2): The statistical results of x 2 test of the variables of corporate
transitional performancel
Variable p-value Variable p-value
BF/TF 0.061 Imp/Exp 0.053
COC 0.058 IWC 0.073
CU 0.052 RDP 0.003
Exp/I Exp 0.06 R&D/S 0.051
Exp/S 0.056 SGR 0.054
FC 0.071 S/TC 0.09
FCCP 0.052 Std 0.054
FD/TF 0.05 S/TM 0.001
GF/TF 0.074 TEG 0.051
GMS 0.062 VA/ATA 0.06
GTIPF 0.08 VQE 0.062
IF/TF 0.063 WC/S 0.055
The results in table (5-2) show that only two variables out of the
twenty four variables are not normally distributed (p-value< 0.05). This means
that 91.67% of the data is normally distributed.
1 The x 2 test is carried out at the significance level 95%.
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5.8.3 Data Validity
5.8.3.1 Content and construct validity
As the variables used in this study are drawn from relevant literature
that adequately provides a multi-dimensional perspectives for measuring
corporate performance, the variables are considered an adequate coverage of
the important content, therefore, they provide a good basis for content validity
(Nunnally, 1978). In addition, as the variables have been empirically examined
in other related studies in the literature of finance, corporate strategy, corporate
governance and international business, they provide an adequate evidence of
construct validity.
5.8.3.2 Discriminant validity
To test for discriminant validity (Podsakoff, and Organ, 1986) and, at
the same time, to address the issue of the dimenionality of the twenty four
ratios that are basically drawn from various literature, another multivariate
technique, the Principal Component Analysis (PCA - varimax rotated), is
carried out. The object of the analysis is to take a number of variables and find
combinations of these to produce indices, i.e., factors that are uncorrelated.
The lack of correlation is a useful property because it means that the factors
are measuring different dimensions in the data (Manly, 1998; Hair et al.,
(1995). Therefore, PCA is used to reduce the dimensionality of the data set.
That is, the original data variables are projected into new axes such that the
new variables, orthogonal to each other and thus uncorrelated, are linear
combinations of the old (Taller, 1981). The decision to include a variable in a
factor was based on factor loadings greater than 0.50 and all factors whose
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eigenvalue was greater than one were retained in the factor solution.
(Tabachnick and Fidel!, 1989; Hair et al., 1995). The results of the PCA
analysis are shown in table (5-3).
Table (5-3): The Principal Component Analysis (PCA-varimax rotated)
Variables Factor
1
Factor
2
Factor
3
Factor
4
Factor
5
Factor
6
Factor
7
Factor
8
BF/TF 0.65
COC I	 0.90
CU 0.55
Exp/I Exp 0.74
Exp/S 0.68
FC I	 0.76
FCCP 0.58
FD/TF 0.53
GF/TF 0.80
GMS 0.81 I
GTIPF [	 0.80 I
IF/TF 0.74
Imp/Exp I	 0.91 I
IWC I	 0.71
RDP 0.72
R&D/S 0.72
SGR 0.80
S/TC 0.64 I	 0.54
Std 0.80
S/TM 1	 0.71
TEG 0.84
VA/ATA 0.81
VQE 0.61
WC/S 0.84
Eigenvalue 5.20 2.94 2.78 1.98 1.70 1.45 1.37 1.16
Percentage
of Variance
21.7 12.3 11.6 8.3 7.1 6.00 5.7 4.9
Reliability
Analysis
alpha 0.55 0.66 0.70 0.70 0.79 0.51 0.51 0.77
F-Ratio 14.06
..
4.47 215.3 4.75 * 28.57 * 52.8 * 287.3 4.34
**
Significant at the significance level 99%.
Significant at the significance level 95%.
Table (5-3) shows a summary of the results of the Principal
Components Factor Analysis. It also shows that the dimensionality of the
twenty four variables could be reduced to eight dimensions. That is, the
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variables are loaded on eight factors that describe eight aspects of companies'
transitional performance. The eight factors accounts for 77.6 per cent of the
explained variance.
5.8.4 Data Reliability
A Reliability Analysis is carried out for each factor (Churchill, 1979;
Nunnally, 1967). The results in Table (5-3) show an acceptable Alpha
coefficients for each factor. Although three of the coefficients, range from 0.51
to 0.55, may be relatively low, they are acceptable considering that: (1) the
combination of the variables used in this study is new; (2) the research
instrument, the application of the Z-score model in the field of international
business in emerging countries in transition is new, and (3) the relatively high
volatility in the business environment in emerging countries in transition
affects the available data with some degree of noise or irregulatory.
5.8.5 Dimensionality of the Variables
The Principal Component Factor Analysis has resulted in loadings of
the twenty four variables on eight uncorrelated factors. Although each factor
includes various, and perhaps different, variables that emphasise more than on
dimension of corporate transitional performance, the factors could be readily
interpreted as it is shown in Table (5-4).
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Table (5-4): Dimensions of corporate transitional performance
Factor Variables Dimension
Factor 1 •	 Foreign Component in a
Company's Portfolio (FCCP)
•	 Internal Financing/Total
Financing (IF/TF)
•	 Sales/Total Capital (S/TC)
•	 Standardised measure of risk
(Std)
•	 Value Added/Average Total
Assets (VA/ATA)
•	 Foreign Debt/Total Financing
(FD/TF)
Viability of Financial
Transformation
Factor 2 •	 Banking Finance/Total Finance
(BF/TF)
•	 Governmental Finance/Total
Finance (GF/TF)
Proxy Measures of Alternative
corporate Governance Structures
Factor 3 •	 Growth in Market Share (GMS)
•	 Sales/Total Employees (S/TM)
•	 Variations in the availability of
Qualified Employees (VQE)
Company's Relative Market
Position
Factor 4 •	 Imports/Exports (Imp/Exp)
•	 Total Exports Growth (TEG)
•	 Exports/ Industry Exports
(Exp/I Exp)
Company's Position in the Process
of Internationalisation
Factor 5 •	 Cost of Capital (COC)
•	 Growth in Total Investments in
Production Facilities (GTIPF)
Inputs of Company's Competitive
Position
Factor 6 •	 Foreign Component (FC)
•	 Inventory Weeks of
Consumption (IWC)
•	 Sales/Total Capital (S/TC)
•	 Working Capital/Sales (WC/S)
Company's Strategic Aspects of
Investing Slack Resources
Factor 7 •	 Capacity Utilisation (CU)
•	 Exports/Sales (Exp/S)
•	 Rare of Defected Products
(RDP)
Degree of Success in Foreign
Markets
Factor 8 •	 R&D/Sales (RDS)
•	 Sustainable Growth Rate
(SGR)
Proxy Measures of Management of
Innovation
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5.8.6 Empirical Results
5.8.6.1 The drived Z-score model
Using a stepwise selection algorithm, it was determined that four
variables were significant predictors of grouping. The one discriminating
function with p-value less than 0.05 is statistically significant at the 95%
significance level. The discriminant function with its standardised coefficients
is as follows.
Z = 1.07 GF/TF + 1.24 BF/TF + 0.76 COC - 0.63 Std
Where Z = Overall score
GF/TF = Governmental Finance/Total Finance
BF/TF = Banking Finance/Total Finance
COC = Cost of Capital
Std = Standardised measure of risk
As the two groups are not in equal size, the model can be used
operationally by taking into account the prior probability estimates of each
group (Taffler, 1983, 1995). The prior probability ratio is an estimate of the
proportion of companies with a ratios profile more similar to that of group 1
(the privatised companies) and a ratios profile more similar to that of group 2
(the non-privatised companies). The estimated prior probability ratios are 0.23
for group 1 and 0.77 for group 2, resulting in a cut-off point of -1.21 on the Z-
Scale. Since the actual variable measurement units are not all comparable to
each other, simple observation of the discriminant coefficient is misleading.
Therefore, the final four variables profile is to show the relative contribution
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of each variable to the total discriminating power of the Z-score model, and
the interaction between them. The common approach used to assess the
relative contribution is based on measuring the proportion of the Mahalanobis
D 2
 -distance between the centriods of the two constituent groups accounted for
by each variable according to the following formula (Mosteller and Wallace,
1963; Taffler, 1981, 1983):
C j (r if 
4	
_
E c,( rif 	 is
i= 1
Where
P j --=-- The proportion of the D 2 -distance accounted for by ratio j
r if and r is = The means of the privatised and non-privatised groups for ratio i
respectively.
Table (5-5): Dimensions of the Z-model of corporate transitional performance
Variable Dimensions of
Transitional
Performance
Relative
Contribution*
%
Banking Finance/Total Proxy Measures of 33.51
Finance (BF/TF) Alternative Corporate
Governance Structures
Governmental 28.92
Finance/Total Finance
(GF/TF)
Cost of Capital (COC) Inputs of Company's 20.54
Competitive Position
Standardised Measure of Viability of Financial 17.03
Risk (Std) Transformation
100
Mosteller-Wallace measure.
The results in Table (5-5) indicate that the ratio of Banking
Finance/Total Finance (BF/TF) accounts for proportionally high percentage of
the total discriminatory power of the model, the next important variable is the
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ratio of Governmental Finance/Total Finance (GF/TF), then the company's
Cost of Capital (COC) and the last variable that accounts for the rest of the
discriminatory power is the Standardised measure of risk (Std).
5.8.6.2 The Accuracy-Matrix of the drived Z-score model
In the multi-group case, a measure of success of the discriminant
analysis is to be carried out. The results are shown in a classification table or
"Accuracy-Matrix," as shown in figure (5-6) (Altman, 1968).
Actual Group Membership 	 Predicted Group Membership
Privatised Non-privatised
Privatised H M1
Non-privatised M 2 H
Figure (5-6): The Accuracy-Matrix of the discriminant analysis
The actual group membership is equivalent to the a priori groupings
and the model attempts to classify correctly these companies. At this stage, the
model is basically explanatory. When new companies are classified, the nature
of the model is predictive. The H's stand for correct classifications (Hits) and
the M's stand for misclassification (Misses). M 1 represents a Type I error and
M 2 represents a Type II error. The jack-knife test, or Lachenbruch Holdout
Test, (Lachenbruch, 1967) is the readily statistical test for carrying out the
classification table. The final results of the jack-knife test are shown in table
(5-6). Therefore, Type I and Type II can be easily observed according to the
"Accuracy-Matrix" shown in figure 1. Type I = 0%, and Type II = 8.33%. In
this sense, the low values of Type I and Type II errors support our confidence
in the Alpha coefficient of the Reliability Analysis (Bagozzi et al., 1991).
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Table (5-6): Lachenbruch Holdout Test (jack-knife test)
Actual Group
Membership
No. of
cases
Predicted Group Membership*
Privatised	 Non-privatised
Privatised 7 7	 0
100.0%	 0%
Non-
privatised
24 2	 22
8.3%	 91.7%
. Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 93.55%. The output of the final results and
the disriminant scores of each company in the sample are presented in Appendix (5-3).
5.8.6.3 The drived Z model's Accuracy of Prediction
The accuracy of prediction can be carried out by two common and
practical tests: the first is to be done through secondary sample of privatised
companies, and the second is to be done through a secondary sample of non-
privatised companies. The essence of the two tests is to trace changes on Type
I and Type II errors respectively. As for the first test, fortunately Table (5-6)
shows that the drived Z model is hundred per cent accurate in predicting the
number of the privatised companies: Type I error literally does not exist at all.
This result is very accurate as long as the privatised companies are seven
companies, the same as the actual number of the privatised firms. When Type
I error does exist, it is very sensible to test the degree of its accuracy.
As for Type II error, the second test is carried out by choosing the non-
privatised companies to test for the prediction accuracy of the model in
classifying those companies. The grouping of the twenty four companies is
based on matching the size and market share of the initial privatised
companies used in the drived model. Nine companies did match the size and
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market share of the initial privatised companies. The results of the jack-knife
test of the twenty four companies are shown in Table (5-7).
Table (5-7): Lachenbruch Holdout Test (jack-knife test) [Accuracy of
Prediction]
Actual Group
Membership
No. of
cases
Predicted Group Membership *
Privatised	 Non-privatised
Privatised 9 6	 3
66.67%
	
33.33%
Non-
privatised
15 4	 11
26.67%
	
73.33%
Percent of "grouped" cases correctly classified: 70.83%.
Table (5-7) shows that the discriminant model correctly classified
73.33% of the non-privatised companies as actually non-privatised. The high
overall correction classification of 70.83% is another indicator of the degree of
accuracy of prediction. In fact, when the actually privatised companies are
taken into account, Type II error decreases to only 8.3%. This is good
indicator of the accuracy of prediction of the drived Z-score model.
The model developed in this chapter adds an additional scope to the
development and usage of these models by the inclusion of a substantial
number of corporate transformation-specific ratios. These ratios emphasise on
very important dimensions specially for the transitional emerging markets.
These dimensions enhance the credibility and validity of the business
strategies adopted in these markets. That is, after the transitional-specific ratios
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are included, the resulted model illustrates the multi-dimensional nature of the
process of corporate reform.
The final outcomes of a transitional-based Z-model are to be viewed as
strategies that need a major concern from both top management and public
policy makers. Thus a continuos development of transitional-based Z-models
helps to clear out the strategies and priorities that should be of major concern.
In this regard, Table (5-4) shows that the most important dimensions are the
Alternative Structures of Corporate Governance, Inputs of Company's
Competitive Position and Viability of Financial Transformation, respectively.
As for the first dimension, it emphasises on the conventional alternative
corporate governance structures: bank financing governance and/or
government financing governance. This dimension is considered as a matter of
reality in the transitional markets, where the financial structures of the
companies combine both of these two types of governance. Considering that
markets in transitional emerging countries are imperfect, the use of the Z
models for corporate monitoring in these countries can help reducing
monitoring costs and information costs. This helps, inter alia, bring about
good governance by corporate constituencies who are interested in corporate
reform in transitional emerging markets.
As for the second dimension, factor 5 in Table (5-3) indicates some of
the well-known inputs for building a competitive position: Cost of Capital and
Growth in Total Investment in Production Facilities. This means that the lower
the first variable and the higher the second one, the higher the competitive
position of a company that is getting ready to compete publicly.
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As for the last dimension, factorl in Table (5-3) shows that Foreign
Component in a Company's Portfolio, Standardised Measure of Risk and
Foreign Debt/Total Finance are the most important variables in monitoring the
Viability of Financial Transformation. This literally means that privatisation is
not a matter of capital transfer and/or capital restructuring as long as this
process is associated with some degree of risk. If the latter is high, the
privatisation process is expected to be very slow, and vice versa. This
conclusion is of great importance to the transitional emerging markets as the
recent crises in the emerging markets in East Asia should encourage public
policy makers to establish well-adaptable institutional infrastructures that can
reduce the degree of risk associated with the process of transition (Peng, 1993,
1994; Lee, eta!., 1998).
5.9 Conclusion
As this chapter is benefiting from the insights provided by the literature
of finance, corporate strategy, corporate governance and international
business, it can be considered as an extension to the literature that incorporates
the international, corporate and business research levels (Dess et al., 1995).
Accordingly, as the Z-model is built using a variety of measures that
demonstrate the financial, operational, and competitive phases of a company,
the model then can be used conveniently to monitor the transitional
performance of a public enterprise (PE) in the transitional economies.
The monitoring aspect of the Z-score model is important to transitional
economies as a study in corporate governance in transitional economies
(Pannier, 1996), indicates that corporate governance reform of public
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enterprises in transitional economies should enable the injection of transparent
rules and procedures instead of direct and personal interventions, and protects
public assets from undue appropriation by insiders. As an evidence, recent
studies show that improved corporate governance is particularly important in
the transitional economies because the institutional infrastructure are not
strong enough to provide fair measures of monitoring corporate performance
(Lieberman et al., 1997; Guislain, 1997). Accordingly, other measures that
provide checks on the behaviour of managers, such as rating companies,
brokers, financial investors that assess the performance of enterprises and the
capital market are yet to develop. From a public policy point of view, there has
also been an intense debate on the role of state and national competitiveness in
the age of global competition. Acknowledging the growing force of
globalisation, Dunning (1996) and Porter (1990) discuss the role of the state in
enhancing the competitiveness of national industries. This, once again,
emphasises on the role of public policy makers in adopting policies that
enhance the viability of financial transformation and companies' competitive
position. Therefore, the public sector in transitional countries can help in
emerging, rather than submerging, these countries' distinctive capabilities. In
addition, the model shows that privatisation is not the only option or mode of
transition as the governmental financing and banking financing relative
contribution are observed. The ultimate benefit from the development and the
use of transitional-based Z models is to provide market indices which can
help in allocating resources efficiently (Choi, 1997).
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As the in-depth quantitative research in emerging economies is
relatively new, it is constrained by the availability of data, the development
strategies adopted by the governments and the degree of success those
economies could realise. Therefore, further research can be carried out in other
emerging economies to build Z models for monitor the degree of convergence,
or divergence, between and among emerging countries, and between
emerging economies and the other two business systems, the Anglo-Saxon
system and Communitatian system. Although the Z model does not capture
the qualitative or the behavioural aspects of a business system, the components
of the model must be regarded as the first-order mechanism for monitoring
corporate observable and measurable quantitative, rather than hard-to-measure
qualitative, performance.
256
CONCLUSION OF PART TWO
Part two examined three interrelated issues in corporate governance.
Specifically, the results show that banks are to be considered good monitors of
corporate orientation towards stakeholders interests including shareholders
interests. In this sense, corporate stakeholders can be considered active
"Drivers of Identity," that help the company to strengthen its relative
competitive position in the marketplace. This necessitates the company to
release some relevant information their stakeholders, so to help them certify its
relative competitive position. This is examined by building Z-Score model for
monitoring corporate performance.
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PART THREE
CONCLUSION OF THE STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH
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Conclusion of the study
This study has explored the differences between the international
corporate governance modes on the basis of their inherent institutional
infrastructure that entails a certain mode to be preferable over others. In this
sense, the differences between and among the international corporate
governance modes are mainly due to differences in the institutional
orientations rather than the differences in corporate governance practices.
On that basis, this study examined three issues that can be considered
premises for addressing any institutional changes specially in emerging
markets. Furthermore, the important conclusion that can be drawn from this
study is the strong link between the financial and non-financial aspects of
corporate governance which ultimately leverage corporate competitiveness in
an age of diminishing business/country boundary.
Taking into account the institutional infrastructure in emerging
markets, the financial and non-financial aspects of corporate governance are to
be considered when the economic institutions in emerging markets are
adaptable and mature enough to perform business transactions without having
to incur drastic economic and/or social pitfalls that may go against enhancing
company/country competitiveness.
Future Research
There are some work that can be done in the future to extend the issues
examined in this study. They are as follows.
1. The issue of shareholders versus stakeholders orientation
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Further research is warranted on the following two areas. Firstly, a more
in depth analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of banking in stakeholder and
shareholder within the same country. Secondly, to analyse whether the inherent
collectiveness of stakeholder systems can lead to difficulties of adjustment to
rapid globalisation and dramatic change.
2. The issue of corporate identity
This issue is examined in banking industry as an example of the
financial services industries which is characterised by product intangibility.
Further research can be carried out in other industries which is characterised
by product tangibility. The comparison between the two cases will add new
insights to the issue of corporate identity as an additional governance structure.
3. The issue of monitoring corporate transitional performance.
This issue is basically applied to Egypt as an example of transitional
emerging countries. This idea can be further developed in other emerging
market not only the transitional markets but also the markets that have already
been emerged such as the Ten Big Emerging markets of which some of them
are recently facing institutional instability.
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APPENDICES
Appendix (3-1): The correlation matrix of the dependent variables (banks
performance measures)2
Y1 ' Y2 I- Y3 Y4 I Y5 Y6 Y7 I Y8 Y9 I Y10 Yll Y12 Y13
Y1 1.00
Y2 0.38 1.00
Y3 -0.35 -0.22 1.00
Y4 -0.42 -0.15 0.85 1.00
Y5 -0.41 -0.19 0.97 0.91 1.00
Y6 -0.13 -0.03 0.13 0.14 0.12 1.00
Y7 -0.15 0.12 0.20 0.21 0.21 0.36 1.00
Y8 0.22 0.16 -0.29 -0.19 -0.32 0.42 0.53 1.00
Y9 0.02 0.27 -0.25 0.07 -0.16 0.14 0.17 0.24 1.00
Y10 0.06 0.27 -0.27 0.05 -0.17 0.11 0.15 0.22 0.98 1.00
Y1 1 0.25 0.94 -0.14 -0.08 -0.09 -0.09 0.10 0.03 0.28 0.28 1.00
Y12 -0.37 -0.80 0.17 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.05 0.07 -0.25 -0.27 -0.88 1.00
Y13 -0.38 -0.84 0.21 0.12 0.15 0.20 0.04 0.05 -0.27 -0.28 -0.91 0.38 1.00
Appendix (3-2): List of the banks in the study
No BANK
1. BANQUE NATIONALE DE PARIS PLC
r	 2. WOODCHESTER CREDIT LYONNAIS PLC
3. YAMAICHI BANK (UK) PLC
4. ABC INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
5. LLOYDS TSB GROUP PLC
6. MIDLAND BANK PLC
7. NATIONAL WESTMINISTER BANK PLC
8. NORTHERN BANK
9. YORKSHIRE BANK PLC
10. ROYAL BANK OF SCOTLAND PLC
11. NATIONAL AUSTRALIA GROUP (UK) LTD
12. TSB BANK SCOTLAND PLC
13. ULSTER BANK LIMITED
14. BARCLAYS BANK PLC
15. TOKAI BANK EUROPE PLC
16. CITIBANK INTERNATIONAL PLC
17. BANK OF AMERICA INTERNATIONAL LTD
18. ITALIAN INTERNATIONAL BANK PLC
2 Y1 = Net Interest Income/Total Revenue, Y2 = Operating Income/Total Assets, Y3 = Liquid
Assets/Total Assets, Y4 = Liquid Assets/Deposits, Y5 = Liquid Assets/Deposits & Borrowing,
Y6 = Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Y7 = Reserves/Gross Loans, Y8 =
Provisions/Gross Loans, Y9 = Shareholders Equity/Total Assets, Y10 = Capital Funds/Total
Assets, Yll = ROI, Y12 = World Ranking (According to Return on Assets), Y13 = Country
Ranking (According to Return on Assets).
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19. NOMURA BANK INTERNATIONAL PLC
20. 31 GROUP PLC
21. FIRST NATIONAL BANK
22. COMMERZBANK
23. BANK OF NEW YORK
24. WHITEA WAY LAIDLAW BANK
25. CLYDESDALE BANK PLC
26. BRITISH ARAB COMMERCIAL BANK LIMITED
27. ABBEY NATIONAL TREASURY SERVICES
28. CO-OPERATIVE BANK PLC
29. LAZARD BROTHERS & CO. LIMITED
30. TOKYO-MITSUBISHI INTERNATIONAL PLC
31. CLIVE DISCOUNT COMPANY LIMITED
32. CHARTERHOUSE BANK LIMITED
33. WEST MERCHANT BANK HOLDINGS LIMITED
34. CATER ALLEN HOLDINGS PLC
35. DAIWA EUROPE BANK PLC
36. HMC GROUP PLC
37. KLEINWORT BENSON LTD
38. ANZ INVESTMENT BANK PLC
39. MERRILL LYNCH INTERNATIONAL BANK LIMITED
40. CAPITAL BANK PUBLIC LIMITED
41. ROYAL BANK OF CANADA EUROPE LIMITED
42. SCHRODERS PLC
43. STANDARD CHARTERED BANK PLC
44. BANKERS TRUST INTERNATIONAL PLC
45. YASUDA TRUST AND BANKING CO. LTD
46. BANK OF SCOTLAND
47. J. HENRY SCHRODERS & CO LIMITED
48. COUTTS & CO.
Appendix (3-3): Correlation matrix of Banks—Corporate Stakeholder
Orientation (the dependent variable is Profitability measures)3
Correlation matrix tor coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 fx2
CONSTANT	 1.0000
	 -0.3870
fx2	
-0.3870	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (3-4): Correlation matrix of Banks—Corporate Stakeholder
Orientation (the dependent variable is Liquidity position)4
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 fx4
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.3155
fx4	 -0.3155	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (3-5): Correlation matrix of Banks—Corporate Stakeholder
Orientation (the dependent variable is Capital adequacy)5
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 fx3
CONSTANT
	 1.0000	 -0.6226
fx3	 -0.6226	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
4
3
5 
fx4 = The financial phase of corporate governance.
fx2 = External relationship development.
fig = The orientation towards 'Stakeholders Management.'
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Correlation matrix or coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 fx3
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.6226
fx3	 -0.6226	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (3-6): Correlation matrix of Banks-Corporate Stakeholder
Orientation (the dependent variable is Asset quality)6
Appendix (4-1): Correlation matrix of the banks performance measures.7
Yl 1 Y12 I Y13 I Y21 I Y22 I Y23 I Y31 I Y32 I Y33 I Y41 I Y42 I Y43
Y 1 1 1
Y12 0.498 1
Y13 0.861 0.796 1
Y21 -0.25 -0.25 -0.17 1
Y22 -0.17 -0.53 -0.03 0.736 1
Y23 -0.13 -0.21 -0.09 0.962 0.74 1
Y31 0.16 0.192 0.269 0.117 0.685 0.214 1
Y32 0.212 0.265 0.335 0.1 -0.07 0.895 0.159 1
Y33 0.108 0.106 0.118 0.028 0.015 0.649 0.158 0.693
Y41 0.616 0.363 0.371 0.099 -0.12 0.236 0.235 0.628 0.792 1
Y42 0.622 0.413 0.419 0.064 -0.18 0.218 0.323 0.717 0.192 0.164 1
Y43 -0.05 0.423 -0.13 0.143 -0.49 0.089 0.048 0.08 -0.23 0.055 0.673 1
7 Yll= Operating Income/Total Assets, Y12 = Net Interest Income/Total Revenue, Y13=
ROA, Y21= Liquid Assets/Total Assets, Y22= Liquid Assets/Deposits, Y23 = Liquid
Assets/Deposits & Borrowing, Y31= Non-performing Loans/Total Loans, Y32=
Reserves/Gross Loans, Y33= Provisions/Gross Loans, Y41= Shareholders Equity/Total
Assets, Y42= Capital Funds/Total Assets, Y43= Deposits/Total Assets.
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6 fx3 = The orientation towards 'Stakeholders Management.'
p,
Appendix (4-2): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity when they
are emphasised (the dependent variable is ROA)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
CONSTANT Agex2 CE0x2
CONSTANT	 1.0000 -0.7501 -0.1900
gex2	 -0.7501 1.0000 -0.3552
CE0x2	 -0.1900 -0.3552 1.0000
he StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
resence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst th
• redictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (4-3): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity when they
are emphasised (the dependent variable is NPL)
orrelation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 COOX2
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.9010
COOX2	 -0.9010	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (4-4): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity when they
are emphasised (the dependent variable is SHE)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 Repux2
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.9229
Repux2	 -0.9229	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst th
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
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Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 Sizex2
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.9347
Sizex2	 -0.9347	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients i
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (4-5): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity when they
are emphasised (the dependent variable is DEP)
Appendix (4-6): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Highly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is ROA)
orrelation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 coox2
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.9169
coox2	 -0.9169	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst th
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (4-7): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Highly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is SHE)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
CONSTANT ceox2 coox2
CONSTANT 1.0000 -0.5561 -0.9014
ceox2 -0.5561 1.0000 0.3249
coox2 -0.9014 0.3249 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst th
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
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Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT
	 repux2
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.8770
repux2	 -0.8770
	
1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
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Appendix (4-8): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Highly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is DEP)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
CONSTANT ceox2 coox2 prof
CONSTANT 1.0000 -0.2811 -0.3680 -0.44
ceox2 -0.2811 1.0000 0.4259 -0.26
coox2 -0.3680 0.4259 1.0000 -0.39
profx2 -0.4436 -0.2660 -0.3919 1.00
repux2 -0.4726 -0.2782 -0.4890 0.49
repux2
CONSTANT -0.4726
ceox2 -0.2782
coox2 -0.4890
profx2 0.4993
repux2 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute value greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (4-9): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Lowly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is ROA)
Appendix (4-10): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Lowly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is NPL)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
	
CONSTANT	 ceox2
CONSTANT	 1.0000	 -0.8831
ceox2	 -0.8831	 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (4-11): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Lowly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is SHE)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
CONSTANT repux2 ceox2
CONSTANT 1.0000 -0.5530 -0.5817
repux2 -0.5530 1.0000 -0.2397
ceox2 -0.5817 -0.2397 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute values greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
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Appendix (4-12): Correlation matrix of banks' Drivers of Identity for 'Lowly
ranked banks': when they are emphasised (the dependent
variable is DEP)
Correlation matrix for coefficient estimates
CONSTANT agex2 profx2
CONSTANT 1.0000 -0.1589 -0.6046
agex2 -0.1589 1.0000 -0.4356
profx2 -0.6046 -0.4356 1.0000
The StatAdvisor
This table shows estimated correlations between the coefficients in
the fitted model. These correlations can be used to detect the
presence of serious multicollinearity, i.e., correlation amongst the
predictor variables. In this case, there are no correlations with
absolute value greater than 0.5 (not including the constant term).
Appendix (5-1): List of the variables used to build the Z-score model
Ratio Symbol
Return on Capital Employed ROCE
Profit Margin PM
Assets Turn AT
Growth in Market Share GMS
Value Added/Average Total Assets VA/ATA
Sustainable Growth Rate SGR
Internal Financing/Total Financing IF/TF
Debt-to-Equity Ratio DER
Foreign Component in a Company's Portfolio FCCP
Return on Investment ROT
Return on Sales ROS
Cash Flow/Investment CF/I
Sales/Total Employees S/TM
Sales/Total Capital S/TC
R&D/Sales R&D/S
Working Capital/Sales WC/S
Dividend Payout Ratio DPR
Governmental Financing/Total Financing GF/TF
Banking Financing/Total Financing BF/TF
Foreign Debt/Total Financing FD/TF
Inventory Weeks of Consumption IWC
Capacity Utilisation (or Unemployed Capacity) CU
Growth in Total Investments in Production
Facilities
GTIPF
Growth in Investment in R&D GIR&D
Variations in the availability of Qualified
Employees
VQE
Rate of Defected Products RDP
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Cost of Capital COC
Foreign Component FC
Imports/Exports Imp/Exp
Total Exports Growth TEG
Exports/Industry Exports Exp/I Exp
Exports/Sales Exp/S
Standardised measure of risk Std
Appendix (5-2): Correlation matrix of the variables used to build the Z-score
model
•
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Appendix (5-3): Output of the classification table (Accuracy-Matrix) of the
discriminant analysis*
Case	 Mis	 Actual	 Highest Probability	 2nd Highest Discrim
Number Val Sel Group
	
Group P(D/G) P(G/D) Group P(G/D) Scores
1 2 2 .4100 .9633 1 .0367 -.1457
2 2 2 .9358 .9959 1 .0041 .5977
3 2 2 .7043 .9990 1 .0010 1.0577
4 2 2 .6973 .9898 1 .0102 .2893
5 2 2
.0526 1.0000 1 .0000 2.6165
6 1 1 .9303 .9718 2 .0282 -2.4129
7 2** 1
.5193 .7930 2 .2070 -1.6811
8 2** 1
.7989 .9251 2 .0749 -2.07079 1 1
.4909 .7702 2 .2298 -1.636510 2 2
.7854 .9986 1 .0014 .950611 2 2
.8011	 .9985 1 .0015 .930112
13
2 2
.9971 .9968 1 .0032 .6747
14
2 2
.2900 .9999 1 .0001 1.7363
15
2 2
.1570 1.0000 1 .0000 2.0934
16
2 2
.5261 .9789 1 .0211 .0442
17
1
1
1
1
.3003 .5418 2 .4582 -1.2896
18 2 2
.7763 .9842 2 .0158 -2.6095
19 2 2
.5785 .9994 1 .0006 1.2339
20 2 2
.6738 .9888 1
.0112 .2574
21 1 1
.6055 .9851 1
.0149 .1617
22 .6842 .9890 2 .0110 -2.73221 1
.5142 .9947 2
.0053 -2.9777
270
23 2 2 .7799 .9986 1 .0014 .9577
24 1 1 .7687 .9847 2 .0153 -2.6195
25 2 2 .2499 .9999 1 .0001 1.8288
26 2 2 .7911	 .9929 1 .0071 .4133
27 2 2 .3734 .9998 1 .0002 1.5684
28 2 2 .9238 .9976 1 .0024 .7739
29 2 2 .5277 .9995 1 .0005 1.3097
30 2 2 .2273 .8925 1 .1075 -.5292
31 2 2 .5954 .9994 1 .0006 1.2093
, This table shows the results of using the derived discriminant functions to
classify observations. It lists the two highest scores amongst the classification
functions for each of the thirty one observations used to fit the model, as well
as for any new observations. For example, row 1 scored highest for Grouping
= 2 and second highest for Grouping = 1. In fact, the true value of Grouping
was 2. Amongst the thirty one observations used to fit the model, twenty nine
or 93.55% were correctly classified.
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